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THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR'S ROLE IN BANK REGULATION AND SUPERVISION: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN THE UK, GERMANY, ITALY AND THE US. 
5.1. Introduction 
This comparative analysis discusses the differences between the structure and systems of bank regulation 
operating in the UK, Germany, Italy and the US. The importance of harmonisation in achieving stated 
supervisory objectives is also emphasised. The main objective of this chapter is to illustrate how the external 
auditor's role could be harnessed more efficiently in the UK banking regulatory and supervisory process. 
This is of particular importance given the reduced supervisory role1 which the Bank of England has assumed 
since banking regulatory and supervisory powers and functions were transferred to the Financial Services 
Authority. External audits and in particular external auditors, have a greater role to play in bank regulation 
and supervision than was the case over 20 years ago. This is so mainly as a result of globalisation. The need 
for a single regulator which regulates not just the banking sector, but also the insurance and securities 
sectors, has arisen principally because of the rise of conglomerate firms. Single regulators are able to manage 
more effectively cross sector services' risks. Correspondingly, the functional overlaps between banking, 
insurance and securities business and their universal scope make it more difficult for a regulator to observe 
and comprehend such businesses.2 The difficulty of measuring and assessing risk within such institutions 
along with the speed with which assets can be adjusted in derivatives markets has led to more emphasis 
being placed on internal managerial control. 3 Consideration is also being given to the structures that can be 
put in place to re inforce the incentives of all parties involved – not just to management but all parties 
including auditors and regulators.4 
Because banking has evolved to a stage where conglomerates now have a significant presence  and provide a 
range of services (and not just banking services), and because of the growing presence of international firms, 
the role of the external auditor has become so important. 
Since 2001, large listed companies in Germany have increasingly used US or International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRSs) accounting for their consolidated statements.5 The presence of international 
accounting firms calls for greater harmonisation efforts in relation to international accounting standards as 
this would facilitate better and more effective enforcement procedures.6 However, there are various obstacles 
to harmonisation (and in particular, to EU harmonisation) because of the nature of the audit profession in 
various EU jurisdictions. The nature of the audit profession contributes to the type of accounting that is 
practised and that could be practised.7  A 1975 Decree in Italy which required listed companies to have 
extended audits similar to those operating in the UK and the US could only be brought into effect during the 
                                                 
1  The Bank of England is involved in (but not responsible for) bank supervision through the process whereby it 
exchanges information with the FSA for bank supervisory purposes. In that sense, it still makes vital contribution to 
the regulatory and supervisory process. For more on this, see the Memorandum of Understanding between HM 
Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority (2006) paragraph 1 
 
2 CAE Goodhart  (ed)  'The Emerging Framework of Financial Regulation   ( Central Banking Publications Ltd  
London 1998) 95-96 
3 ibid 
4 ibid 
5 C Nobes and R Parker Comparative International Accounting  (Prentice Hall London , Ninth Edition) 569 
6 Major reasons for foreign banks establishing their physical presence in the early 60s in the UK resulted from the 
prominence of London as an international financial centre, the absence of entry restraints and a flexible regulatory 
treatment. The number of foreign banks steadily grew between 1962 and 1982 from 51 to 232. The economic 
potential and performance of the German economy, the strong presence of foreign owned non-financial enterprises 
and the importance of German foreign trade have played a part in motivating the establishment of foreign bank 
offices in Germany. In Italy, the servicing of multinational corporations and trade financing have been the principal 
initiatives for the growth of foreign banking presence there. See RM Pecchioli 'Trends in Banking Structure and 
Regulation in OECD Countries, The Internationalisation of Banking: The Policy Issues  [1983] 68 
7 C Nobes and R Parker Comparative International Accounting p 27 
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1980s because of the substantial increase in the number of international accounting firms.8 
Effective supervision on a global consolidated basis and the internationalisation of banking generally, calls 
for close co-operation between national supervisors. It is therefore of great significance that although several 
obstacles have been encountered, immense progress has been made over the past decade in developing a 
multilateral framework based on the Basel Committee Banking Regulatory and Supervisory practices.9  
This chapter amongst other objectives, aims to show why it is important for the FSA to use specialists such 
as external auditors to make up for (but not substitute for) the Bank of England's reduced presence in the 
supervision process. The benefits of the central bank's involvement in banking supervision in jurisdictions 
such as Germany, Italy and the US will be considered as part of the first main investigational objective, 
which is, the rationale for a single regulator.  
The perceived advantage of the German system over the UK system of financial supervision is due to the 
fact that Germany's central bank, the Bundesbank still retains supervisory functions (naturally as well as 
monetary policy setting functions) whilst benefiting from attributes of a single regulator (one of such 
attributes being the ability of a single regulator to manage cross sector services' risks more effectively). In 
contrast, the UK system of financial services supervision comprises a system whereby banking supervisory 
functions of the central bank have been transferred to its single regulator, the Financial Services Authority. 
However, certain disadvantages also feature within the German system of banking regulation and 
supervision as will be seen later on in this chapter. 
Through an analysis and comparison of primary sources such as the Financial Services and Markets Act 
(FSMA) 2000, das Gesetz ueber das Kreditwesen, Gesetz ueber die Bundesanstalt fuer 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, the Italian Legislation , Law 262 of December 2005 and relevant US federal 
and state statutes, a basis will be provided as to how important the central bank's role is in the bank 
supervisory process. The historical background of banking institutions of the jurisdictions being investigated, 
objectives of the central banks and bank regulators of these jurisdictions will also be considered. In addition 
to the primary sources already mentioned, other primary and secondary sources such as annual reports from 
the central banks  will also be considered.  
 
Other aspects of the jurisdictional analysis relating to Germany, Italy and the US include the second main 
investigational aim of this chapter, their approaches to risk-based supervision. Risk based regulation is a 
growing phenomenon across several jurisdictions and external auditors can play an important role not only in 
risk based regulation, but also in the Basel II process. They can assist in the validation process of the 
advanced techniques used for measurements under the Basel II Accord.10 
In addition to this role, external auditors can also help the regulator in the process of obtaining information 
which the regulator needs to assess whether a regulated institution is complying with required standards. If 
the external auditor's roles in bank regulation and supervision are to be effective, then safeguards and 
measures need to be in operation in order to protect his independence.  
The third major investigational aim explores safeguards in place to protect the external auditor's 
independence in these jurisdictions. Ethical guidance issued by international bodies such as La Federation 
des Experts Comptables Europeens (FEE), the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) and activities 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Independent Standards Board in the US have 
facilitated discussions on the issue of the independence of the external auditor.11  
Safeguards to auditor independence in some countries are considered to be barriers to promoting a single 
                                                 
8 Ibid p 27 
9 'Trends in Banking Structure and Regulation in OECD Countries'  [1987]  14-15  
10 E Huepkes 'The External Auditor and the Bank Supervisor: Sherlock Holmes and Doctor Watson?'  (2005)  7 No1/2 
Journal of Banking Regulation 
11  J Stevenson 'Auditor Independence: A Comparative Descriptive Study of the UK, France and Italy' [2002] 
International Journal of Auditing 155 
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European audit market. The Italian position on the issue of auditor independence differs considerably from 
that adopted by the UK profession and such differences have understandably led to difficulties in 
harmonisation12. The European Commission issued a Consultative Paper dealing with fundamental 
principles on statutory auditor independence to be adopted by Member states into their own regulation.13 
This EC Paper, has to a large extent, been influenced by the UK position on the issue of auditor 
  (FEE) which represents major European professional accounting bodies 
lso contributed a paper to this debate. 
 threat to auditor independence include: 
might result to them  being reluctant to take 
ould be adverse to the interests of the audit firm.20 
l statements and may be 
 independence include23 : Management threat, advocacy threat, familiarity 
independence.14  
It had been intended that the EC's Eighth Council Directive would harmonise the regulation of auditors in the 
European Union.15 The Directive considers the harmonisation of the conditions for the approval of 
auditors.16 It also deals with auditor competence, integrity, independence and liability.17 As regards the issue 
of auditor independence, the Directive assigns authority to Member States for making sure that statutory 
auditors are sufficiently independent of clients whom they are auditing.18 The Green Paper, which was 
published in 1996, deals with the role, position and liability of statutory auditors in the EU.19 The Federation 
des Experts Comptables Europeens
a
 
Categories of
Self Interest 
This arises when auditors have financial or other interests which 
actions that w
Self Review 
This arises when the results of a non audit service performed by the auditors or by others within the audit 
firm are included in the figures disclosed in the financial statements.21 As a result of providing non audit 
service, the audit firm is associated with aspects of the preparation of the financia
unable to give an objective view of relevant aspects of those financial statements.22 
Other threats to objectivity and
threat and  intimidation threat. 
Safeguards which may reduce these  threats include a combination of personal qualities (integrity and 
reputation) and protective measures ensuing from both the practice environment and the profession itself.24 
Protective measures could include staff training, encouragement to discuss concerns between staff, second 
partner review, audit partner rotation in assignments, meticulous screening of all new engagements or 
                                                 
12 Also see C Nobes and R Parker Comparative International Accounting at p 95,100 
 J Stevenson 'Auditor Independence: A13  Comparative Descriptive Study of the UK, France and Italy' [2002] 
tional Journal of Auditing 155 
16 ture of Audit Firms : Incorporation in the UK and Germany' 
17  Comparative Descriptive Study of the UK, France and Italy' [2002] 
tional Journal of Auditing 156 
ibid 
ww.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm
Interna
14  ibid 
15  Ibid p 156 
L Evans and C Nobes 'Harmonisation of the Struc
(1998) 7 The European Accounting Review 125 
  J Stevenson 'Auditor Independence: A
Interna
18  ibid 
19  
20 Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraph  28 
<http://w > (last visited 12 January 2007) 
24  Comparative Descriptive Study of the UK, France and Italy' [2002] 
tional Journal of Auditing 165 
21 ibid 
22 ibid 
23 ibid 
  J Stevenson 'Auditor Independence: A
Interna
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existing ones before re-accepting.25 Small firms in the UK are advised to consult the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Scotland (ICAS) if some of the mentioned safeguards are inappropriate.26 In addition, firms 
should consider the involvement of third parties where there is perception of a significant threat to 
objectivity.27 The UK audit profession has established certain independence safeguards which include the 
support for members through an Ethics Secretariat and Committee, the monitoring of audit work and 
policing of complaints and the ethical code.28 In addition, the Working Party Review (ICAEW 2000) has 
ade numerous recommendations aimed at strengthening the ethical guidance.29 
ent will then follow with a conclusion which embraces proposals for 
forms on the topics being considered. 
r Italy. For an in-depth analysis of the role of the external 
uditor in general, please refer to chapter three. 
5.2. ome Causes of  International Differences  in Auditing 
es in the behaviour of auditors is explained 
nting values namely:30 
ry control 
 
te to measurement and 
isclosure.31 In addition to cultural differences, there also exist colonial differences. 
                                                
m
 
As the fourth main investigational aim, the expectations gap will also be discussed but would only be 
considered briefly. Comparisons of the aspects being investigated will be undertaken between the UK, 
Germany, Italy and the US. An assessm
re
 
Limitations of this Research 
Generally, more in depth analysis and comparisons will be carried out between the UK and Germany since 
Germany is the only country out of all three (itself, Italy and the US), which has adopted a single financial 
services regulator. However, some other comparative aspects will also be discussed in greater detail between 
the UK and the remaining jurisdictions being investigated. Because of the importance attached to investor 
protection in the UK and the US, the issue of audit independence will be explored in greater depth, on a 
comparative level between the US and the UK. The roles of external auditors in investor protection being 
greater in these jurisdictions than in Germany o
a
 
S
 
Cultural Differences  
An approach which may well explain the international differenc
through Gray's contrasting pairs of accou
Professionalism versus statuto
Uniformity versus flexibility 
Conversatism versus optimism
Secrecy versus transparency 
Whilst the first two relate to authority and enforcement, the second two rela
d
 
Legal Systems 
 
25  ibid 
26  ibid 
27  ibid 
28  Ibid p 166 
29  Ibid  
30 Ibid p 18 
31 Ibid p 19 
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The influence of common law (the UK and the US) and codified Roman law (Italy and Germany) on the 
nature of a jurisdiction's accounting rules is evidenced by the fact that common law systems influence 
commercial law – which traditionally does not prescribe rules to cover the behaviour of companies or how 
they should prepare their financial statements.32 Accounting within such common law systems, are to a large 
extent, not dependent upon law as was evidenced by the UK till the UK Companies Act 1981 came along.33 
Accountants establish rules which may later become recommendations or standards and the difference 
between this and codified systems exists in that company law or commercial codes for codified systems need 
34
' or 'Continental European' is 
nction between Anglo-American and Continental European accounting, 
lower and Nobes have started to clutch at straws. The[y] both make offensive attacks on the people 
                                                
to establish rules for accounting and financial reporting.  In Germany, for example, company accounting 
constitutes to a large extent, a branch of company law.35 
However, Cairns36 questions the appropriateness of trying to classify and identify causes of international 
differences since these cannot be depended upon in order to explain differences in practice. The 
appropriateness of classifying certain accounting practices as 'Anglo-American
also addressed and he highlights the fact that some French and German companies are moving towards US or 
international practices where the issue of financial reporting was concerned.37  
As a result of these arguments, six observations are made by Cairns namely that:38 'The distinction between 
Anglo-American accounting and Continental European accounting is becoming less and less relevant and 
more and more confused' ; secondly, 'Those who continue to favour these classifications are ignoring what is 
happening in the world and how companies actually account for transactions and events' ; thirdly, 'It is 
increasingly apparent that the different economic, social and legal considerations which have influenced 
national accounting do not necessarily result in different accounting'; fourthly, 'There are now probably far 
more similarities between American and German accounting than there are between American and British 
accounting'; fifth, 'The futility of attempting to classify accounting was well demonstrated' ; and finally, 'In 
their attempts to maintain the disti
F
involved in the work of the IASC.' 
 
Nobes responds to these observations and particularly the fourth observation, by referring to the 1996 annual 
report of Daimler which stated that German and US accounting principles were based on different 
perspectives.39 The principle of caution and creditor protection is identified by the German 
Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB) as being of greater emphasis and this is distinguished from the main objective of 
US accounting – which is the availability of relevant information for shareholder decision making.40 It is 
therefore concluded that comparability of financial statements are of greater importance under US 
accounting than under the HGB.41 Whilst Cairns may be right to conclude that there are more similarities 
between American and German accounting, it may be more difficult establishing his claim that those 
similarities are greater than those which exist between American and British accounting. As discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter,  large listed companies in Germany are increasingly using International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRSs) accounting for their consolidated statements. However, to say that similarities 
between German and US firms are greater than those which exist between UK and US firms, would be to 
discount and discredit the fundamental importance placed in the objectives of accounting – as determined by 
the users of financial information in these jurisdictions. Whilst German objectives may focus on creditor 
protection as per the German Handelsgesetzbuch, UK and US accounting, being capital market systems 
 
32 Ibid p 20 
33 ibid 
34 ibid 
35 Ibid p 20 
36 See D Cairns  'The Future Shape of Harmonisation: A Reply' (1997) 6 (2) European Accounting Review 316-317 
37 Ibid at pp 307-308 
38 Ibid pp 316-317 
39 See C Nobes 'The Future Shape of Harmonisation: Some Responses'  (1998) 7(2) European Accounting Review 326 
40  ibid 
41 ibid 
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place greater value on audits (as will be shown later on during the comparative section of this chapter) and 
this is largely as a result of the composition of the users of financial information in these jurisdictions. As a 
sult of the existing similarities attributed by users of financial information in the UK and the US, 
ich are principles based 
ersus rules based accounting may provide further support for Cairns argument that similarities between 
erman and US firms are greater than those similarities between UK and US firms. 
First Investigative Aim : The Rationale for a Single Regulator 
ons being investigated, this section considers the 
 of a coherent and  “truly integrated” approach in achieving stated supervisory objectives. The 
entral bank in supervision is also emphasised. 
ittee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International Association 
f Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
47
                                                
re
similarities also prevail between the UK and the US in terms of the providers of finance. 
 
Another blurring area of the Anglo-American and the Continental European distinction is due to the fact that 
it is increasingly the case that shares in the UK and the US are held by institutional rather than individual 
shareholders – however, this still contrasts with state, bank or family holdings.42 Differences between UK 
and US accounting (as will be discussed later on during the chapter), amongst wh
v
G
 
5.3 
 
Since the UK and Germany are the only jurisdictions (amongst those being investigated), who have actually 
adopted a single financial services regulator, the main focus of jurisdictional comparison will be between 
these two countries. The most important differences to note between Germany and the UK are: The degree of  
involvement of Germany's central bank in the supervisory process and the fact that Germany has not yet 
implemented an integrated supervisory approach between its banking, insurance and securities sectors. An 
“umbrella type” of supervision exists here whereby these sectors operate functionally under one regulator, 
the Federal Financial Supervisory Office, Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht – BaFin. In 
addition to highlighting the importance of historical, cultural and economic factors in determining the 
structure of financial regulation across the four jurisdicti
importance
role of the c
Germany 
As far back as the early 1990s, the issue of financial conglomerates supervision has been prominent in 
various academic literature.43 The objective of supervising such conglomerates was to capture effectively 
risks generated by various types of businesses and their associations.44 In response to the blurring distinction 
between bank, insurance and investment sectors, many countries including Germany, have created a single 
financial services regulator. The rise of conglomerates has led to growing internationalisation of accounting 
and hence the growing importance of transparency and increasing reliance on financial statements in 
countries such as Germany and Italy where fewer listed companies exist in comparison to the UK and the 
US.45 At international level, the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates established in 1996, was created in 
response to the issue.46 The Basel Comm
o
work together within the Joint Forum.  
 
The lack of a significant body of private shareholders and public companies in countries such as Italy and 
Germany obviates the reduced role played by auditors in these jurisdictions when compared to such 
jurisdictions such as the UK and the US.48 However there is growing realisation of the importance of audits 
 
42 C Nobes and R Parker  Comparative International Accounting  at p 22  
43 See Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘Supervision of Financial Conglomerates in Germany’ Monthly Report (April 2005)  47 
44 ibid 
45 C Nobes and R Parker Comparative International Accounting  p 20 
46 See Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘Supervision of Financial Conglomerates in Germany’ Monthly Report (April 2005) 47 
47 ibid 
48 C Nobes and R Parker Comparative International Accounting  p 27 
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in Germany and Italy in that the respective governments have recognised the importance of requiring public 
r listed companies to publish detailed, audited financial statements even though there are fewer listed 
49
f Central Banks), the Banking Advisory Committee, Groupe de Contact, the International Organisation of 
ecurities Commissions, the Financial Stability Forum and the Committee on the Global Financial System.51 
 The Bank of England's 
lationship with the government, in contrast, was not clearly defined – even though it was nationalised in 
946, it still occupied an independent position between the market and the state.56 
"Act Establishing the Federal Financial 
legal and functional supervision of the Federal Ministry of Finance.  It is funded entirely 
                                                
o
companies when compared to the UK and the US.  
 
Today, prudential regulations in Germany are based to a great extent on international standards and on the 
Basel Capital Accord and the EC Directives in particular.50 The Deutsche Bundesbank has been a member of 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision since its inception and also works with other international 
banking supervisory bodies such as the Banking Supervision Committee of the ESCB ( the European System 
o
S
 
Banking  Supervision in Germany 
Banking supervision in Germany is carried out by its central bank, the Deutsche Bundesbank in close 
collaboration with the Federal Financial Supervisory Office, Bundesanstalt fuer 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht – BaFin). Prior to this present model, Germany had a separate agency, the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt fuer das Kreditwesen (BAK – federal banking supervisory office) and supervision 
arrangements were not like those which existed then in the UK where supervision was organised as a 
department within the central bank, the Bank of England.52 As with the Federal Banking Supervisory Office 
(Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht – BaFin), the Bundesaufsichtsamt fuer das Kreditwesen 
was also required to collaborate with the Bundesbank and relied on information from the Bundesbank.53  The 
Bundesbank enjoys such independence that neither the government nor legislature are willing to grant it 
powers beyond those contained in the Bundesbank law.54 The Bundesaufsichtsamt fuer das Kreditwesen 
enjoyed wide powers but was still controlled by the Ministry of Finance.55
re
1
 
The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht -  BaFin) was 
established on 1 May 2002 and the legal basis for its creation is the 
Supervisory Authority " (Gesetz über die Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht - 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsichtsgesetz - FinDAG) of 22 April 2002.57 
BaFin is an amalgamation of the three former Federal Supervisory Offices responsible for banking (the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen - BAKred), the insurance industry (the Bundesaufsichtsamt für das 
Versicherungswesen - BAV) and securities trading (the Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel – 
BAWe). BaFin is a public-law institution with legal capacity reporting directly to the Federal Government 
and subject to the 58
out of fees and contributions from the institutions and companies that it supervises and is independent of the 
Federal budget.59 
 
49 Ibid p 23 
50 Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision p 39 
51 Ibid p 40 
52 See HR Vieten ‘Banking Regulation in Britain and Germany Compared: Capital Ratios, External Audit and Internal 
Controls’ (PhD thesis, London School of Economics 1996) 62, 63 
53 Ibid p 71 
54 Ibid pp 62, 63 
55 Ibid p 71 
56 ibid 
57 <http://www.bafin.de/bafin/aufgabenundziele_en.htm#n1> 
58 ibid 
59 ibid 
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BaFin was set up in response to global changes and developments within the financial services sector, 
ndamental changes which required a legislative response in order to secure the future stability of the 
erman financial system.60  
ts, 
tantive law, the Banking Act (Gesetz ueber das Kreditwesen) 
 which could endanger assets entrusted to institutions, disrupt the 
e  Bundesbank system, with its main 
ignificant  role the Bundesbank  will  play  in  banking  supervision, and that  is  the reason, 
hy I  would  like  to  call  the  new  BaFin a ‘modified’ single regulator as compared to the British FSA, for 
xample…-67   
others 
                                                
fu
G
 
The  Banking  Act Gesetz  ueber das Kreditwesen (Kreditwesengesetz – KWG), is  the legal basis for banking  
supervision in Germany  and  it aims  at safeguarding  the  viability of the banking  industry – which is  
particularly sensitive  to fluctuations, by protecting  creditors. The German Banking Act consists of six par
each part subdivided into divisions. There are sixty – four sections covering the six parts of  the Act 
(Kreditwesengesetz , KWG  last  amended  through Article 5 of  the  law of  5th April 2004, BGBI.IS.502). 
It is however interesting to note that the subs
was not replaced – as is the case with the UK where the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 came into 
force, replacing previous banking legislation. 
Section 6 of the Banking Act delegates the central role in banking supervision to the Federal Financial 
Supervisory Office. In addition to licensing, monitoring and (where necessary), closing individual 
institutions, the tasks of the Federal Authority also include issuing general instructions which lay down rules 
for carrying out banking business and providing financial services and for limiting risks.61 It can do this by 
issuing principles and regulations.62 The Federal Authority's duties also include resolving issues in the 
banking and financial services sector
orderly conduct of banking business or the orderly provision of financial services or lead to considerable 
problems for the economy as a whole. 
The legislature provided for the Bundesbank to be  involved  in  banking  supervision  having  recognised 
that functions of the authority responsible for banking  supervision  and those of the central bank are 
interconnected.63 Participation of the Bundesbank was considered necessary since the then Federal Banking 
Supervisory Office had no substructure of its own.64  It  was only th
offices  and  branch  offices that  permitted efficient  and  cost-effective supervision, at local level, of the 
over 4000 credit institutions  in  the  Federal  Republic of  Germany.65 
There is clear division of functions between the Federal Financial Supervisory Office and the Bundesbank in 
the area of banking supervision.66 When asked what made the German  approach so  special,  Jochen  Sanro, 
President  of  the  Federal Banking Supervisory Office of Germany responded  by  saying: - The answer, of 
course, is  the s
w
e
 
BaFin  has  3  main  objectives :68 
- To  ensure  the  functioning  of  the  entire  financial  industry  in  Germany.  From this objective, 2 
can be inferred: 
 
60 K Mwenda and J Mvula 'A Framework for Unified Financial Services Supervision: Lessons from Germany and 
Other European Countries' (2003) 5 Journal of International Banking Regulation  37 
61 <http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_bafin.en.php> 
62 ibid 
63  T Filipova  ‘ Concept  of  Integrated Financial  Supervision  and  Regulation  of Financial Conglomerates : The 
Case of  Germany and the UK’  (2003 ) 1 
64  ibid 
65  ibid 
66  ibid 
67   Mwenda and  Mvula  ‘ A Framework for Unified Financial Services Supervision’  (2003)  5  Journal of  
International  Banking Regulation  39 
68  ibid p 37; Also see <http://www.bafin.de/bafin/aufgabenundziele_en.htm#n1> 
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- To  safeguard  the  solvency  of  banks,  financial  services  institutions  and  insurance  undertakings 
aFin maintains that as a unified regulatory agency, it would be able to develop more effective rules in 
anking and financial services sector which may endanger the safety of the assests 
ntrusted to institutions, impair the proper conduct of banking business or provision of financial services or 
volve serious disadvantages for the economy...”70 The insurance and securities industry also have their 
banking crisis.   Taking into consideration all the surrounding events, the German Reich's Government 
issued out various emergency decrees which included the Ordinance Governing Stock Corporation Law, 
                             
- To protect clients and investors. 
 
B
managing risk – as compared to all previous financial regulators.69 
 
According to the Banking Act section 6, the objective of banking regulation is “ ...to counteract undesirable 
developments in the b
e
in
separate objectives.71 
 
Development of Banking Supervision in Germany. 
Since the introduction in Germany of general state banking supervision, the central bank the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, has  played an integral role in supervision.72  This prominent role  has continued over the years 
and the Banking Act facilitates the Bundesbank's participation in the monitoring of institutions73. One of the 
early examples of official banking regulation can be traced back to the Nuremberg Bancomat in 1621.74  The 
Reichsbank was established in 1875 and proposals for state supervision of banks were discussed – however, 
these were abandoned.75 This was so even though Germany had witnessed a series of bank failures over the 
past decades. The Rheinisch – Westfaelische Bank and the Vereinsbank Berlin failed in 1891 and the 
Dresdner Credit Anstalt and Leipziger Bank had collapsed in 1901.76  As a result of the importance of credit 
institutions  financing the German industrial revolution, the Reichsbank extended its powers from monetary 
policy to controlling the credit sector.77  In 1931, the Austrian banking crisis extended to Germany and led to 
the collapse of Danatbank.78 That same year, the banking crisis triggered the adoption of state supervision of 
all banks carrying out operations in Germany.79 A banking supervisory body  governing all the German 
banks was set up for the first time on September 19 1931 by the Emergency Decree of the Reich President on 
Companies Law, banking Supervision and Fiscal Amnesty.80 In addition to specifying licensing criteria, the 
supervisory authority also arranged for regular monitoring of the banks.81 The New York stock market crash 
of 1929, “Black Friday”, had negative effects on the Great Depression which in turn, worsened the 1931 
82
                    
72 
73  ‘The Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision' Monthly Report 
74 mpared: Capital Ratios, External Audit and Internal 
s’ (PhD thesis, London School of Economics 1996)  57 
ieten p 58 
80 , ‘The Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision' Monthly Report 
ember 2000) 32 
ry of Banking Supervision ' < http://www.bafin.de/bafin/historie_ba_en.htm> 
69  ibid p 38 
70 T Filipova (2006) 89 
71 See VAG section 81 and WpHG section 41 respectively 
See 'Bundesbank – Banking Supervision-Motives and Aims' < 
http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_motive.en.php> 
 Deutsche Bundesbank,
(September 2000)  31 
See HR Vieten ‘Banking Regulation in Britain and Germany Co
Control
75 ibid 
76 See V
77 ibid 
78 ibid 
79 See 'History of Banking Supervision ' < http://www.bafin.de/bafin/historie_ba_en.htm> 
Deutsche Bundesbank
(Sept
81 ibid 
82 'Histo
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Banking Supervision and Tax Amnesty in September 1931.83 These became the foundation for a uniform 
system of state supervision – applicable to all banks.84 Prior to this, only particular groups85 or targeted 
fields of banking86 had been supervised.87 Up till the start of the 1930s, Germany's banking sector had been 
operating in accordance with the principle of “Gewerbefreiheit”, which meant the freedom of trade and 
commerce – which was of great importance in the German Industrial Code of 1869.88 The occurrence of the 
1931 German banking crisis led to the establishment of the emergency decree of September 1931 – its aim 
being the stabilisation of the whole financial sector.89 A more detailed legislative framework for banking 
supervision was introduced as part of the Banking Act ( Kreditwesengesetz – KWG) which was adopted on 
the 5th December 1934 and it superseded the Emergency Decree.90  After World War II, banking supervision 
was at first, carried out by the individual states within Germany's new federal system. There was no uniform 
91 
                                    
regulatory framework till the Banking Act of July 10 1961 was passed.
 The years following the Second World War saw the Banking Act of 1934 amended in several instances. 
These amendments resulted from difficulties connected to the implementation of framework regulations, lack 
of clarity regarding certain areas of jurisdiction and proposals suggested by western allies.92  The Banking 
Act of 1939 gave powers of prudential responsibilities to the Reich Banking Supervisory Office which 
reported directly to the Reich Minister of Economics.93 The Bundesbank was established as an independent 
monetary body in 1957 – with the establishment of the Bundesausichtsamt fuer das Kreditwesen (BAK) 
following  in 1961.94 After many years of work, Germany's new “Gesetz ueber das Kreditwesen” (Banking 
Act version of 10 July 1961) was eventually adopted on 1 January 1962.95 This Act was aimed at fostering 
order within the financial system at a general level whilst preserving the efficiency and stability of the 
financial sector.96 The Banking Act of 1961 resulted in responsibility for banking supervision becoming 
centralised once again – after decentralisation had occurred by the Western military governments after the 
end of the Second World War.97 Despite opposition by a number of Bundeslaender as to the concentration of 
banking supervisory powers within a single federal body, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the 
Banking Act was in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law, Grundgesetz, in June 1962.98  The 
Federal Banking Supervisory Office was granted sovereign responsibility with the Act making provision for 
             
 savings banks in Prussia since 1838 - as well as mortgage banks since 1899 ; ibid  
 under the Safe Custody Act and the Exchange Act of 1896; ibid 
90 
83 ibid 
84 ibid 
85 Public
86 Those
87 ibid 
88 ibid 
89 ibid 
ibid 
91 See ' Development of Banking Supervision after the Second World War ' , < 
www.law.nyu.edu/centralbankscenter/texts/ Deutsch_Bundesbank_Banking_Act > 
See 'History of Bankin92 g Supervision' < http://www.bafin.de/bafin/historie_ba_en.htm> 
sbank, ‘The Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision' Monthly Report 
95 g Supervision' < http://www.bafin.de/bafin/historie_ba_en.htm> 
undesbank, ‘The Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision' Monthly Report 
97 
98 
93 Deutsche Bunde
(September 2000) 32 
94 Vieten at pg 58 
See 'History of Bankin
96 Deutsche B
(September 2000) 32 
ibid 
See 'History of Banking Supervision' < http://www.bafin.de/bafin/historie_ba_en.htm> Some of the Laender had 
argued that establishing a superior Federal authority was unconstitutional due to the fact that it was not provided for 
by Article 87(3) sentence 1 of the Constitution. However, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled on July 24 196
that the Banking Act was actually consistent with the Constitution. It observed further that the functions which the 
Banking Act delegated to the Bundesbank pursuant to Article 88 of the Constitution was within its operational 
jurisdiction as a central bank. In explaining its decision further, the Court stated that the central bank had alw
been involved in banki
2 
ays 
ng supervision and that issues of monetary policy and banking supervision were linked. See   
Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘The Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision' Monthly Report 
(September 2000) 33 
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the Bundesbank participation in the monitoring of credit institutions.99 The Sixth Act Amending the Banking 
Act of 1997 broadened  the scope of the Bundesbank's involvement in prudential supervision to embrace the 
100
, the law was 
109
econd Banking Coordination Directive and the Directive on the 
                                                
monitoring of financial services institutions.  
The First Act Amending the Banking Act brought about minor changes – however, undertakings subject to 
official supervision and sections relating to supervisory jurisdiction were gradually expanded.101 Following 
the Second Act Amending the Banking Act and its adoption on 1 May 1976, the Federal Banking 
Supervisory Office was authorised to issue a moratorium on a bank considered to be in jeopardy102 or request 
for an audit to be undertaken without special reason.103 Other amendments included the adoption of internal 
control mechanisms and more thorough provisions regarding large exposures.104 It has been said that this 
amendment of the Banking Act was prompted after weaknesses within the bank supervisory process became 
apparent – following the failure of Herstatt Bank in 1974.105 After the collapse of Herstatt Bank
changed to allow German regulators to commission special reports without specific reasons.106 
In addition to considering extensive revision of the Banking Act and establishing a Commission of Inquiry 
into “ Basic Banking Questions” for this purpose in November 1974, the Federal Ministry of Finance also 
examined whether the framework of the German banking system should be reformed.107 It was held in its 
report submitted in May 1979, that even though the German banking system had proved efficacious, 
adjustments would have to be made to the Banking Act to reflect changes in the credit institutions' risk 
position.108  In addition to concluding that findings of the inquiry were in line with the demands which the 
banking supervisory authorities had been making in the light of their practical experience, the issue of 
ensuring that individual institutions and groups of institutions had adequate capital had to be addressed.   
The Third Act Amending the Banking Act upon its coming into force on 1 January 1985, introduced a 
consolidation process  for prudential purposes in addition to the existing supervision of individual credit 
institutions.110 The Third Act Amending the Banking Act was also based on a report published by the 
Inquiry Commission established after the collapse of Herstatt, regarding basic issues within the banking 
sector, “Grundsatzfragen der Kreditwirtschaft”.111 Around the end of 1992, the Fourth Act Amending the 
Banking Act led to transposition of the S
Own Funds of Credit Institutions into German law.112  
As well as re defining the concept of own funds, the Fourth Act Amending the Banking Act also introduced 
the principle of shareholder monitoring and placed restrictions on non-bank ownership interests.113 The Fifth 
Act Amending the Banking Act was adopted in September 1994 and saw the transposition of the Large 
 
eut he Bundesbank, ‘The Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision' Monthly Report 
ep
pervision' < http://www.bafin.de/bafin/historie_ba_en.htm> 
104 osures, section 13 KWG. 
s'  
http
99 D sc
(S tember 2000) 32,33 
100  Ibid p 33 
101 See 'History of Banking Su
102 Section 46a KWG 
103 Section 44(1) KWG; ibid 
 Ibid; For internal control mechanisms, see section 33 KWG and large exp
105 See  'Bundesbank – Banking Supervision-Motives and Aim
< ://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_motive.en.php> 
106
desbank – Banking Supervision-Motives and Aims' 
ndesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_motive.en.php>
 See Deutsche Bundesbank, Geschaeftsbericht ( 1974) 68 
107 See  'Bun
<http://www.bu  
109
110 institutions could build up credit pyramids through their subsidiaries without any increase 
 th ased on the 
edi
111 afin/historie_ba_en.htm> 
 see Deutsche Bundesbank, 'The Fourth Act Amending the Banking Act – A Further Step Towards 
e E
113
108 ibid 
 ibid 
 Ibid; Till then, credit 
in e parent institution's capital base, thereby bypass ing the limits on business operations that were b
cr t institutions' capital. 
 See 'History of Banking Supervision' < http://www.bafin.de/b
112 Ibid; Also
th uropean Banking Market'  Monthly Report  (January 1993)  
 ibid 
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Exposure Directive and the Second Consolidation Directive into German law.114 Further amendments, the 
most recent being the Sixth Act Amending the Banking Act as of 1 January 1998, served to implement 
Directives of the European Union and thereby harmonise banking supervision legislation in the European 
ing subject to a banking 
 within the banking and financial services sectors.  The 
 Improved clarity is one of the features of 
                                                
Economic Area (EEA).115 These have resulted to legal conditions being created for the freedom of banking 
activities and financial services within the single European market.116  
In September 2001, the Federal Ministry of Finance published a first draft of the Fourth Financial Markets 
Enhancement Act.117 A new draft Act then followed in 2002 – the purpose of this Draft Act being the 
improvement of the protection of private investors and to help extend the scope of capital market activities in 
Germany.118  It does not completely codify financial markets laws but amends present laws –  including the 
German Banking Act.119 Amendments to the German Banking Act include:120 The issue of credit cards and 
traveller cheques (given that the issuer is not at the same time the offeror of the services paid for through 
such instruments) being subject to a licence requirement; “ e money business” becom
licence requirement; the powers of German regulatory authorities being extended in a number of areas to 
give full effect to the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 1997. 
The measures in the Fourth Financial Market Promotion Act ( “ the Act” ) consider the impact of 
international standards in banking supervision.121 The Act also brings the present law in alignment with 
major technological developments, particularly 122
Fourth Financial Market Promotion Act also implements the EC E Money Directive and facilitates the 
increased use of online and internet banking.123 
On the 1st January 2004, an entirely new Investment Act and a new Investment Tax Act came into operation 
in Germany.124 This Act not only implements the amended UCITS ( Undertakings for Collective Investment 
in Transferable Securities), but also implements innovations such as hedge funds in order to increase the 
competitiveness of Germany as an international financial market centre.125 One of the reasons prompting this 
near complete revision of the German investment law was the need to implement the amended UCITS 
Directive by February 13 2004.126  The new Investment Act covers what was governed by the previous 
Investment Companies Act and the Foreign Investment Act with exception of the tax provisions of the 
Foreign Investment Act which are within the Investment tax Act.127
the structure of the new Investment Act and the new Investment Tax Act – however the taxation provisions 
of the new Investment Tax Act are still ambiguous.128  
Unlike other European investment companies, German investment companies, being credit institutions, are 
 
g the Banking Act' Deutsche Bundesbank 
www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_motive.en.php> 
114 Ibid; See also Deutsche Bundesbank,  'The Fifth Act Amendin
Monthly Report (November 1994 ) 
115 See  'Bundesbank – Banking Supervision-Motives and Aims' 
<http://  
 
 'Regulatory Changes Proposed in Germany' 2002 (2) Journal of International  Banking Law 29 
120
nd C Loosen 'New Legislation to Reform and Enhance Germany's Status as a Financial Centre' 2002     
122
cial Market Promotion Act 2002' Monthly Report October 2002 
l  'The New German Investment Act'  2004 (4 ) Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 
116 Ibid ; also see Deutsche Bundesbank, 'The Sixth Act Amending the Banking Act' Monthly Report (January
1998) 
117 P Scherer
118 ibid 
119 ibid 
 ibid at p 31  
121 A Steck a
(9)      Journal of International Banking Law 274 
 ibid 
123 ibid at p 275; Also see Deutsche Bundesbank,  'Amendments to the Banking Act caused by the Fourth 
Finan
124 See T Pau
136 
125 ibid 
126 ibid 
127 ibid 
128 ibid 
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subject not only to the provisions of the Investment Act, but also to the Banking Act.129 German investment 
companies are obliged to manage investment funds solely in the unit holders' interests and the objective of 
protecting the integrity of the markets is now clearly stated in the Investment Act.130 Investment companies 
must also provide BaFin with information on asset portfolio and specified information on all securities and 
derivatives in order t 131o facilitate supervision of compliance by BaFin.  According to the Investment Act, 
he new Investment Act undoubtedly signifies a significant change for the German investment industry 
nce the Investment Companies Act first regulated investment funds in 1957.133 The flexibility 
structure of a 
egulatory system, should consider such factors as the necessary number of agencies, the appropriate 
ructure of those agencies, how the objectives for each agency should be defined, the degree of 
oordination and information haring between different agencies, the independence and accountability 
 also be considered. 
enged in having to capture risks arising 
n of the financial markets requires a holistic view of the system which can be 
ven though financial services has been brought under one roof, BaFin still recognises the differences which 
xist between the industries and the government did not amend the substantive law137 forming the basis of 
outsourcing by an investment company is only allowed if basic requirements for outsourcing under the 
Banking Act are met and if delegation does not restrict the investment company from acting in the unit-
holders' interests.132  
T
si
demonstrated by the new law whilst striving to achieve the objective of investor protection, has been 
applauded.134 
 
Whilst some single financial services regulators in countries like Denmark are not closely associated to their 
central bank operations, the UK cooperates with its central bank, exchanging information through a 
Memorandum of Understanding. As stated by Llewellyn, any country setting up the 
r
st
c
of the regulatory agencies and other factors.135 Historical factors should
 
 
Reasons  for Creation of a Unified Services Regulator in Germany. 
Reasons for integrated financial market supervision include:136 
– The growth of financial conglomerates. The regulator is chall
from cross-shareholdings and intra-group  transactions within conglomerates; 
– The increasing integratio
provided only by an integrated financial supervisory authority; 
– Banking; insurance and investment groups compete for the savings of private households with similar or 
even identical products. 
E
e
the three previously separate areas.138 In addition, BaFin's organisational structure also recognises these 
industry differences.139 
                                                 
129 ibid 
130 ibid p 137 
131 ibid 
132 ibid 
133 Ibid p 142 
134 ibid 
135 See D Llewellyn 'The Creation of a Single Financial Regulatory Agency in Estonia : The Global Context' 
Paper Presented at Conference Organised by the World Bank and the Ministry of Finance of Estonia, 2001 at p 4 
136 <http://www.bafin.de/bafin/aufgabenundziele_en.htm#n1> 
137 Namely the Banking Act ( Kreditwesengesetz – KWG), the Insurance Supervision Act ( 
Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz – VAG) and the Securities Trading Act ( Wertpapierhandelsgesetz – WpHG); ibid 
138 ibid 
139 ibid 
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Collaboration between the Federal Ministry of Finance, the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal 
Financial Supervisory Authority. 
At first, it might seem that collaboration within the German Banking Act is a two way affair between the 
nsults with the 
utsche Bundesbank and after this, may issue more 
Act and the issue of more 
also delegate this authority to the FFSA ( section 25 b ( 4 ) KWG.  
r consulting with the Bundesbank, may issue 
y way of a 
gulation, issue more comprehensive provisions regarding conditions whereby such exemption from the 
anking Act may be granted. The Federal Ministry of Finance could also by way of a regulation, delegate 
provided that the regulation is issued in 
Functions of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority 
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority and the Deutsche Bundesbank. However, the Federal Ministry of 
Finance is involved in various consultations with the Deutsche Bundesbank and also delegates, in various 
instances, certain duties to the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority. In carrying out and delegating 
certain duties, the Federal Ministry of Finance usually does so by way of a regulation. 
Collaboration relating to definitions within the German Banking Act 
Under section 1 ( 3 ) KWG, the Federal Ministry of Finance, the Bundesfinanzministerium, co
Deutsche Bundesbank and after doing so, may designate certain enterprises as financial enterprises by way 
of a regulation. According to section 1 ( 12 ), and in order to determine the definition of the trading book, the 
Federal Ministry of Finance also consults with the De
detailed provisions regarding the definition of the trading book by way of a regulation. The Federal Ministry 
of Finance may, by way of a regulation, also delegate this authority to the Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority provided that the regulation is issued in agreement with the Deutsche Bundesbank.  
Collaboration relating to exemptions from certain provisions of the Banking 
detailed provisions in relation to sections of the Act.  
The Federal Ministry of Finance is also authorised to permit, by way of regulation and without requiring 
consent of the Upper House of Parliament ( the Deutscher Bundesrat) exemptions from certain obligations 
for individual payment types and individual payment systems. The Federal Ministry of Finance may by way 
of delegation, 
According to Division 7, section 31 of the KWG, the Federal Ministry of Finance, after consulting with the 
Deutsche Bundesbank, may by way of a regulation, exempt all institutions or certain types/classes of 
institutions from the duty to report specific exposures and facts. It may also delegate this authority to the 
FFSA, by way of a regulation - so far as the regulation is issued in consultation with the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. 
In relation to the special duties of the auditor, the Federal Ministry of Finance, in agreement with the Federal 
Ministry of Justice (Bundesministerium der Justiz) and afte
more detailed provisions on the object of an audit, the time at which it is carried out and the contents of 
auditors' reports by way of regulation ( Section 29 ( 4 ) KWG. This is so far as it is necessary for the 
performance of the FFSA's duties and also particularly to enable it identify inconsistencies which may 
endanger the assets entrusted to the institution or which may affect proper execution of banking business or 
provision of financial services and to obtain consistent records for assessing the business conducted by 
institutions. It may also delegate this authority to the FFSA.   
Under section 2 ( 5 ) of the KWG, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority may decide in certain cases, 
after consulting with the Deutsche Bundesbank, that an enterprise which mainly carries out e money business 
is not subject to certain sections of the German Banking Act. Such ruling is published in the Federal Gazette. 
The Federal Ministry of Finance, after consulting with the Deutsche Bundesbank, may b
re
B
this authority ( the issue of more detailed provisions) to the FFSA 
agreement with the Bundesbank. In a way, this tripartite arrangement is comparable to that which exists in 
the UK between the FSA, the Bank of England and the Treasury. However, there is a more direct 
relationship between the Federal Financial Supervisory (FFSA) and the Deutsche Bundesbank.  
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The Banking Act of 1961 transferred responsibilities for the monitoring of credit institutions and with the 
Federal Banking Supervisory Office reported directly to the Minister of 
 the provisions of the German Banking Act ( 
3) Issues orders to institutions and their managers in order to prevent violations of regulatory 
provisions, to prevent incidences which could endanger the safety of assets entrusted to an institution 
ould affect the proper conduct of its banking business or provision of 
desbank with the 
iness and financial services ( section 44c ), basic right restricted. 
hose enterprises domiciled abroad which are part of a group are to allow the FFSA carry out audits upon 
, section 44c ( 1) KWG 
quires an enterprise whose facts are known to point to the assumption that it carries out banking business 
r provides financial services without licence required by the KWG or that it carries out business prohibited 
coming into force of the Sixth Act Amending the Banking Act, the monitoring of financial services 
institutions as well, to the Federal Banking Supervisory Office (now known as the Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority).140  The 
Economics and since 1972, to the Federal Ministry of Finance.141   
In addition to deciding whether certain enterprises are bound by
section 4 KWG), the FFSA also: 
1) supervises institutions pursuant to the provisions of the German Banking Act ( Division 2, section 6 ( 
1 ) ) 
2) Seeks to prevent developments within the banking and financial services sector which may endanger 
the safety of assets under the control of institutions, affect the proper conduct of banking businesses 
or lead to serious advantages for the economy of the nation ( Division 2, section 6 ( 2 ) ) 
or prevent incidences which c
financial services ( Division 2, section 6 ( 3). 
 
Division 3. Information and Audits 
Section 44. Information from and audits of institutions, ancillary banking services enterprises, financial 
holding companies and enterprises included in supervision on a consolidated basis 
Upon request, an institution, members of its governing bodies, its employees are required to provide 
information to the FFSA, to agencies and persons used by the FFSA in carrying out its functions and to the 
Bundesbank about all business activities and also submit documentation ( section 44 ( 1 )). The FFSA may 
perform audits at the institutions without special reason and may entrust the Deutsche Bun
duty of carrying out these audits. Staff of the FFSA, the Deutsche Bundesbank and other persons used by the 
FFSA to carry out its audit may enter and inspect the institution's business premises during usual business 
hours. ( note basic right within the Grundgesetz is not restricted to this extent. However, when prosecuting 
unauthorised banking bus
T
request from the FFSA – particularly those checks relevant to the accuracy of the consolidated accounts ( 
section 44 ( 3 ) KWG ).  
 
Under section 44 ( 4 ) KWG, the FFSA is empowered to send representatives to shareholders' meetings, 
general meetings or partners' meetings, meetings of the supervisory bodies of institutions organised in the 
form of a legal person. 
In relation to prosecution of unauthorised banking business and financial services
re
o
under section 3 of the KWG, to provide information on the business activities of the enterprise. The 
enterprise is also required give documentation to the FFSA and the Deutsche Bank. 
 
The FFSA has the power to carry out inspections on the enterprises's site and on the premises of any persons 
                                                 
140 Deutsche Bundesbank ‘The Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision’ Monthly Report 
(September 2000) 34  
141 ibid 
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and enterprises required to provide information and documentation and it may entrust to the Deutsche 
Bundesbank the duty of performing such inspections ( section 44c ( 2 ) KWG). For this purpose, the FFSA 
and the Deutsche Bundesbank are empowered to enter and inspect these premises during usual customary 
business hours. In order to avoid apparent risks to public order and safety, they are also authorised to enter 
and inspect the premises also outside customary office and business hours and can also enter and inspect 
areas serving as residential quarters. As a result, the basic right contained within Article 13 of the 
Constitution (Grundgesetz) is restricted to this extent. Under section 44c ( 3 ), staff of the FFSA and the 
Deutsche Bundesbank are empowered to carry out searches on the premises of the enterprise and of the 
ersons and enterprises required to provide information and present documentation to subsection (1 ) 
ntence 1 of section 44c. The basic right contained within Article 13 of the Constitution is restricted to this 
xtent and searches of business premises require a judicial warrant except in the cases of imminent risk. Staff 
keep items which could be of importance as 
vidence in their investigations ( section 44c ( 4 )). 
banking supervision process.  The Bundesbank is involved in basically all aspects of 
anking supervision and these include:144 The issuing of general rules such as principles and regulations; 
ndertaking regular surveillance which excludes sovereign and isolated measures directed at institutions – as 
onal cooperation in coordination of prudential matters and crisis 
anagement roles. 
ng of institutions are to be performed by the 
er any observations and 
                                                
p
se
e
of the FFSA and the Deutsche Bundesbank are allowed to safe 
e
 
 
The Bundesbank’s Involvement in Banking Supervision 
 
The Bundesbank has extensive knowledge of the financial sector, well-trained, qualified staff with expertise 
due to its business relationships with credit institutions, its local presence and general proximity to the 
market.142 Parliament therefore had good reasons for involving the Bundesbank through section 7 of the 
Banking Act in the 143
b
u
these are reserved for the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority; banking supervisory audits; ongoing 
monitoring of institutions; internati
m
 
Functions performed through collaboration between the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (FFSA) and 
the Deutsche Bundesbank comprise: 
 
1) Ongoing monitoring of institutions by the Deutsche Bundesbank. This involves the evaluation of 
documents submitted by institutions; auditors' reports pursuant to section 26 KWG, annual financial 
statements, as well as performing and evaluating audits of banking operations in order to assess the 
adequacy of institutions' capital and risk management procedures and the appraisal of audit findings 
( Division 2 , Section 7 of KWG). Ongoing monitori
Bundesbank's regional offices. Collaboration with the FFSA is involved in the monitoring performed 
by the Bundesbank as the Bundesbank is required to observe guidelines issued by the FFSA. The 
guidelines are also issued in agreement with the Deutsche Bundesbank. If no agreement can be 
reached within a certain period, the Federal Ministry of Finance issues guidelines in consultation 
with the Deutsche Bundesbank ( section 7 ( 2 ) KWG. 
2) The FFSA and the Deutsche Bundesbank are to communicate to each oth
findings deemed necessary for the performance of their duties ( Section 7 ( 3 ) KWG. Against this 
background, the Bundesbank is required to provide the FFSA with information it obtains through the 
collection of statistics pursuant to section 18 of the Bundesbank Act ( Gesetz ueber die Deutsche 
 
142 Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘The Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision’ Monthly Report 
(September 2000)  34  
143 ibid 
144 ibid 
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Bundesbank). Before ordering the collection of statistics, the Bundesbank is required to consult with 
the FFSA ( section 18 sentence 5 of the Bundesbank Act) where necessary. 
s it 
is acting under the German Banking Act, the Bundesbank are required to cooperate with respective 
authorities of the state involved ( Division 2, Section 8 ( 3 ) KWG). 
on monthly returns with its comments to the 
rts to the Bundesbank. Other circumstances exist 
hereby an institution is required to report certain activities to the FFSA and the Bundesbank. These include: 
 of qualified participating interests in an institute ( section 2b ( 1 ) KWG.; ( ii ) Where the 
older of a qualified participating interest intends to increase the amount of the qualified participating 
y are 
volved in implementing the German Banking Act are under obligation not to disclose or use without 
their duties and 
iness and trade 
c prosecutors' offices or courts having jurisdiction in criminal cases and administrative fine cases; 
 enterprises and to persons commissioned by such agencies; 
ement of insolvency proceedings over 
rge of statutory audits of accounts of institutions or financial enterprises and to agencies 
pervising such persons; 
3) The FFSA and the Bundesbank may also permit each other access to their respective database in 
order to carry out their duties under the German Banking Act ( section 7 ( 4 ). Where the FFSA 
obtains personal data from the Deutsche Bundesbank's database, every tenth time, the Bundesbank is 
required to log the time and details which allow the obtained data to be identified and the identity of 
the person obtaining the data. 
4) The FFSA and the Bundesbank may also set up joint data files. When supervising institutions which 
carry out banking business or provide financial services in another state of the European Economic 
Area, and when supervising institutions pursuant to the Banking Directive, the FFSA and so far a
5) Institutions are required to submit monthly returns to the Deutsche Bundesbank immediately after 
the end of every month. The Bundesbank also passes 
FFSA and the FFSA may waive its right to receiving certain monthly returns ( section 25 KWG). 
 
Further evidence of close working relationship between the FFSA and the Deutsche Bundesbank can be seen 
under sections 26, 28, 29, 44, 44c of the German Banking Act. 
Under section 2 ( 10 ),  change in a financial services institution's circumstances should be reported to the 
FFSA without delay. The FFSA then forwards these repo
w
i) The acquisition
h
interest in such a way that the thresholds of 20%, 33% or 50% of the voting rights or capital are reached or 
exceeded, or that the institution comes under his control.  
 
Confidentiality 
 
Employees of the FFSA and anyone commissioned under section 4 ( 2 ) of the Act on integrated financial 
services ( Gesetz zur Errichtung der Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht ), supervisors 
appointed under section 46 ( 1 ) sentence 2 number 4,  liquidators appointed under section 37 sentence 2 
and section 38 ( 2 ) sentences 2 and 4 and employees of the Deutsche Bundesbank, insofar as the
in
authority, information and facts which have come to their observation during the course of 
which should be kept secret in the interests of the institution or a third party ( especially bus
secrets ) - not even after they have left such employment or their activities have ended ( section 9 KWG ). 
The same applies to other persons who learn of such facts or information as a result of official reports.  
 
Such facts are deemed not to be disclosed or of use without authorisation if they are passed : 
a) To publi
b) To agencies which as a result of a parliamentary act or public mandate, are entrusted with supervision of 
institutions and other stated
c) To agencies dealing with an institution's liquidation or the commenc
its assets; 
d) To persons in cha
su
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e) To a deposit guarantee scheme or an investor compensation scheme 
f) To stock markets or financial futures exchanges or  
g) To central banks 
ubmission of Annual Accounts, Management Report and Auditor’s Reports 
 relation to credit institutions belonging to a credit cooperative audit association or audited by the audit 
iation, the auditor submits the audit report only upon request by the 
stitutions are to inform the FFSA and the Bundesbank of their appointed auditors immediately after the 
ithin one month of receiving this information, the FFSA may order the 
 addition to auditing the annual or interim accounts of a financial institution, the auditor is also required to 
n or 
riously disrupt its progress or which indicates that managers have seriously disregarded the law or the 
rticles of Association or the partnership agreement, he is to report this immediately to the FFSA and the 
equest from the FFSA or the Bundesbank, he shall provide 
The Deutsche Bundesbank's Responsibilities   
 
Insofar as these agencies require the information for the performance of their functions. In the case of a 
foreign agency, the agency is to be made aware that it may use information solely for the purpose for which 
it has been passed on to it. 
 
S
In addition to an institution being required to submit its approved annual accounts, approved management 
report to the FFSA and the Deutsche Bundesbank without delay, pursuant to Division 5a, section 26 of the 
KWG, the auditor is also required to submit his report on the auditing of the annual accounts (auditor’s 
report), to the FFSA and the Bundesbank without delay upon completion of the audit. 
 
In
office of  a savings bank and giro assoc
FFSA ( KWG 26  ( 1 ). Audit reports on supplementary audit carried out in association with a guarantee 
scheme and audits on group accounts are to be submitted by the auditor to the FFSA and the Bundesbank 
without delay upon completion of the audit ( Section 26 ( 2, 3) KWG). 
 
Auditors Appointed in Special Cases. 
In
appointment has taken place. W
appointment of another auditor if this is necessary in order to attain the aim of the audit ( section 28 ( 1 )). 
The court of registration having jurisdiction of the institution shall then appoint an auditor upon request of 
the FFSA ( section 28 ( 2 ) ) subject to certain conditions under this section of the Act. 
 
Special Duties of the Auditor 
In
examine its financial circumstances ( section 29 ( 1 ) ). Compliance with reporting requirements, obligations 
under the Money Laundering Act, section 128 of the Companies Act on disclosure requirements and section 
135 of the Companies Act are to be included in the auditor's report -  with some items being reported 
separately in the report ( section 29 ss1,2 KWG).  
 
If during the course of of his audit the auditor discovers information which may lead to the audit being 
qualified or lead to the certificate of audit being with held, jeopardise the existence of the institutio
se
A
Deutsche Bundesbank ( section 29 ( 3 )). Upon r
them the auditor's report and communicate any other facts obtained during the course of the audit which may 
suggest that the institution's business affairs have not been conducted properly. Provided he reported in good 
faith, the auditor would not be held accountable for accuracy of facts relating the information provided.  
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The Bundesbank's involvement in banking supervision arises not only from historical evolution but also from 
the nature of its duties.145 As a result of its business relationships with credit institutions, its local presence 
d its general proximity to the market, the Bundesbank has deep insights into the financial sector and 
ssesses knowledgeable, qualified staff who deal with issues relating to the financial market and its 
ce and the Bundesbank as regarding banking supervision.  
 the stability of the financial system 
B).156 In fact, a considerable shift in 
areas of banking supervision as 
  
• prudential audits and  
                       
an
po
stability.146 It is therefore not surprising that the German Parliament approved the Bundesbank's involvement 
in banking supervision in section 7 of the Banking Act.147  
  
The Bundesbank is assigned most of the operational tasks in banking supervision and the functional 
effectiveness of the supervisory system is essentially backed, in particular, by the Bundesbank's many years 
and expertise in the field of financial markets and payment operations.148  The Bundesbank's responsibilities 
notably include evaluating the documents, reports, annual accounts and auditors' reports submitted by the 
institutions as well as regular audits of banking operations.149 There is clear division of responsibilities 
between the Federal Financial Supervisory Offi 150
The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority,  being successor to the Federal Banking Supervisory Office, is 
responsible for all sovereign measures.151 Sovereign functions include such functions as the issuing of 
administrative acts. Only in exceptional cases will the FFSA carry out audits of banking operations, either 
together with the Bundesbank or on its own.152  
Before issuing general regulations, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority must consult with the 
Bundesbank.153 The extent of the Bundesbank's participation in the supervisory process is graded according 
to the level to which those regulations affect its functions.154 Through this involvement in supervising 
individual institutions, the Bundesbank also acquires knowledge about the solvency of its own borrowers 
which it needs for its central bank functions.155 This in turn contributes to
- also in the framework of the European System of Central Banks (ESC
emphasis has been apparent during the past few years towards strengthening the stability of the financial 
system.157 The Bundesbank plays an important role in virtually all 
follows:158 
• the issuing of general rules (such as principles and regulations)
• the process of ongoing supervision, with the exception of (sovereign) individual regulatory measures 
vis-à-vis institutions, which are reserved for the Federal Agency  
• international cooperation/coordination in the prudential field.  
                          
w.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_bafin.en.php> 
149
150 ndesbank_Banking_Act.html
145 <http://ww
146 ibid 
147 ibid 
148 <http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_bafin.en.php> 
 ibid 
 See <http://www.law.nyu.edu/centralbankscenter/texts/Deutsch_Bu >and also 
<http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/KWG.htm>  For more updated version of the Act , see 
ndesbank.de/download/bankenaufsicht/pdf/kwg_e.pdf> 
152
://www.law.nyu.edu/centralbankscenter/texts/Deutsch_Bundesbank_Banking_Act.html
<http://www.bu
151 <http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_bafin.en.php> 
 ibid 
153 See <http > and also 
w.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_bafin.en.php> 
<http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/KWG.htm> 
154 ibid 
155 <http://ww
156 ibid 
157 ibid 
158 ibid 
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In addition, the Bundesbank plays an important role in crisis management.159 The Bundesbank's task's are set 
out in the Bundesbank Act and in the EC Treaty. 
 
Article 3 of the Memorandum of Understanding explains160 the responsibilities of the main offices of 
Bundesbank in analysing banking business documents and notifying BaFin of the results of the analysis. The 
Deutsche Bundesbank also studies the auditor's report and  has more control over bank audits.161  
Audits of Credit Institutions 
The banking supervisory process relies substantially on the credit institutions' data – hence dependence on 
the use of auditors. Even though the Bundesbank has its own banking supervisory auditors ( approximately 
0 as of September 2000), these also conduct trading activities on behalf of the Federal Financial 
upervisory Office as well as audits to determine the adequacy of institutions' market risk models.162  As a 
 the use of external auditors is of great importance. Credit institutions are audited by independent 
s and who, in their audits, have to comply with detailed 
upervisory Office. Section 29 lists duties of the auditors. 
s to the public.  The Antitrust Authority, the 
ost recently created of the financial bodies, aims to guarantee a free market166 and also to prevent 
alfunctions and bias of the capital market and the market in general. Separate supervisors such as Isvap and 
   
7
S
result,
certified auditors whom they select themselve
auditing guidelines laid by the Federal Banking S
 
Italy 
Banking Regulation and Supervision in Italy 
Financial regulation and supervision is undertaken by Italy’s six financial regulators namely: The Bank of 
Italy (Banca d’Italia) – the central bank; Consob ( Commissione Nazionale per le Societa e la Borsa ) – the 
Italian Securities and Exchange Commission; the UIC ( Ufficio Italiano dei Cambi) The Antitrust Authority; 
the CICR ( Comitato Interministeriale per il Credito ed il Risparmio,Isvap ( Istituto per la vigilanza sulle 
assicurazioni private e di interesse collettivo) and Covip (Commissione di vigilanza sui fondi 
pensione).Banking regulation and supervision in Italy has always been the function of the central bank. Even 
though the 1926 and 1936 Banking Laws actually created a separate banking inspectorate, this was headed 
by the Governor of the Bank of Italy and staffed by the personnel of the Bank163. The supervisory function 
was transferred back to the Bank in 1947. The Italian Securities and Exchange Commission, Commissione 
Nazionale per le Societa e la Borsa (CONSOB) was established in 1974 through regulation L.216/1974. 
This is the very same law that led to the establishment of several decrees which set out the fundamental 
regulations of the capital market.164 CONSOB shares regulatory responsibilities with the Bank of Italy. 
Whilst the Bank focuses on financial stability, the prudential supervision of banks, financial companies and 
investment firms, CONSOB which is similar to the US SEC, is in charge of transparency and investor 
protection. As a result, it not only has regulatory powers over companies as issuers of securities but also over 
banks and investment firms as providers of investment service 165
m
m
                                              
159 ibid 
161 normally carried out by the Bundesbank : see Articles  6 and 7 of  the 
em
7 
163
3/weekly/101002/lecs.htm >; also <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~hine/seminarpapers/Carosio.htm> 
164 arket include financial statements, formats and requirements, 
and
165
166
4) http://www.washingtonpost.com
160  Page 25 
 Banking business audits are  
M orandum of Understanding. 
162  Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision Monthly Report September 2000 p 3
  G Carosio  'Italy,Europe and Financial Regulation' <http://www.ox.ac.uk/gazette/2002-
 
  Fundamental regulations of the capital m
m atory auditing for listed companies etc. 
  G Carosio  'Italy,Europe and Financial Regulation' <http://www.ox.ac.uk/gazette/2002-
3/weekly/101002/lecs.htm >; also <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~hine/seminarpapers/Carosio.htm> 
  See S Delaney 'Parmalat Spurs Call for Reform in Business: Italian Government Plans To Strengthen 
Oversight'  The Washington Post (January 20 200  last visited 20 July 2007 
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Covip regulate and supervise the insurance and pensions industries respectively. The financial regulators are 
distinguished from the credit authorities which comprise of the Interministerial Committee for Credit and 
Savings, the Minister of the Treasury and the Bank of Italy.167 
 
Banking Objectives in Italy 
The objectives of supervision – sound and prudent management of intermediaries and the overall stability, 
efficiency and competitiveness of the financial system – were established expressly with the Bank of Italy 
being required to give prior public notice of the principles and criteria of its supervisory activity, and its 
regulatory powers were redefined with reference to banking risks.168 Because the Bank of Italy's objectives 
involve the general interest, it is afforded great powers of in tits utional and operational independence and it 
an use these in its pursuit of monetary and financial stability.169 As the state has no share in the Bank's 
gans, this facilitates the Bank's independence from 
bject to ministerial supervision by an Inspectorate 
, anca Romana, Banco di Napoli and Bano di Sicilia.175Towards the end of the century, 
179 In addition to major banks holding shares within the 
c
capital and is not represented in the Bank's governing or
political interference.170 The Bank of Italy is however su
General which audits the Bank's annual accounts.171 The Minister of Treasury also has powers of supervision 
and has to authorise changes affecting the Bank's branches after approval by the Board of Directors and 
approve guidelines for the investment of the Bank's reserves.172 
 
Historical Background of the Italian Banking System 
Banking in Italy dates back as far as the fourteenth century.173 In 1861, when Italy's new Parliament decreed 
the unification of Italy, there were just about six banks of issue and although unification embraced a wide 
range of activities, these did not include the issue of bank notes.174 The six banks of issue included Banca 
Nazionale nel Regno d'Italia, Banca Nazionale Toscana, Banca Toscana di Credito per le Industrie e il 
Commercio d'Italia B
a serious bank crisis, in which Banca Romana was involved, led to a radical reorganisation of the banking 
system and in 1893, the Bank of Italy was created through a merger of three of the six existing banks of 
issue.176 Banca Romana was wound up whilst Banco di Napoli and Banco di Sicilia continued to issue notes 
until 1926 when the Bank of Italy became the country's only bank of issue.177 As well as becoming the only 
bank of issue, the Bank of Italy was given powers of control over other banks and this was aimed at 
protecting savings.178 
The period between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century saw very 
important banks such as the Credito Italiano, the Banco di Roma, the Banca Commerciale Italiana and the 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro coming into existence.
                                                 
167  See Article 1(a) of the 1993 Banking Law 
taly, Europe and Financial Regulation' 
ins of the Bank of Italy'  Bank of Italy  Representative Office for Japan 
171
173 tudy of the Midlands and Piedmont 1945 – 1973 
ndon School of Economics and Political Science 1997) 182 
-27F, 
 three banks which were merged were Banca Nazionale nel Regno d'Italia, Banca Nazionale 
177
178
179 e of the Credito Mobiliare and the Banca Centrale in 
nca di Sconto in 1920 were the result of misguided use as venture capitalists and poor 
 Italian government. The crisis which followed the global economic slump in 1930 exposed the 
168  Carosio 'I
169  'The Orig
170  ibid 
  ibid 
172  ibid 
  F Carnevali British and Italian Banks and Small Firms : A S
(PhD Thesis Lo
174  'The Origins of the Bank of Italy'  Bank of Italy  Representative Office for Japan, ARK Mori Bldg West
1-12-32, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo 107  Tel (03) 3588-8111   
175  ibid 
176  Ibid;  The
Toscana, Banca Toscana di Credito per le Industrie e il Commercio d'Italia 
 ibid 
  ibid 
   F Carnevali p 182; Some major bank collapses – thos
1893 and that of the Ba
speculation by the
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state governed iron and steel industries, three of these banks, the Banca Commerciale Italiana, the Banco di 
Roma and the Credito Italiano, also held shares in ailing Italian firms and had to be taken over by the 
government.180 State control was intended to be permanent and shares taken from the affected banks were 
ansferred to the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI).181 In 1937, state ownership became 
ermanent and as a result, the IRI having ownership over the three banks and their shares in the failed firms, 
controlling holding company within the Westen economies.182 The three major 
deposit and short term operations) and Istituti di 
 and they placed bonds representing 
pid economic growth in the 1950s 
                                                                                                                                       
tr
p
became the largest state 
banks, the Banca Commerciale Italiana, the Banco di Roma and the Credito Italiano, became the Banche di 
Interesse Nazionale. 
 
The 1936 Banking Law 
The 1936 Banking Law established a structure which classified Italian banks into two main classes namely 
Istituti di credito ordinario (dealing only with savings 
credito speciale (dealing with medium to long term operations). Among the Istituti di credito ordinario, six 
groups were identified depending on their property structure and bylaws namely: Public law banks (Istituti di 
Diritto Pubblico), banks of national interest ( Banche di Interesse Nazionale), ordinary credit banks (Banche 
di Credito Ordinario), co-operative people's banks ( Banche Popolari), savings banks ( Casse di Risparmio) 
and rural and artisan banks ( Casse Rurali e Artigiane).183 
The Banking Law of 1926, revised and supplemented by that of 1936 's rigid regulatory regime, stemmed 
from the creation of IRI, Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale and IMI, Istituto per la Mobilizzazione 
Industriale.184 IMI's dealings concerned medium and long term finance
different industrial sectors on the market.185 During the period when the 1936 Banking Law came into force, 
most European regulators had the opinion that restricting competition would maintain bank rates at a level 
which would favour bank profitability.186 The Bank of Italy's functional evolution did not end in 1936; whilst 
its institutional framework has not really changed, it has evolved as the custodian of a stable currency and 
economy and regulator of the country's financial sector development.187 
In 1946, the Banking Law was updated with the Bank of Italy intending to reflect the pre war economists' 
view that the role of banks was to promote economic development.188 The association between Italy's 
economic growth and the role played by banks was assessed by Raffaele Mattioli, chairman of the Banca 
Commerciale Italiana, who remarked that banks contributed to Italy's ra
and that this was as a result of the financial assistance given to mainly small firms.189 The existence of small 
banks was also considered important since they provided assistance to small and medium- sized firms who 
would have been overlooked by larger banks.190 Controls were in place to help preserve a system whereby 
small banks existing at regional or local levels could operate alongside the larger banks and as a result, bank 
competition was restricted to prevent a rise in industrial concentration.191 
                           
eak
180
73 
ini 'The Role of the Bank of Italy as Antitrust Authority in the Banking Sector' Banca d'Italia 
188
189
190
191
he current Italian banking 
ste haped through the 1926 and 1936 Banking Acts, the Italian financial structure, post 1945, 
w nesses within the Italian banking infrastructure; ibid. 
  Ibid pp 182,183 
181   Ibid p 183 
182  ibid 
183  F Carnevali British and Italian Banks and Small Firms : A Study of the Midlands and Piedmont 1945 – 19
(PhD Thesis London School of Economics and Political Science 1997) 184 
184  ibid p 185 
185  ibid 
186  G Trequattr
187  The Origins of the Bank of Italy'  Bank of Italy  Representative Office for Japan 
   F Carnevali p 186 
  Ibid pp 186,187 
  Ibid p 187 
  Ibid; The Italian financial system has been described as one with a poorly developed capital market, under 
developed stock exchange and one which is bank oriented ;ibid p 199.  Even though t
sy m has been s
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The direction taken by the body whose duty was to create post-fascist Italian institutions the Assemblea 
Costitutente, along with the recommendatio
192
ns of the Committee of Inquiry influenced the structure of Italy's 
t firms suffering the 
onsequences of imbalance between debt and equity.  The Bank of Italy also paid increased focus on the 
plications of its supervisory action for competition. Whilst priority was given to the objective of stability 
0s, the objective of stability was coupled with 
36 promoted a tightly regulated system which ensured that 
ll and medium sized firms with 
200
n banking regulation before the nineties was therefore characterised by a structure that 
as highly fragmented, a system whereby specialisation was the dominant characteristic of the banking 
stem and one whereby the greater part of banking business was carried out by public sector banks.202 
 and liabilities were also main features of 
financial system.  One very important finding of the Committee through interviews conducted with 
representatives of the country's various financial institutions was that even though the distinction between 
banks and provision of medium and long term finance was to continue, the stock market was not regarded as 
an important optional source of capital.193   
Instead, it was considered that funds held by investors should be passed on to firms, that these would lend to 
firms and that they would also finance firms activities through the sale to public of industrial bonds.194  From 
this, a financial system whereby funds were directed through institutions was seen as easier to direct than a 
system left in the control of individual firms and investors.195 As a result, little was done to promote the 
development of the stock market.196 Guido Carli, who succeeded Menichella as the Governor of the Bank of 
Italy in 1960,  realised the need to develop the stock market in order to preven
197c
im
of the banking system in the fifties and sixties, during the 197
that of higher efficiency which was to be achieved through promoting competition.198  
 
The Efficiency/Inefficiency of the Italian Banking System 
As stated earlier, the Banking Law of 19
competition would not eliminate the smaller and more local banks. However as the country industrialised, 
the segmentation of the banking system and apparent absence of other financial systems ( as the banking 
sector's prominence was evident), resulted in the efficiency of the Italian banking system being questioned – 
particularly from the mid 1970s onwards.199 
Even though the contribution made by small banks (namely providing sma
capital) has been recognised, their place in a modern international, financial environment was contentious.  
Small banks were considered inefficient because of their inability to achieve economies of scale, provide 
modern services and use advanced technologies.201 The stifling of competition and rigid regulatory 
framework were other factors highlighted within the Italian banking system. 
The system of Italia
w
sy
Strong structural controls, barriers to entry and restraints on assets
bank regulation.203 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
developed as a result of the debate raised instigated by the Ministerial Committee of Inquiry on Finance and 
202.The debate involved amongst other things, the distinction between short- term loans, medium 
d l s and also the differences between equity and debt finance. 
ini 'The Role of the Bank of Italy as Antitrust Authority in the Banking Sector' Banca d'Italia 
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Changes in the Italian banking industry and legal framework  
Between 1990 and 1992, several Parliamentary Acts consolidated the Amato Law, resulting in a complete 
change of the legal framework for banking.204 The Amato Law (218/1990) formed the basis of the legal 
framework and paved way for the privatisation of the Italian public banking system.205 In 1993, the 
Legislative Decree 385 of 1st Sept 1993 (the 1993 Banking Law), replaced the 1936 Banking Law and 
 1 assigns the highest 
pervisory authority for credit and the protection of savings to the Inter-ministerial Committee for Credit 
asures within the scope 
f its authority. It is also required to establish and give prior public notice of principles and methods 
time limits for the adoption of measures and publish 
                                                
consolidated all previous legislation in the banking industry. Under the 1993 Banking Law, previous 
distinctions between deposit banks and long-term specialised credit institutions were abolished and a model 
asymmetric to universal banking established. This was the start of a new era of consolidated supervision in 
which banking groups were formally recognised and non-bank financial intermediaries were incorporated in 
the regulatory framework. 
Article 2 ( title 1) of the 1993 Banking Law deals with credit authorities and section
su
and Savings. The Inter-ministerial Committee for Credit and Savings decides on matters assigned to it by the 
Legislative Decree 385 and is composed of the Minister of the Treasury (its chairman) and seven other 
ministers from other government sectors. The Governor of the Bank of Italy has to attend these meetings and 
the meeting may also be attended (on invitation by the Chairman), by other ministers. 
 
Article 4 of the 1993 Banking Law states the duties assigned to the Bank of Italy during the course 
of performing its supervisory functions. These duties include: the formulation of proposals for 
resolutions within the scope of the authority of the Credit Committee, the issue of regulations in 
cases provided for by law, issue of instructions and adoption of specific me
o
relating to its supervisory activity, to establish 
an annual report on its supervisory activity. Article 5 ( 1) states the objectives and scope of financial 
supervision and this includes: the sound and prudent management of those subject to supervision, 
the overall stability, efficiency and competitiveness of the financial system. 
 
Title 3, chapter 1 of the 1993 Banking Law deals with supervision of banks. Its provisions include reporting 
requirements,206 notification by boards of auditors and persons appointed to audit the accounts,207 regulatory 
powers of the Bank of Italy,208 and  inspections209. Title 3, chapter 2 deals with supervision on a consolidated 
basis and contains provisions relating to reporting requirements, regulatory powers of the Bank of Italy and 
inspections in Articles 66, 67 and 68 respectively. 
Per capita GDP in Southern Italy is about 30% lower than national average with unemployment rate being 
around 18% - compared with 6% in the central parts and 3.8% in the north.210 By the early 1990s, the South 
was a dependent economy structurally, with 36% of Italy’s population.211 During the recession of 1992-93, 
the reduction of domestic demand and interest rate adjustments required to face the crisis affected the 
profitability of firms. As a result of difficulties experienced by the southern banking system, supervisory 
action was required from the Bank of Italy and this was aimed at fundamental aims of protecting depositors 
 
204  F Carnevali p 184 
he Bank,  'Italy's Savings Banks: First Reforms Create Big Universal Banks with Untapped 
oten nitor Financial Market  Special Deutsche Bank Research  November 25 2004 No 17 
211 ework and Implications' 
205  See Deutsc
P tial' EU Mo
206  Article 51 
207  Article 52 
208  Article 53 
209  Article 54 
210  See Carosio 'Italy, Europe and Financial Regulation' 
  A Goglio 'Sectoral Regulatory Reforms in Italy : Fram
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and maintaining financial support for businesses in the south.212  Between 1990 and 1995, on site controls 
were undertaken in the southern banking system and around 60% negative evaluation received – in contrast 
to 15% received by banks in the central and northern parts of Italy. The process of rehabilitating southern 
banks was aided through the Interbank Deposit Protection Fund and contribution from banking groups. 
One of such banking groups included Banco di Napoli. As the leading bank in South Italy, it had acted to 
support the southern banks and had been slow in adapting back – particularly in the face of an increasing 
competitive market. 
The need to prevent a serious impact on the South’s economy, avoid systemic risks required special 
legislation to be approved for the rescue of Banco di Napoli. As a result, Law 588 of 19 November 1996 was 
nacted and it provided for the Treasury to supply funds for recapitalisation. This was a unique occurrence as 
proved by 
sis (factors 
ision : Post Parmalat Reforms 
he post Parmalat reforms do not consolidate Italy’s five financial regulators into one, unlike Britain’s FSA 
tion of Savings and Financial Markets Discipline.216 This overhaul was 
iggered by the financial scandals relating to Cirio and Parmalat, two major Italian food companies.217 The 
th
ion (as opposed to the prudential 
plications) of mergers and acquisitions. These powers will be assigned to the Guarantee Authority for 
e
it was the first time public intervention had been made to adopt a restructuring plan which was ap
the Bank of Italy. Banco di Napoli’s structures were renewed and factors which resulted in its cri
such as bank loan portfolio, high costs and low efficiency of its operations) were corrected to align it with 
national average requirements. In addition to these developments within the legal framework, the 1998 
Consolidated Law on Financial Intermediation has also enabled intermediaries to offer a wide range of asset 
management products. 
 
The Central Bank’s Role in Financial Regulation and Superv
T
and Germany’s BaFin.213 The post Parmalat reforms according to many, have been disappointing as the 
central bank, Bank of Italy had still managed to retain many of its powers whilst Consob has not been 
afforded as much power as was previously expected. According to the draft law of February 2004, a new 
regulator, provisionally called the Authority for the Protection of Savings was to replace Consob, the 
securities market watch dog.214 This new Consob is to be more powerful than its predecessor and would take 
over the supervision of debt issuance from the Bank of Italy.215 
 
The Italian financial regulatory framework went through a major overhaul in 2005 through the Law 262 of 
December 12th 2005 on Protec
tr
new legislation came into effect on the 10  January 2006 – however, due to some provisions requiring 
secondary legislation, these provisions were not implemented straightaway. The legislation affects the Bank 
of Italy, Consob, the Competition Authority (Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato), the Pension 
Fund Supervisory Committee ( Commissione Vigilanza Fondi Previdenza) Covip, and the Institute for 
Supervision of Private and Collective Interest Insurance (Istituto per la Vigilanza sulle Assicurazioni Private 
e di Interesse Collettivo) Isvap. 
 
A major impact of the new legislation on the Bank of Italy will be to increase the transparency of its 
operations and to transfer powers it holds in deciding upon the concentrat
im
Competition and Markets (Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato). Large crossborder bank 
mergers come under the jurisdiction of the European Commission. Transparency should be improved  as a 
                                                 
212   A Fazio  'The Reorganisation  of the Italian Bank System'  (Joint Session of the Sixth Committees of the 
Italian Senate and Chamber of Deputies 10 October 2002) 
213  See  'Italian Financial Regulation: Not So Super Consob’ The Economist (Feb 5th 2004) 
214  ibid 
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result of the following measures namely: Through requirements that board decisions having implications 
outside the central bank be taken by consensus, that written records be kept of board meetings and that the 
Bank of Italy report semi-annually on its activities to both the parliament and the government. The Bank of 
Italy and Consob will share strengthened powers over conflicts of interest. 
oth Banca d’Italia, Italy’s central bank and the National Financial Markets Commission ( Commissione 
d where 
ompany law is not transparent have been increased.222 
 
 opinion favoured an Italian “Sarbanes Oxley” and even though work commenced rapidly 
ion 
of s 
                      
 
Law 262 of December 12th 2005, resulted in distinct changes apart from those in the area of competition. 
Those that affect the Bank of Italy mainly involve requirements for greater transparency in its decision-
making and more formal co-operation with insurance and financial-market regulators. New rules on avoiding 
conflicts of interest in financial-market operations will be the joint responsibility of the Bank of Italy and 
Consob. Bank of Italy rules on banks’ exposure to associated groups acquired direct force of law, and the 
Bank of Italy has acquired the ability to impose administrative fines. A new system of arbitration of 
consumer disputes with banks is to be set up under Bank of Italy auspices to be funded by a levy on all 
banks. This had not yet been set up as of July 2006. 
 
B
Nazionale per le Societa e la Borsa, Consob) had been criticised for their inability to foresee the impending 
scandals.218 There have been a lot of suggestions that the Bank of Italy has been entrusted with too much 
power and that Consob’s powers need to be enforced and increased.219  This resulted to suggestions for 
reforms which would leave the basic form of supervision in its original form but replace Consob with a 
Financial Markets Authority which had more powers.220 Even though it was later decided in the course of 
Parliament, not to replace Consob,221  Consob now has more investigative powers and more personnel. 
Powers which relate particularly to issuance of financial instruments and companies establishe  
c
 
Lack of close cooperative relationship between Banca d’Italia (Bank of Italy) and Consob was one of the 
reasons attributed to the Parmalat scandal. During the early months of 2002, financial analysts had voiced 
concerns about Parmalat’s management’s unwillingness to provide explanations of its financing strategy. 223 
Apart from the failure of Consob to investigate Parmalat before it was apparent that market forces were 
discounting Parmalat’s stock in reaction to its practices,224 the Bank of Italy was criticised for failing to share 
with Consob vital information on distressed and defaulted debt apparent in the central bank records.225 
The Italian public
on the reforms, Parliamentary work was delayed as a result of several factors which included the resignat
Italy’s finance minister, Giulio Tremonti, who had campaigned tirelessly to reduce the central bank’
                           
219 omist Feb 5  2004; See also S Delaney 
arm  
ww.washingtonpost.com> 
221
222
sed in offshore tax havens  is avoided. 
o 'Have Governance Reforms Spurred on by Parmalat's Collapse Given Investors a False Sense of 
224
 reported on its balance sheet; for more information on this 
218  ibid 
  See 'Italian Financial Regulation: Not So Super Consob’ The Econ th
'P alat Spurs Call for Reform in Business: Italian Government Plans To Strengthen Oversight'  The Washington
Post (January 20 2004) <http://w
220   'Banks: Bank Regulators' Economist Intelligence Unit – Country Finance (Volume 7 No 2)  23 August 2006 
  ibid 
  Ibid; This latter measure is aimed at ensuring that another Parmalat-type abuse of corporate governance 
through the use of companise ba
223  M Tonell
Security?' Novemeber 14 2006 
  These practices involved the need to raise capital through complicated and expensive bond placements rather 
than using the “so-called” large amounts of cash  falsely
see M Tonello 'Have Governance Reforms Spurred on by Parmalat's Collapse Given Investors a False Sense of 
Security?' Novemeber 14 2006 
225 ibid 
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powers.226 In April 2005, Parliament through approval of the Legge Comunitaria 2004 permitted 
implementation of the EU Market Abuse Directive 2003/6/CE.227 These rules aimed at safeguarding 
transparency and fairness on financial markets came into force on 12 May 2005.228 The Italian financial 
regulatory framework went through a major overhaul in 2005 through the Law 262 of December 12th 2005 
on Protection of Savings and Financial Markets Discipline. Consob’s powers have been  re-inforced in many 
ways including:229 Additional investigative powers; the capacity to directly apply sanctions; a new internal 
framework comprising 150 new officers and a new framework for collaboration with the “Guardia di 
inanzia” (financial police) in order to carry out their surveillance activities. National implementation of the 
U Market Abuse Directive has therefore strengthened Consob’s powers. The Market Abuse Directive not 
on 
eir own – better enforcement procedures need to be put in place. There is also need for better protection of 
aller investors.232 Where possible, many investors decided to sue Parmalat's lending banks and external 
ccording to the president of the Association of Italian banks, Maurizio Sella,235 Italy would benefit from 
hen considering 
hether or not to adopt certain Sarbanes Oxley measures. Differences between Italy and the US include the 
ct that no established procedures in civil law exist to help investors who lose money in such cases to regain 
tion lawsuits in Italy, contingency fees to lawyers helping in case of 
 
     
F
E
only permits greater sanctions for abuse of privileged information and stock manipulation but also introduces 
new regulations on confidential communications, public communications and international cooperation 
between financial authorities.230 
 
However, the reform on savings has been put on hold by the Senate.231 Reforms are not just sufficient 
th
sm
auditors in US courts – US courts being perceived as having more expertise in corporate financial issues, 
providing more certainty of outcome and being more likely to provide more recovery of damages.233 These 
are litigation facilities which are not available under Italian or many other European jurisdictions.234 
 
A
adopting an Act similar to that of Sarbanes Oxley. The need for external auditors to be more independent was 
also highlighted. As part of the post Parmalat reforms, Giulio Tremonti called for clearer demarcation 
between company and external auditors.236 
 
Differences between the US and Italian systems would still need to be taken into account w
w
fa
their losses; there are also no class-ac
investors who cannot afford lawyers are illegal, no common rules about what businesses are required to write 
in prospectuses or what recourse investors have if a prospectus turns out to be false exist.237 
                                            
  See  M Moriconi ' Italy: Changes to the Legislative and Regulatory Framework post-Parmalat – Some Faster 
han Others!' Hill and Knowlton's Financial Services Newsletter  Number 5 May 2005 ; 'Italian Financial Regulation 
 Not So Super Consob’ The Economist Feb 5th 2004;  
 See  M Moriconi ' Italy: Changes to the Legislative and Regulatory Framework post-Parmalat – Some Faster 
226 
t
:
227 
than Others!' Hill and Knowlton's Financial Services Newsletter  Number 5 May 2005 
228 ibid 
229   See  M Moriconi ' Italy: Changes to the Legislative and Regulatory Framework post-Parmalat – Some Faster 
than Others!' Hill and Knowlton's Financial Services Newsletter  Number 5 May 2005 
230  ibid 
231  ibid 
232 M Tonello 'Have Governance Reforms Spurred on by Parmalat's Collapse Given Investors a False Sense of 
Security?' Novemeber 14 2006 
233  ibid 
234  ibid 
235  S Delaney 'Parmalat Spurs Call for Reform in Business: Italian Government Plans To Strengthen Oversight'  
The Washington Post January 20 2004 <http://www.washingtonpost.com> 
236 ibid 
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Responsibilities of the Bank of Italy 
) Supervision of banking and asset management sectors:  The Bank of Italy’s approval is required in order 
 
’s money supply. The Bank of Italy collaborates with 
the ECB on banking supervision as well as authorisation and the payments system. It also works with the 
3) 
 
n paper, mainly 
sovereign issues. These form part of Italy’s reserves. The UIC’s role has diminished in recent years as 
part of Italy’s reserves have been transferred to the ECB, and many transactions that were previously in 
 in euros. The UIC monitors implementation of legislation on money-
sactions in gold, and keeps the register of non-bank financial intermediaries. 
owers relating to full responsibility for anti-competitive behaviour in the banking sector were granted to the 
ion Authority on  January 1st 2006. Previously,  it  had shared responsibilities with the Bank of 
1
to start up or acquire a bank or securities trading company. Its approval is also required to increase 
holdings above pre-determined thresholds in either banks or asset managers. The Inter-ministerial Credit 
and Savings Committee (Imitators Ministerially per ail Creditor e ail Disparage) CICR, formulates 
banking and credit policies. It cannot intervene in the decisions of the Bank of Italy. The purpose of the 
committee is to advise on new legislation and interpret existing legislation. It comes under the Ministry 
of Economy and Finance (Minister dell Economic e dell Finance). Its powers to issue secondary 
legislation have passed to the Bank of Italy and Con sob under the new law on savings and financial 
markets discipline. 
2) Issue of coins: Having been a member of the European System of Central Banks ( that is, the central 
banks of the European Union) and the Euro system ( that is, the central banks of the Euro area) since 
June 1est 1998, coin issuance remains a national responsibility of the Bank of Italy even though the 
European Central Bank (ECB) is the issuing authority. Coin issuance by the Bank of Italy is however 
subject to ECB approval, since it affects the EMU
Committee of European Banking Supervisors, set up in late 2003, which has its secretariat in London. 
 
The Bank of Italy also operates the Centre for Financial Risks (Centrale dei Rischi), which keeps credit 
records on all national companies and business individuals. All credit operations, including factoring and 
leasing operations, and guarantees capitalised in excess of  75,000 are registered with this office. Credit 
institutions can check a loan applicant’s overall exposure with the centre and also information which is 
available to credit institutions in other EU states. 
4) The Italian Foreign Exchange Office (Ufficio Italiano dei Cambi ”UIC) is an arm of the Bank of Italy but 
it enjoys considerable independence. Primary functions include gathering balance-of-payments statistics 
and monitoring payment transactions for fraud and money-laundering. It is active in international 
financial markets on behalf of the public sector, as it hedges debt and invests in foreig
foreign currency are now
laundering, usury and tran
 
5) The Bank of Italy is also responsible for capital-adequacy oversight in the finance sector. The rules are 
incorporated in the Instructions for Banking Supervision (Istruzioni di Vigilanza per le Banche), which 
are updated regularly and of which the Bank of Italy issues a consolidated version at each update. They 
are based on EU Directives and the international Basle agreements on capital adequacy. 
 
 
The Competition Authority 
 
P
Competit
Italy, and in some cases the latter had taken the lead. In January 2006, the Authority opened an investigation 
into retail banking service prices. In July 2006, it announced a  2.5% of turnover fine on CO.GE.BAN 
(Convenzione per la Gestione del marchio Bancomat), an agreement between banks on the terms and 
conditions for transactions via point-of-sale terminals connected to banks. The fine was for failure to comply 
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with a Bank of Italy decision in October 2005 that maximum commission levels and restrictions on the 
ability to transact through the terminals of more than one bank were anti-competitive. The case was one that 
the Competition Authority had taken from the Bank of Italy under its new powers. 
 
Consob 
For listed financial institutions, takeover laws apply and the authority responsible for such cases is the stock-
exchange regulator, Consob. Consob must be notified as soon as a company holds a stake of 2% in a listed 
company. The stake is calculated on the basis of voting rights. Consob must also be notified when stakes 
reach 5%, 7.5%, 10% and increments of five thereafter. Anyone participating in a voting pact that has a stake 
f more than 5% in total must notify Consob. The Bank of Italy’s approval must be obtained for any 
vestment of 5% or more in an Italian bank (or securities house (SIM), asset management company, 
ctoring group), or in any company holding a 
and of any subsequent increase to 10%, 15%, 20%, 33% and 50%. The 5% 
of voting rights but is not absolute. The criterion is the degree of control a 
as control even over certain types of decisions, then it may require approval 
om the Bank of Italy. A stake of 10%, even without voting rights, is also subject to authorisation. A 
ulation and Supervision  in the United States 
the 
merican Stock Exchange Incorporation, the National Association of Securities Dealers, the Municipal 
 futures SROs (Self-Regulating Organisations), the National Futures 
ssociation. 
s a result of 
is, New York imposed a law prohibiting the insurance services sector from engaging in banking and 
such as the 1929 US stock market crash and a “run” on the banks by depositors (who feared that banks 
 
o
in
financial company, including a consumer credit, leasing or fa
stake of more than 5% in a bank, 
ceiling is calculated on the basis 
company holds. If a company h
fr
takeover bid is compulsory once the 30% threshold is reached in a listed company under Legislative Decree 
58/98. New takeover legislation is likely to take effect in late 2006 when Italy implements EU Directive 
2004/25 on takeovers. 
 
Banking Reg
Financial Regulation in the US 
Regulatory Structure in the US 
 
Financial regulation in the US is quite fragmented and is carried out by the following institutions: For 
securities, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); For futures, the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission;For securities SROs (Self-Regulating Organisations), the New York Stock Exchange, 
A
Securities Rule-making Board ;For
A
Banking regulation is carried out by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Office of 
Thrift Supervision (OTS), the National Credit Union Administration and the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council. Insurance regulation and supervision is almost entirely regulated at state level. This 
dates back to when the first major insurance scandal occurred in New York in the early 1900s. A
th
securities activities. Other states decided to follow this lead and the situation remains the same till today. 
 
History of US Financial Regulation 
 
Until 1863, US banks were regulated at state level. In that same year, a need arose for a means whereby the 
Federal Government could raise some source of funding. The Civil War had been going on for two years and 
the Federal Government was in need of cash. The National Banking Act came into existence two years later 
– with the formation of the OCC. A dual system of banking was introduced whereby some banks were 
chartered and regulated by the states and some banks were chartered and regulated by the OCC. 
 
The 1913 Federal Reserve Act led to the formation of the Federal Reserve System as a central bank and 
lender of last resort. Prior to 1933, US securities markets were regulated to a large extent. However events 
would be unable to repay the money in their accounts)  led  to  the  enactment  of  two  important  pieces of
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legislature  namely the  Securities  Act of 1933  and  the Securities Exchange Act  of 1934. Many banks had 
ollapsed as a result of the stock market crash and as a result, the 1933 Banking Act was enacted. The 1933 
heir subsidiaries). 
nder the Glass Steagall Act, commercial banks could also participate in overseas securities business. 
arket risks. The legal definition of “securities” 
nder the 1933 Act also did not incorporate futures markets. Due to these shortcomings, commercial banks 
s a result of the collapse of Enron, Congress passed the Sarbanes Oxley Act (also known as SOX) in 2002. 
d, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
orporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
urrency (OCC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).243 The main focus of this research will be the 
empowered Italian Consob, the US Federal Reserve Board is also the central bank and is therefore 
responsible for setting monetary policy. The Federal Reserve has regulatory and supervisory control over an 
                                                
c
Banking Act (also known as the Glass Steagall Act), distinguished between commercial and investment 
banks and led to the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation which was to provide deposit  
insurance to commercial banks. The 1934 Securities Exchange Act provided the framework for a partnership 
between the  legislature and the judiciary which aimed to achieve the tasks of imposing  minimum standards 
of information disclosed  by companies who issue publicly-listed shares or bonds, controlling  the quality of 
that  information and policing  the market place238. The Act also led to the establishment of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) as the primary regulator for US securities markets. 
 
The distinction made by the Glass Steagall Act of 1933, between commercial and investment banks had been 
getting blurred over the years – due to global developments which had not been foreseen when the 1933 Act 
was enacted. The original 1933 Act allowed banks to deal in exempt securities and over the years, 
authorisation was expanded to allow banks to deal with non-exempt securities (through t
U
Shortcomings of the Glass Steagall Act included failure to incorporate derivatives such as OTC derivatives 
markets, such derivatives not having been foreseen when the Act was enacted in 1933. Also currencies were 
not classed as securities even though they entailed similar m
u
were able to take significant risks and a new legislation had to be introduced. This led to the Financial 
Services Modernisation Act (also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) being passed by Congress in 
1999. The Act removed the distinction between commercial banks and securities business. 
 
There was still a lot of debate and concern as to how OTC derivatives were to be regulated. The 
Commodities Futures Modernisation Act was passed by Congress in 2000, replacing the 1974 Commodity 
Exchange Act. OTC derivatives were to be left unregulated. 
 
A
The Sarbanes Oxley Act is an Act which aims ‘to protect investors by improving the accuracy and 
reliabilityof corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes.’  On February 
13th 2002, the SEC also called for changes to corporate-disclosure rules.239 Businesses would now have to 
disclose transactions in company shares by executives rather than waiting up to 45 days.240 Annual results 
now have to be posted within 60 days not 90 days and quarterly results published within 30 rather than 45 
days.241 Firms would also have to explain their reasons for certain accounting treatments.242 
 
The US bank regulators are as follows:  The Federal Reserve Boar
C
C
Federal Reserve Board. Unlike federal regulators such as Britain’s FSA, Germany’s BaFin and the newly 
 
238   N Veron 'Strengthening  Europe's Capital Markets'  see  < http://www.ecif.info/CapitalMark> (l
Dec 2005)  
ast visited 15 
239  'Financial Regulation in America : Pitt the Gamekeeper”  The Economist  February 14th 2002  
<http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=988338> 
240   'Financial Regulation in America : Pitt the Gamekeeper”  The Economist  February 14th 2002  
onomist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id<http://www.ec =988338> 
242
w.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/enforcement/> 
241  ibid 
  ibid 
243 See 'The Federal Reserve Board: Enforcement Actions' 
<http://ww
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extensive range of financial institutions and activities. Alongside other federal and state supervisory 
authorities, it works to ensure the safety and soundness of financial institutions, stability within the financial 
market 244s and fair treatment of consumers in their business transactions.  
oreign banks are regulated by the FDIC ( insured branches of foreign banks)246, foreign state licensed 
deral Reserve and the FDIC whilst foreign federally licensed 
cess 
 ther Regulators 
ne of the main objectives of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was to enable banks, securities broker-dealers 
ompanies associate with each other through the structure of the bank holding company.250 In 
tions, the 
ederal Reserve may resort to taking supervisory action to ensure that the institution amends its ways.252 
sually management and directors of  the banking organisation are informed of such findings in the form of 
a written report, asked to respond to all identified problems voluntarily and take necessary action to ensure 
e 
 
A dual system of banking exists and operates in the US. This dual system of banking refers to the parallel 
state and federal banking systems. The Federal Reserve Board regulates state member banks.245 State non 
member banks are regulated by the FDIC. National banks, federally chartered branches are regulated by the 
OCC. 
 
F
branches and agencies are regulated by the Fe
branches and agencies are regulated by the OCC and the FDIC.247 Other regulators, namely the National 
Credit Union Administration and the Office of Thrift Supervision regulate credit unions and thrift 
associations respectively.248 
 
Main Objective of the Supervisory Pro
This is the evaluation of the overall safety and soundness of the banking system which includes assessing 
risk-management systems, financial condition of banks and whether banks are complying with relevant 
banking laws and regulations.249 
 
Collaboration with O
O
and insurance c
order to benefit from the extended associations allowed under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, a bank holding 
company must meet certain capital, managerial and other conditions and must elect to become a “financial 
holding company”.251 
 
Enforcement 
Where it is concluded that a state member bank or bank holding company has problems which could affect 
the institution’s viability and well-being or that it is not acting in compliance with laws and regula
F
U
that such problems do not recur.253 In other cases however, the Federal Reserve may be compelled to tak
                                                 
244 The Federal Reserve System, Purposes and Functions (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System July 
245 ral Reserve Board: Enforcement Actions' <http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/enforcement/ 
al Reserve System, Purposes and Functions p 61 
ral Reserve Board: Enforcement Actions' <http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/enforcement/ 
ral Reserve System, Purposes and Functions (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
ly 
250
251
252
253
2005) 59 
  'The Fede
246  ibid 
247 The Feder
248   'The Fede
249  The Fede
Ju 2005 ) 62 
 The Federal Reserve System, Purposes and Functions p 65 
  ibid 
  Ibid p 66 
  ibid 
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informal supervisory actions or  formal enforcement actions to ensure that management and directors of an 
ciated with the banks, companies and organisations it regulates.  These individuals are 
nown as “institution-affiliated parties.” Formal enforcement actions such as cease and desist orders, written 
greements, removal and prohibition orders, orders assessing civil money penalties may be taken where 
lation of laws, rules, carry out unsafe practices, breach fiduciary duties and violate 
ility had originally been granted to the Congress by the US Constitution. The 
ederal Reserve Act of 1913 empowered the Federal Reserve in giving it responsibility for setting monetary 
olicy.261 The mission of the Federal Reserve Board as set out by the Congress is as follows:262 To maintain 
um sustainable growth in output and employment and to facilitate a stable and 
cording to the Basel Core Principles for effective 
anking Supervision 1997, an effective banking supervisory system should consist of a mix of both “on-site” 
nd “off-site” supervision.264 Off-site supervision involves the regulator making use of external auditors. On-
affected banking organisation  or persons associated with it address the organisation’s problems.254 
 
The Federal Reserve Board 
The Federal Reserve Board not only regulates state member banks, branches and agencies of foreign banking 
organisations operating in the US and their parent banks, but also bank holding companies, non bank 
subsidiaries of bank holding companies, edge and agreement corporations.255 As well as performing dual 
functions of regulator and setting monetary policy, the Federal Reserve is also empowered with statutory 
authority to take formal enforcement actions against banks, companies and organisations it regulates.256 It 
can also take formal enforcement actions against officers, directors, employees and certain other classes of 
individuals asso 257
k
a
those regulated act in vio
final orders.258 
 
Historical Background 
The Federal Reserve was established by Congress in 1913 and given the power to coin money and regulate 
its value.259 This responsib 260
F
p
price stability; to foster maxim
efficient financial system. 
 
The Supervisory Process 
The supervisory process consists of both on-site examinations and inspections and off-site surveillance and 
monitoring. State member banks must usually have an on-site examination at least once every twelve months 
whilst banks with assets of less than $250 million which meet certain management, capital and other criteria 
are likely to be examined once every 18 months.263 Ac
B
a
                                                 
254  Ibid; Informal supervisory actions include requiring an institution to adopt a board resolution or agreeing to 
provisions within a Memorandum of Understanding to correct the problem. Formal enforcement measures include 
tution or individual associated with the institution (officer or director), assessing a fine, removing an 
or from office and permanently prohibiting him or her from the banking industry, or both ; ibid 
eral Reserve Board: Enforcement Actions' <http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/enforcement/ 
257
260
ittee' ; <http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/ 
263
 Effective  Banking Supervision 1997, Basel Committee          
the Federal Reserve entering into a written agreement with the affected institution, issuing a cease-and-desist order 
against the insti
officer or direct
255   'The Fed
256  ibid 
  ibid 
258  ibid 
259  See Remarks by Chairman Ben S Bernanke at the Ceremonial Swearing In by President Bush, Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors, Washington D.C, Feb 6 2006 ; <http://www.federalreserve.gov> 
  ibid 
261  See 'Monetary Policymaking : Federal Open Market Comm
262  See Remarks by Chairman Ben S Bernanke at the Ceremonial Swearing In by President Bush, Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors, Washington D.C, Feb 6 2006 ; <http://www.federalreserve.gov> 
 The Federal Reserve System Purposes and Functions p 62 
264  See The Relationship between Bank Supervisors and External Auditors”, Basel Committee Publications No. 
87 January 2002. Also see  Basel Core Principles for
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site work is usually done by the examination staff of the bank supervisory agency or commissioned by 
supervisors but may be undertaken by external auditors. 
 
In the US, periodic on-site examinations are carried out and justified on the basis of the large number of 
small banks and on unit banking within particular states.265 Unlike jurisdictions where authorities place 
reliance on outside experts, bank supervisors in the US must possess skills in order to evaluate asset quality 
nd other areas governing a bank’s activities.266 The disadvantage in this is that it can be labour intensive and 
 budgetary constraints.267 US supervisory authorities have responded to resource constraints in 
 of the bank or holding company.270 The confidential rating, based on a supervisory rating 
stem is a supervisory tool used by all of the federal and state banking agencies to communicate 
ents to bank organisations.271 It is also used to identify potentially problematic institutions which 
ion.272 The Federal Reserve also performs on-site examinations to ensure banks’ 
he system of bank supervision in jurisdictions such as Germany is based on one which delegates on-site 
ination and inspection of banks and the verification of their records to external auditors.274 In Germany, 
ns and must inform the authorities should they discover facts 
a
restricted by
recent years by making greater use of off-site surveillance systems.268 However the use of off-site 
surveillance systems can also be disadvantageous as computers cannot observe certain aspects of 
examinations namely the scrutiny of management practices.269 For this reason, the use of external auditors is 
also encouraged. 
 
Results from US on-site examinations or inspections are communicated to the board of directors and 
management
sy
assessm
require special attent
compliance with consumer protection laws, compliance with fiduciary activities, transfer agency, securities 
clearing agency, government and municipal securities dealing, securities credit lending and information 
technology. 
 
Off-site Monitoring 
The Federal Reserve utilises automated screening systems to detect organisations with poor or deteriorating 
financial profiles in order to make predictions on adverse trends which may be imminent in the banking 
industry.273 
T
exam
general auditors perform bank examinatio
warranting an audit qualification.275 In comparison to this, the UK’s system involves a reduced use of 
external auditors and mixed system of supervision whereby its regulator, the Financial Services Authority 
inspects banks (on-site) and utilises external auditors (off-site). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Publications No. 30  (September 1997);< http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.htm> 
to 'Prudential Regulation and Banking Supervision: Building an Institutional Framework for Banks' 
 World Bank Working Paper at p 17 
268
nk/historical/history/vol2/panel2.pdf
265  V Polizat
(January 1990)
266 ibid 
267 ibid 
  ibid 
269 See 'Off-site Surveillance Systems' < http://www.fdic.gov/ba >  last visited 
006. Also see advantages  and disadvantages of Off site Monitoring on pp 479,480 
271
ating system for banks is usually abbreviated to CAMELS meaning: Capital adequacy, Asset 
ali
273
to 'Prudential Regulation and Banking Supervision : Building an Institutional Framework for Banks' 
17 November 2
270  The Federal Reserve System Purposes and Functions  p 63 
  ibid 
272  Ibid; The r
qu ty, Management and administration, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity to market risk. 
  Ibid p 64 
274  V Polizat
(January 1990) World Bank Working Paper p 15 
275  ibid 
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Structure of the Federal Reserve System 
The Federal Reserve System is made up of the Board of Governors, the Federal Open Market Committee, 
serve banks and the Board of Directors.276 The Federal Open Market Committee performs the vital role of 
aking monetary policy decisions. The Federal Reserve utilises three tools of monetary policy namely: open 
count rate and 
I Accord as it realises the importance of adopting a system which can efficiently 
l II Accord.  
g such external related risks has been acknowledged in Basel II through the 
establishment, by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, of a specific treatment for operational 
282 s do indeed face external risks so it can also be said that risk based 
dopts a more realistic approach to external 
. W mains the same – both forms of regulation 
    
re
m
market operations, the discount rate and reserve requirements.277 Responsibility for the dis
reserve requirements lies with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System whilst the Federal 
Open Market Committee controls open market operations.278 
 
 
5.4 Second Investigative Aim: Risk Based  Supervision and its Growing Importance 
The main focus of jurisdictional comparison here will be between the UK and the US. The US places great 
importance on the Basel I
manage risks in the face of increasing conglomeration and globalisation. Due to historical factors and the 
complex structure of financial regulation which currently exists in the US, a move towards the adoption of a 
single regulator would call for considerable change. Although the US realises the importance of having a 
single regulator which can manage more efficiently cross sector services' risks, implementation would be a 
daunting task for which it is not yet prepared. In the light of this, there is great interest in implementing the 
Basel Capita
Financial markets all over the world have witnessed considerable changes as more complex methods of 
dealing with assets, liabilities and improved risk management techniques have been developed to enhance 
the profitability of financial intermediaries.279 The combination of deregulation and developments in risk 
management techniques has meant that regulators can no longer focus on traditional risks linked to the 
business they authorised and the need to acquire an understanding of other forms of risks has been 
realised.280 
Risk based supervision incorporates not only internal risks inherent within the regulated institutions, but also 
external risks. In this respect, it differs from meta regulation (of which the Basel II Capital Accord is an 
example) which draws firms into regulatory processes and attempts to both influence and make use of firms 
internal risk management and control strategies.281 Since external risks are more subjective and not as easy to 
measure, it could be argued that meta regulation presents a more accurate means of measuring risks. The 
difficulties in measurin  
risk . It is evident however that firm
supervision by focussing more on external risks quantitatively, a
way the argument goes, the underlying issue rerisks hichever 
focus on risks. Whilst one form of regulation may seem more advantageous than the other, both still have 
inherent disadvantages.283 
                                             
  <276 http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/frseries/frseri2.htm> 
  See <277 http://www.federalreserve.gov/FOMC/>  (last visited 22nd February 2006) 
  ibid 278
280
281
282  
t external data, scenario analysis and bank 
nal Risk : 
283
279  D Singh 'Legal Aspects of Prudential Supervision' [2007] 85  
  ibid p 86 
 J Gray and J Hamilton  Implementing Financial Regulation: Theory and Practice  (2006) 36; Operational risks 
however also incorporate risks resulting from external events 
  The new framework of Pillar 1 of Basel II establishes that capital calculation be founded on a combination of
qualitative and quantitative elements including internal data, relevan
specific business environment and internal control factors. See M Moscadelli 'The Modelling of Operatio
Experience with the Analysis of Data collected by the Basel Committee' Banca D'Italia Temi di Discussione del 
Servizio Studi Bank of Italy, Banking Supervision Department Number 517, July 2004.  
  One major advantage of meta-risk regulation is that it should enable the FSA exploit the expertise of the 
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To a large extent, risk based regulation does not rely on past performance indicators.284 The importance of 
future performance indicators has become increasingly evident in today's world. Whilst it has been argued 
that risk based supervision ultimately relies on past performance,285 the availability of experienced staff who 
can identify inconsistencies in the information provided to them will better facilitate the use of the risk based 
approach.  
The risk based approach structures regulatory decision-making in a more coherent way and also highlights 
the complex nature of decision making and the judgment required to be exercised.286 Timely, accurate and 
complete information is particularly important to regulators – especially in situations where the central bank 
is not really involved in supervision.287 
  
The UK's financial regulator, the FSA, operates on a risk-based approach whereby it differentiates between 
regulated institutions and allocates resources to areas of greater perceived risk.288  It identifies three sources 
of risk namely:289 The external environment ; consumer and industry-wide risks and the regulated 
institutions themselves.  
                                            
 
Risk-Based Regulation and Supervision in Germany 
The importance of risk-related information as a vital component of companies' annual reports  when 
performing operating and financial reviews (OFRs) of listed companies was highlighted in a report aimed at 
inquiring into the arrangements for financial regulation of public limited companies in the UK.290 This 
ensued from the realisation that traditional financial statements, no matter how well constructed, would not 
always provide sufficient information for analysts and investors.291 
As part of the implementation of the Financial Conglomerates Directive, section 25 a (1) was amended in the 
last quarter of 2004.292 The implementation of the European Financial Conglomerates Directive into German 
                                                                                                                      
aid of reducing risks to the FSA's objectives rather than directly imposing detailed requirements on firms as to the 
design of their internal risk assessment and management strategies. 
 e an accurate indicator of future 
 also 
s that pose the greatest risk at the expense 
f the business considered to have lower risk; ibid p 132 
site Surveillance Systems' < http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/vol2/panel2.pdf
industry in an age when the complexity and volatility of modern risk calls into question the ability of financial 
regulators to stay one step ahead. A disadvantage lies with its use of  mathematical models; ibid p 38. Other dangers 
with meta-risk regulation involve meta-risk management seeking to leverage off firms' own systems and expertise in 
In relation to risk based supervision, it has been argued that it may not b
performance; see D Singh 'Legal Aspects of Prudential Supervision' 2007 p 95 Hence the importance of having  
experienced staff who are able to spot inconsistencies in the information provided. The risk based approach
presents concern in that regulatory resources are focussed mainly on area
of those parts o
284  Risk ratios enable the prediction, well in advance and before a bank collapses, of which banks are more likely 
to fail. See 'Off- > 
286
287 um of 
ns M Hogg and D Mallett  Banking: A Regulatory Accounting and Auditing Guide (The Institute of 
hart its 
 Financial Regulation'  2006 p 25. There are however 
289 id  p 121 
e of Commons  - Treasury – Minutes  of Evidence , House of Commons Environmental Audit, 
our
285  See  D Singh 'Legal Aspects of Prudential Supervision' [2007]  95 
  ibid 
  The exchange of information between the FSA and the Bank of England occurs through the Memorand
Understanding 
288 See J Hitchi
C ered Accountants 2001) 120,121. In January 2000, the FSA announced its adoption of risk as a driver for 
“business”, see J Gray and  J Hamilton 'Implementing
questions surrounding the suitability of risk as a capable regulatory tool due to its contested nature. 
 Ib
290  See Hous
F th Report  13 March 2007 Session 2006/2007 < 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmenvaud/227/22702.htm> (last visited 22nd Aug
2007) 
ust 
292 ngermueller, M Eichhorn and T Ramke 'New Standards of Banking Supervision – A Look at the German 
pl Approach for the Second Pillar of Basel II'  2005 (2) Journal of International Banking Law and 
291  ibid 
 NO A
Im ementation 
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Law took effect on the 1st Jan 2005 and it requires clearly for a strategy whereby the institution's ability to 
manage risks as part of a proper business organisation is taken into account293. 
The adoption of a risk based approach to financial regulation and supervision in Germany has been prompted 
by the significance of financial conglomerates.294 Financial conglomerates have significant influence on 
financial stability particularly when they have a notable level of market share in several financial sectors and 
gain increasing significance in t e h market as a result of their size.295 The objectives of the Financial 
in
 t t sectoral supervisory 
 and 
ather experience based on incoming reports. Arrangements to resolve or at least disclose conflicts of 
ented, but not overrided, by rules governing group-wide supervision (solo-plus 
Has pproach to Risk-based Regulation influenced the Degree of involvement of External 
Auditors  in Germany?  
Bund istics ongoing banking supervision304 
Ongo  
Item 2002 2003 2004 
                                                                                
Conglomerates Directive interalia includes ensuring the sound supervision of additional risks associated 
with financial groups who are involved in cross-sector financial activities.296 It also encourages member 
states to develop their standards for limits on risk concentrations or permit their national supervisors to do so 
until there is further coordination.297 
The implementation of the EU Financial Conglomerates Directive in Germany considers the grow g 
economic importance of financial conglomerates and for the first time, supervisors now have a weapon in 
overcoming risks to the financial system attributed to financial conglomerates.298 The Bundesbank's 
significant involvement in financial conglomerates' reporting enhances its ability to assess risks to 
enterprises within a conglomerate and the risks to financial stability attributed to financial conglomerates.299  
 Despite the Bundesbank's involvement, supervisors are still challenged by the fact ha
requirements address the relevant risks differently and that there is still no integrated approach to cross-
sector supervision of equivalent risks.300 Supervisors are therefore still largely confining themselves to a 
form of monitoring that informs them about risk concentrations and intra-group transactions but does not yet 
set integrated supervisory upper limits across all sectors - which appears reasonable301. 
It is therefore important, prior to creating more extensive supervisory standards, to compile information
g
interest resulting from business activity in different financial sectors have also not been reached.302 The 
focus of the supervision of companies belonging to a financial conglomerate remains on individual 
supervision that is supplem
approach).303 
 
the A
esbank and German Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin): Stat
ing banking supervision operations, Number of operations conducted
                                                                                  
Reg f institutions 
293 lomerates in Germ ' M ly rt (April 
2005) 39 
294  Ibid p 44 
ulation 52; Section 25 (a) deals with  particular organisational duties o
 See also Deutsche Bundesbank,  'Supervision of Financial Cong any onth Repo
295  Ibid pp 45,46 
296 Ibid p 48 
297  Ibid p 51,52 
298  Ibid p 55 
299  Ibid ; also see Deutsche Bundesbank,  'The Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision' 
Monthly Report (September 2000) 
300   See Deutsche Bundesbank,  'Supervision of Financial Conglomerates in Germany' Monthly Report (April 
2005)  p 55 
301  ibid 
302  ibid 
303  ibid 
304  Source : <http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_bafin_fenster.en.php> 
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Item 
¹ Revised from the previous year. Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 
   
king Act 
  6 
4a of the Banking Act 585 561 002 
g Act 42 40 38 
rsuant to section 
Reports on the auditing of safe custody accounts 
fund auditors' reports   
 44 and 44c of the Banking Act  
Auditors' reports on the special funds of investment companies 1 431 1 309 1 459
Reports from investment companies on their activities 6 635 6 891 6 606
r Principle I 846 923 907 
king 
ts have more than doubled. 
From this, it can be inferred that the adoption of risk based regulation in financial supervision in Germany 
 
f 
s 
2002 2003 2004 
Individual reports pursuant to sections 13 to 14 of the Banking Act 206971 
153
035 
186
754 
Single borrowers included in the summary reports submitted pursuant to 
sections 13 to 14 of the Ban
2 314
292 
1 832
038 
2 12
336 
Reports pursuant to sections 24 and 2 47 44 47 
Monthly returns pursuant to section 25 and 25a of the Bankin 992 918 558 
Reports on the volume of foreign lending (country risk) pu
25 (3) of the Banking Act 270 370 912 
Auditors' reports on annual accounts 3 378 3 263 3 253
614 
1 887
483 
1 755
644 
1 678Routine, special and deposit guarantee 
Audits pursuant to sections 69 79 155
Reports unde 32 29 28 
Reports under Principle II 31 617 
28 
990 
27 
789 
Audits of internal risk models 8 9 6 
Reports under the Capital Accord of the Basel Committee on Ban
Supervision 76 76 81 
 
From the statistics on ongoing banking supervision, it can be seen that although auditors' reports on annual 
accounts, routine special and deposit guarantee fund auditors' reports have decreased, audits pursuant to 
sections 44 and 44c of the Banking Act, auditors' reports on the special funds of investment companies have 
increased. Particularly notable is the significant increase in sections 44 and 44c audits pursuant to the 
Banking Act. Between 2002 and 2004, these audi
has overall, not resulted to a reduction in its use of external auditors. The growing importance of risk-based
regulation is also highlighted through risk-oriented reporting as it now represents a significant component o
standard disclosure requirements and credit institutions must not only explain their assets and other element
but also outline their own risk situation and their ability to manage these risks.305 The growing importance of 
                                                 
  See Deutsche Bundesbank, 'New Transpar305 ency Rules for Credit Institutions' Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly 
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sing external auditors is also demonstrated through the Basel Committee's recommendations306 and certain 
 which is of greater importance – whether it is risk-
r  Kreditwesen circulated the statement on 
io  10 (1b) of the 
erman Banking Act will be amended with regards to pillar 2.313 Pillar 2 not only seeks to ensure that banks 
i titutions (MaK) with Basel II Internal Risk Based approaches, in detail, it is evident that 
he minimum requirements for risk management ( MaRisk) combines the minimum requirements for the 
 MaIR.318 As well as paving way for more holistic 
s specified in the New Basel  Capital Accord.319  
u
post Enron reforms.307  It is therefore difficult to establish
based regulation or the use of external auditors.  
 
The Impact of Basel II on German Banking Supervision 
It was expected that the new Basel Capital Accord would result to a shift as on-site prudential audits 
assume greater importance within the supervisory review process and came to supplement the 
evaluation of reports and returns from institutions.308  This seems to be reflected in the above table of 
statistics on ongoing supervision. Basel II has three pillars namely : Minimum capital requirements, 
supervisory review process and market discipline. Even though the past years have concentrated on pillar 1, 
pillar 2 presents a great challenge for banks and supervisory agencies.309  In October 1995, following the 
collapse of Barings Bank, which was attributed to inadequate control mechanisms, organisation and risk 
management, BaFin's predecessor, the Bundesaufsichtsamt fue  das
“minimum requirements for the trading activities of credit institutions”.310 BaFin gave an official statement 
regarding the implementation of Pillar 2 on the 15th April 2004.311 The foundation for this is a new circular 
called MaRisk ( minimum requirements for risk management).312   
Pillars 1 and 3 are to be covered by the new solvency directive Solvenzverordnung. Sect n
G
have adequate capital to support all the risks related to their activities, but also encourages banks to develop 
and implement better risk management techniques in monitoring and managing their risks.314 
 
Basel II goes beyond the current German bank regulations – as a result there are not only inconsistencies, but 
also gaps between the regulations.315 When comparing the minimum requirements for the credit business of 
credit ns
requirements for IRB approaches are beyond those of the MaK.316 As a result of its higher sophistication, 
those ratings which fulfil IRB requirements will also fulfill MaK requirements but the reverse is not the 
same.317  
T
credit business of credit institutions (MaK), MaH and
regulation, this merger should prevent further risk classe
                                                                                                                                                                  
Report (October 2005) p 69 
306 Basel Committee's Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision and the Relationship between Banking 
307 esbank,  'The Evolution of Accounting Standards for Credit Institutions, Deutsche 
und
308
0) p 37  
mueller, M Eichhorn and T Ramke 'New Standards of Banking Supervision – A Look at the German 
 Approach for the Second Pillar of Basel II' (2005) 2 Journal of International Banking Law and 
 
318
319 bid p 55 
Supervisors and Banks' External Auditors , International Auditing Practices Committee 
  See Deutsche Bund
B esbank Monthly Report (June 2002) p 39 
 Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision  Monthly Report 
(September 200
309 NO Anger
Implementation
Regulation  45 
310 Ibid p 47 
311 ibid 
312 ibid 
313 Ibid p 52
314  ibid p 55 
315  ibid  
316  ibid 52 
317  ibid pp 52,52 
  ibid p 54 
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Risk Based Approach to  Bank Supervision in Italy 
al requirements in the EU 
les for banks venture-capital business in order not to put excessive dampers on finance for start-ups, given 
medium-risk investment firms will be able to continue using the existing 
xpenditure-based rules for credit risk, though they will have to divide their exposures into a larger number 
audits, the outsourcing of business functions and electronic banking.  Since 2001, the Basel Committee's 
                      
Supervisory activities aimed at increasing the capitalisation of banks – particularly major ones and to manage 
their risks of large exposures became more of a regular practice in 2001.320 Methods for certifying banks’ 
internal models for market risk calculation and related capital charges were also established.321 
 
The Bank of Italy is taking measures to implement the new Basle Capital Accord.322 In accordance with the 
EU’s Capital Adequacy Directives 2006/48 and 2006/49 on the taking up and pursuit of the business of 
credit institutions and the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions respectively, the so-
called Basle II capital-adequacy principles will take effect as from January 1st 2007. The exception will be 
for financial institutions adopting more sophisticated methods of risk calculation, who will be allowed to 
adopt the principles on January 1st 2008. Although the EU will apply Basle rules to all banks and investment 
firms, and not just to those that are internationally active as required by the Basle Accord, a number of 
adjustments have been made to incorporate EU specifications and to make life easier for smaller firms. There 
are areas where national discretion may be exercised. There will be lower capit
ru
that these are regarded as crucial for the future growth and competitiveness of the EU. This directive will 
introduce a common regulatory approach to securitisation across the EU for the first time. The Bank of Italy 
was still consulting with Italian financial institutions as of end-July 2006 on details relating to the Italian 
legislation for the purposes of transposing EU directives into national legislation. 
 
In the area of credit risk, low- and 
e
of classes. This will be known as the standardised approach. The more sophisticated approach for other 
financial institutions uses the internal ratings-based (IRB) method based on the Basel agreement, but will 
comprise foundation and advanced approaches. Less complex institutions will be able to mix the less and 
more sophisticated methodologies. 
 
There will be similar flexibility in addressing operational risk, consisting of three levels: the basic 
indicator approach, the standardised approach, and the advanced measurement approach (AMA)323. 
These levels reflect the increasing levels of risk sensitivity. The standard definition of operational risk as 
agreed to by the Risk Management Group of the Basel Committee and industry representatives is “ the risk 
of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events.”324 
This definition includes legal risk and excludes strategic and reputational risk and depends on the 
classification of operational risks according to the underlying causes325. Other important operational risk 
issues currently encountered by banks include business-continuity planning, the role of internal and external 
326
                           
rvision of Banks and Other Intermediaries:  Banking Supervision”, Bank of Italy at p  205 
http
320  See  'Supe
< ://www.bancaditalia.it/vigilanza_tutela/vig_ban/pubblicazioni/rela/2001/Supervision.pdf> last visited Jan 20 
2007 
  ibid 
  Ibid 
   The basic approach is founded on a fixed percentage of gross income, the st
321
322
323 andardised approach extends the 
sic y breaking down banks' activities into components' and the advanced measurement approach is 
option of banks' internal models. See M Moscadelli 'The Modelling of Operational Risk: Experience 
ith t e del 
325
326 pproach to Banking Regulation' Badell and Grau Legal 
ba  approach b
based on the ad
w he Analysis of Data collected by the Basel Committee' (July 2004) Banca D'Italia Temi di Discussion
Servizio Studi Bank of Italy, Banking Supervision Department Number 517/2004 
324  ibid p 10 
  ibid 
  D Quiroz Rendon 'The Formal Regulatory A
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Risk Management Group has been carrying out surveys of banks' operational loss data with the aim of 
obtaining information o
327
n the sector's operational risk experience and also with a view to refining the capital 
amework.  The Bank of Italy checked the state of preparedness of Italy’s eight largest banking groups in 
here will be a single consolidating supervisor through which cross border groups will channel applications 
 use the IRB and AMA methodologies. Decisions will be made within six months by the different 
versight; Policies, procedures and limits; Risk monitoring management information systems 
ties faced by banks and this involved institutions managing their risks in a more efficient 
the safety and 
undness of a bank.  Benefits of the OCC's risk based approach include:  Core assessment criteria which 
                                  
fr
2005 and concluded that management was well aware of the imminence of the changes and that statistical 
systems were adequate. However, it identified a need for improvements in the quality of data and in IT 
systems for modelling. 
 
T
to
supervisors acting together. 
 
 
Risk Based Supervision in the US 
The Federal Reserve also operates according to a risk-focussed method of supervision which was adopted 
not only as a result of the ever growing size and complexity of banks, but also because of the continuity 
inherent in its nature – as opposed to a point-in-time examination.328 The risk based approach was also 
introduced following the 'savings and loans' debacle of the late 1980s and 1990s.329 The risk-based 
supervision process aims to ascertain the greatest risks to a banking organisation and evaluate the ability of 
the organisation’s management to identify, measure, monitor and control those risks.330 Businesses which 
have the potential to produce the greatest risks form the main focus of examination carried out by Federal 
Reserve examiners.331 The risk management component consists of four sub components which indicate the 
effectiveness of the banking organisation’s risk management and controls namely: Board and senior 
management o
and  Internal controls.332 According to Alan Greenspan, a combination of improved risk management and the 
utilisation of financial derivatives to manage the risk portfolio has enabled banks to calculate risks more 
efficiently in business, which in turn has resulted to a reduction of the burden of the banking system on its 
regulators.333 
The move towards a risk-based approach is an attempt to realign bank regulation and supervision with the 
commercial reali
way to reflect the increase in modes of obtaining finance for business and also to hedge risks.334 The risk 
based approach in the USA concentrates on both small 'community banks' and 'large banks' and the mode of 
supervision has developed in distinct ways as a result of the existence of more than one bank regulator at the 
federal level.335 
The risk based approach consolidates on the extent to which a risk could adversely affect 
336 337so
                                                                                                                                
Consultants ; also see <http://www.badellgrau.com/legalbanking.html> (last visited 10 June 2007) 
327  See M Moscadelli 'The Modelling of Operational Risk: Experience with the Analysis of Data collected by the 
e del Servizio Studi Bank of Italy, Banking 
Legal Aspects of Prudential Supervision' 2007 p 127 
ral Reserve System Purposes and Functions p 63 
enspan  ‘Banking’, Federal Reserve Bulletin, 7 October (2002) 
335
336
 risk taking but that it expects 
 processes available to capture those risks. 
Basel Committee' (July 2004)  Banca D'Italia Temi di Discussion
Supervision Department Number 517/2004  p 10 
328  The Federal Reserve System Purposes and Functions p 63 
329  D Singh '
330  The Fede
331 ibid 
332  ibid 
333  A Gre
334  D Singh 'The Legal Aspects of Prudential Supervision' 2007 p 129 
  ibid   
  ibid p 130; The OCC sets out its policy on supervision of national banks in its Comptrollers Handbooks of 
1996 and 2001. It emphasises that the supervisory process does not seek to restrict
banks to maintain such risk taking by having appropriate risk management
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assist the OCC in its application of a common methodology to evaluate the risk profile of individual group 
lexity of 
roducts and services provided by large internationally active banks.  A more risk-capital framework has 
quacy Framework that will replace the present general risk-based capital standards which have 
een applied to large, internationally active US banks.344 The proposed framework would also implement the 
rk as described in the NPR, would require some qualifying 
anks and permit others to calculate their regulatory risk-based capital requirements using an internal 
                                                                                                                                                                 
entities to ensure that risks can be measured consistently and ; the forward looking and proactive nature of 
the OCC's approach which enables it to gauge how risks will change over the next 12 months. 
 
Impact of Basel II on US Financial Regulation and Supervision 
Basel II is important not only because it is a common standard for measuring capital adequacy but also 
because it is based on the risks of an institution’s investments.338 It therefore allows for greater facilitation of 
harmonisation and easier comparisons between different countries, particularly at a time when globalisation 
and the increase of multinational firms has made this necessary. The risk based capital standards not only 
mandate institutions that assume greater risk to have higher levels of capital but also take into consideration 
risks associated with operations that are not included on a bank’s balance sheet, such as those risks resulting 
from obligations to make loans.339 Basel II has been pursued by the Federal Reserve due to the increasing 
inadequacies of Basel I regulatory capital rules particularly in the context of the growing comp
340p
been called for and it is believed that Basel II would provide such framework for such internationally active 
banks.341 As banking involves the acceptance and management of risks, it is of great importance that bank 
supervisors  ensure that an adequate level of capital is maintained to insulate itself against potential losses. 
Minimum regulatory capital requirements are vital to ensuring that such protection is facilitated.342 
 
On the 25th of September, 2006, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury (OCC); Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); and 
Office of Thrift Supervision, Treasury (OTS), which are collectively known as the Agencies, issued a notice 
of proposed rule making ( NPR or proposed rule).343 This notice welcomes comments on the New Advanced 
Capital Ade
b
“International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards : A Revised Framework,” which 
was published in June 2004 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel II) in the US.345  Basel 
II consists of three pillars namely: capital adequacy requirements, centralized supervision and market 
discipline. 
 
In relation to Pillar 1, the proposed framewo
b
ratings-based (IRB) approach for credit risk and the advanced measurement approaches (AMA) for 
operational risk.346 As well as giving guidelines for the supervisory review process and requiring a process 
 
 p. 3 
he Legal Aspects of Prudential Supervision' 2007 p 131 
339
340  
 the Global Association of Risk Professionals Basel II Summit, New York, February 27 2007 
deralreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2007/20070226/default.htm
Also see  OCC Large Bank Supervision, Comptrollers Handbook, (2001) at
337 D Singh 'T
338  The Federal Reserve System, Purposes and Functions p 73 
  ibid 
  See 'An Update on Basel II Implementation in the US', 'Reasons for Basel II',  'Remarks by Governor Susan
Schmidt Bies at
<http://www.fe > last visited February 27 2007 
342
343
aches for Operational Risk, and the Supervisory Review Process (Pillar 2) Related to Basel II 
. <http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2007/20070215/attachment.pdf
341  ibid 
  ibid 
 See 'Proposed  Supervisory Guidance for Internal Ratings-Based Systems for Credit Risk, Advanced 
Measurement Appro
Implementation > last visited 
 F
344
ar 1, the US has proposed only the advanced approaches for implementation.  
internal ratings -based approach and advanced measurement approaches are both known as the 
20 ebruary 2007 
 ibid 
th
345 Ibid; Even though Basel II lists various possible approaches for calculating regulatory risk-based capital 
requirements under Pill
346 Ibid; The 
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for the supervisory review of capital adequacy under Pillar 2, the NPR also highlights requirements for 
improved public disclosures under Pillar 3.347 
 
Three documents lay out the proposed supervisory guidance for implementing proposed revisions to the risk-
based capital standards in the US and this new capital framework would be compulsory for large 
internationally active US banking organisations and optional for other institutions.348 Two of these 
documents relate to the Basel II advanced approaches for calculating risk-based capital requirements namely, 
the advanced internal ratings-based (IRB) approach for credit risk and the advanced measurement 
approaches (AMA) for operational risk.349 Under the IRB framework, internal estimates of certain risk 
omponents would be used as key inputs by banks in determining their regulatory risk-based capital 
uidance on the Basel II supervisory review process for assessing capital adequacy.353 
r nd external auditors in countries such as the USA and Italy.356 Supervisors in these 
                                                                                                                                                                 
c
requirement for credit risk.350 As well as updating and consolidating previously proposed supervisory 
guidance on corporate and retail exposures, the IRB Guidance also provides new guidance on systems which 
a bank may require in order to distinguish risks posed by other types of credit exposure.351 
 
The second guidance document provides supervisory guidance on the AMA for operational risk and updates 
the proposed AMA Guidance published in 2003.352 The third document, issued for the first time, sets out 
proposals for g
  
Third Investigative Aim: The Role of the External Auditor in Banking Regulation and 
Supervision 
The degree of external auditors' involvement in bank regulation and supervision varies across different 
jurisdictions. In the US, periodic on-site examinations are carried out and justified on the basis of the large 
number of small banks and on unit banking within particular states.354 Unlike jurisdictions where authorities 
place reliance on outside experts, bank supervisors in the US must possess skills in order to evaluate asset 
quality and other areas governing a bank's activities.355 There is no formal statutory based relationship 
etween the superviso s ab
countries depend on direct inspections which they themselves carry out and commercial law governs the 
appointment of bank auditors.357 In the UK and Germany, the banking supervisor has statutory powers over 
the appointment of external auditors, such as the right of approval or removal, and the right to commission 
an independent audit.358 
 
 
347
cies Seek Public Comment on Proposed Supervisory Guidance for Basel II' 
http
advanced approaches. 
 ibid 
348 See 'Agen
< ://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2007/20070215/default.htm> 
 ibid 
 See 'Proposed  Supervisory Guidance for Internal Ratings-Based Systems for Credit Risk, Advanced 
Measurement Appro
349
350
aches for Operational Risk, and the Supervisory Review Process (Pillar 2) Related to Basel II 
. <http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2007/20070215/attachment.pdfImplementation > last visited 
007 
352
creg/2007/20070215/default.htm>
20th February 2
351 ibid 
 ibid 
353 See 'Agencies Seek Public Comment on Proposed Supervisory Guidance for Basel II' 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/b  
o, 'Prudential Regulation and Banking Supervision: Building an Institutional Framework for Banks' 
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s 'The External Auditor and the Bank Supervisor: Sherlock Holmes and Dr Watson?' (2005) 7 No1/2 
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354 V Polizatt
(January 1990) World Bank Working Paper  p 17 
 ibid 
356  E Huepke
Journal of Banking Regulation 10 ; Italy has a statutory auditor though 
357  ibid 
  ibid; See German Banking Act section 28; FSMA 2000 section 166  
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The benefits of using the external auditor in the bank regulation and supervisory process include the ability 
of the external auditor to provide a wide range of resources and knowledge and acting as an intermediary for 
the regulator, thereby helping to protect the regulator's reputation and avoiding regulatory c
359
apture. The risks 
volved in using the external auditor include conflict of interests , loss of information during the transfer 
f information to the regulator and higher costs.360  This investigative aim, in addition to providing a 
 professions of selected jurisdictions, considers the safeguards in place to 
m the use of external auditors in the supervisory process. 
ory and executive board.  The audit carried out by the 
368
first paragraph of the published audit 
port states that the audit was conducted accordingly with section 317 of the German Commercial Code and 
at the audit abides by the professional standards of the Institut der Wirtschaftspruefer, the last paragraph 
in
o
descriptive analysis of the audit
mitigate those risks emanating fro
 
 
The German Audit Profession 
Individual financial statements and annual reports for German stock corporations are required to be prepared 
in accordance with the German Commercial Code.361 Section 264 paragraph 1 sentence 1 of the German 
Commercial Code requires the executive board to prepare individual financial statements.362 In addition, 
stock corporations must also prepare annual reports unless it is a small corporation under the definition of 
section 267 of the Commercial Code.363 Audits are carried out on two levels. Whilst the audit of financial 
statements and the annual report is performed by the statutory auditor364, the individual and consolidated 
financial statements, as well as the annual report of a stock corporation are subject to examination by the 
supervisory board of the company.365 The statutory audit results in two documents being issued namely:366 
The audit report which is published along with the financial statements and the confidential audit report 
known as the long-form audit report. Whilst the audit report which is addressed to the public contains a 
summary of the overall conclusion reached in the audit by the auditor, the long form audit report provides 
detailed conclusions and is addressed to the supervis 367
supervisory board is more comprehensive than that of the statutory audit.  Upon the supervisory board's 
consent of the financial statements, the individual financial statements are usually approved and rarely 
require an approval by the general meeting.369 The audit of the individual financial statements by the 
statutory auditor is however, subject to approval.370 
The audit objective in Germany is the identification and public disclosure of irregularities and omissions and 
arriving at an opinion on the firm as a going concern.371 Whilst the 
re
th
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e re by the  regulator.   
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states that the financial statements present fairly the financial position, operating activities and cash flows of 
the firm accordingly with generally accepted accounting principles.372 
 
Growing Perception of Auditor Independence in Germany?  
Since 1931, when the audit profession started being regulated, outsiders, in particular credit institutions, have 
been giving up their stakes in firms of partnerships (Wirtschaftspruefer, WP).373 Apart from the growing 
realisation that outside ownership was not popular internationally, there was also growing doubt as to 
whether firms which were partly owned by outsiders promoted auditor independence.374 However, there is 
now a growing trend of audit services being provided by non audit owners in Germany. Medium sized 
partnership firms (Wirtschaftspruefer) are being founded by non auditors – in particular members of the 
consultancy profession wishing to offer their clients the additional service of an audit.375 Even though the 8th 
Directive has achieved some degree of harmonisation in that both Germany and the UK now permit 
incorporation, the legislation regarding ownership of audit firms presents a reversal of the original 
tuation.376 As a result of changes arising from the implementation of the 8th Directive, there have been 
n to changing perceptions of auditors and audit in both countries – whether there is 
ercialism in the UK and whether there is growing focus on independence and 
y g out mandatory audit rotation 
a datory rotation) outweighs the cost of carrying out 
andatory rotation.381 This is because mandatory rotation can reduce legal liability in such markets. In 
                                                
si
questions raised in relatio
growing focus on comm
professionalism in Germany.377 A higher perception of audit independence in Germany is probably long 
overdue following criticisms of auditors’ independence.  
 
AUDITOR ROTATION 
Auditor rotation has been a topic of considerable debate – particularly in jurisdictions such as Germany. The 
debate usually centres around the alleged costs of implementing and carr in
and also the claim that quality of audits will fall.378 An issue for consideration in Germany is whether the 
audit liability level is high enough to make up for the lack of mandatory audit rotation. However, there may 
be dangers in using only liability levels to ensure independence – especially where liability levels become 
too high.379 It is also important to note that just as mandatory rotation can reduce legal liability in thin 
markets, it will also tend to increase legal liabilities in developed markets.380 
In audit markets with relatively few large clients (thin markets), it has been proved that the resulting 
improved incentives for independence ( benefits from m n
m
addition, there is greater concern for reappointment in thin markets and hence there would be greater 
likelihood that an auditor would be more willing in such markets, to compromise his independence. If audit 
markets are thin, independence can still be attained with lower level of legal liability under mandatory 
rotation than in a case where rotation is not mandatory.382 
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Gietzmann and Sen also argue that in contrast, auditors’ potential gains from establishing and sustai inn g a 
e limited, no matter how good that 
uditor’s reputation is.  As a result, it is concluded that if audit markets are thin, rotation is desirable.385 
market as relatively few companies are public limited 
bH) are more dominant with only a section of these 
ssible introduction of auditor rotation.   
(internal) audit through legislative 
strictions.392 In contrast to the present European trend whereby there seems to be a  relaxing approach on 
a ontrol systems formed a focal point during prudential analysis and particular 
portance was given to verifying the effectiveness of internal audits.395 Internal auditing is considered to be 
                        
reputation for independence supersedes the gains of reappointment with a particular client where a more 
developed audit market with many potential new clients exists.383 These results occur because in a 
sufficiently thin market, the auditor’s reputation is not a strong incentive as there relatively few new clients 
and in addition, opportunities to replace the existing client base ar
384a
Germany has been classed as having a relatively thin 
companies (AG’s).386 Private limited companies (Gm
companies requiring statutory audits.387 The German legislature has considered an active reform on the 
regulation of auditors and po 388
 
Safeguarding the Auditor’s Independence in Italy 
In Italy, the Board of Directors are required to prepare annual financial statements according to Article 2423 
of the Italian Civil Code.389 
Focus on internal audits : enough focus on external audits? 
The concept of the external audit, is not as developed in Italy when compared to Germany and Britain.390 
Presidential Decree No 136 of 1975, whose source is the Law 216/1974, brought into force for the first time 
the requirement for the external audit of listed company financial statements in Italy.391 External audit is 
differentiated from the traditional Collegio Sindicale or simply sindaci 
re
standards of auditor independence, Italy has adopted a more stringent approach to provisions on auditor 
independence.393 CONSOB plays a significant role in regulating external audit of listed companies and its 
involvement appears to have resulted in stricter provisions for ensuring that auditors carry out their 
responsibilities in an objective manner and that they are seen as doing so.394 
 
In 2001, the quality of intern l c
im
in a phase whereby it assumes an approach to inspection that is not well positioned to assessing the 
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effectiveness of the internal control system.396 The process involves mainly checking operations of branches 
and verifying compliance with internal rules – audit controls on central structures and process analysis are 
considered to be inadequate.397 
 
Apart from certifying compliance with prudential requirements, the supervisory process has also involved 
control of risks.398 The growth of foreign connections of large banks has 
399
ry role than an auditing role and as such, does not carry out a full audit but monitors proper 
pliance with rules.402 Audits by the Collegio Sindicale must be 
inancial Statements In Italy  
e f entities such as state-owned companies.407 The  L’Ordine dei Dottori 
of the traditional audit board ( sindaci) in the interests of most of its members.  As a result, Decree no 127 
                        
greater focus on the effective 
resulted to special supervisory action aimed at dealing with risks of subsidiaries overseas.  In addition, 
increasing utilisation of credit derivatives for hedging and trading activities has warranted a check on 
measures whereby risks are calculated and managed.400 
 
The Audit Profession in Italy 
There are two types of statutory auditors in Italy namely:401 The Collegio Sindicale – this type of statutory 
auditors ( a board of three or five members chaired usually by their senior), has more of a management 
superviso
administration of the entity and its com
carried out on all limited liability companies who appoint the Collegio Sindicale and  whose share capital 
exceeds around 103,000 Euros.403 Full auditors are empowered to carry out full audits and according to the 
law, companies subject to mandatory full audits have to employ the services of both Collegio Sindicale and a 
full auditor. 
Audit of F
The Italian 1942 Civil Code mandated capital-based companies requiring a statutory audit to appoint a board, 
“Statutory Board of Auditors” (un Collegio Sindacale) of between 3 and 5 individual auditors (Revisori 
Contabili) to carry out an ‘institutional internal audit’.404 The Civil Code, Article 2488 states that the 
Collegio Sindacale must be appointed if certain conditions relating to size of the company405, share capital 
are met.  
For the first time in Italy, through the Presidential Decree No 136 of 1975, the requirement for the external 
audit of listed companies was introduced  under the Il Commissione Nazionale per le Societa e la Borsa 
(CONSOB) – the stock exchange regulatory authority.406 This compulsory external audit requirement has 
since been extended to a wide rang  o
Commercialisti ( graduates in Economics and Commerce) and L’Ordine dei Ragionieri e Periti Commerciali 
(College of Accountants and Commercial Experts – high school diploma) supported the continued existence 
408
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in 1991 whilst imposing a statutory external audit requirement on some classes of businesses, allowed for 
continued operation of the sindaci.409 
Whilst the Collegio Sindac lea  is mandatory for all companies where an audit of the accounts is required, the 
v ione414 in listed companies by making inapplicable 
 relation to non listed companies, the Italian Civil Code417 states that the Board of Statutory Auditors must 
s re also required to report to CONSOB if they are aware of any irregularities during the 
                                                
use of external auditors is compulsory only in companies which are required to get an audit opinion.410 The 
audit company must be authorised by the Security and Exchange Commission, CONSOB.411 In outlining the 
responsibilities of the Board of Statutory Auditors, the Italian Civil Code did not distinguish between listed 
and non listed companies.412  
The Collegio Sindicale performs audits restricted to particular account balances and fiscal/social security 
areas and as a result, duties of the Collegio Sindicale and those of full auditors overlapped.413 The Draghi 
law (Decreto Legislativo 24 febbraio 1998 no 58 – Decreto Draghi) attempted to clarify the apparent overlap 
of audit duties between the sindaci and the societa di re is
almost half of the Civil Code provisions for sindaci in these companies.415 It addresses the overlap of audit 
duties for some companies (more importantly for the listed companies), in that the Collegio Sindicale of 
some of the companies subject to the Draghi law have no audit responsibilities – these responsibilities 
having been transferred to external accountancy firms.416 
In
perform operations to verify the correctness of accounting, cash accounts, existence of investments and other 
assets of the company every three months.418 As well as other proposals and provisions, the final report on 
the draft of financial statements should summarise activities and the results of such activities.419 
 
Legislative Decree no 58 of the 24 February 1998 effective from the 1st July !998 exempted some provisions 
included in the Italian Civil Code for listed companies and describes the roles and responsibilities of the 
Board of Statutory Auditors for listed companies.420 These roles include the oversight of the company's 
compliance with the Italian Civil Code and Articles of Incorporation, the appropriateness of the 
administration which includes the internal system of controls and administrative functions.421 The Board of 
Statutory Auditor  a
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performance of their control functions.422 Irregularities relating to the directors' operations within the 
company can also be reported to any competent court.423 All other areas required by the Italian Civil Code to 
be verified by the Board of Statutory Auditors became the exclusive responsibilities of the external auditors 
for the company.424 
However, this law did not result in change for most companies operating in Italy.425 It gave the societa di 
revisione sole responsibility for the control of client accounting – including verification of underlying 
accounting records, however the sindaci are still required to express and report an opinion on the financial 
statements.426 Further change occurred through the reform of the Italian commercial law in 2001 whereby 
the possibility to appoint a full auditor (individual or audit firm) instead of a Collegio Sindicale was given in 
io ieri e 
any reasons and 
ere are now more companies undertaking voluntary audits than there are companies for whom a statutory 
luntary audits.433 The Civil Code434 details 
ng professionals now in Italy, it 
lines are available to auditors in Italy depending on which professional body they belong 
: The Consiglio Nazionale dei Dottori Commercialisti’s (CNDC) Norme di Deontologia Professionale 
hich came into force in 1987 and whose revised January 2001 version has been used and 
some cases.427 This reform came into effect on 1 January 2004 and provided an option to the company to 
choose whether or not to employ an individual auditor or an audit firm instead of the Collegio Sindicale – 
thereby changing the obligation under prior legislation of limited liability companies to appoint a  Collegio 
Sindicale (or according to the new law, a full auditor).428 
The EC Eight Directive was implemented in Italian law in 1992 and as a result, the statutory auditor 
(Revisore Contabile) is required to be enrolled on a register held by the Ministry of Justice and hold one of 
two recognised professional qualifications.429 One of the two professional qualifications must be from either 
L’Ordine dei Dottori Commercialisti ( graduates in Economics and Commerce) or L’Ordine dei Rag n
Periti Commerciali (College of Accountants and Commercial Experts).430 This objective was only partially 
achieved as whoever was sindaco for at least three years before the law was enforced, regardless of his 
school/academic qualifications, was automatically enrolled on the new register. These bodies appoint a 
commission (Commissione per la Statuizione dei Principi di Revisione) to issue auditing statements.431 
In addition to statutory audit – that is, the external audit of listed companies and other bodies and the quasi-
internal audit by sindaci, there is growing preference for voluntary audit in Italy due to m
th
audit is required.432 Individual auditors are allowed to perform vo
provisions regarding accounting and auditing and with over 70,000 accounti
has the second largest number of accounting professionals in Europe after the UK. 
 
Safeguards in Operation to Reduce Threats to Independence  
Two ethical guide
435   to
w
                                                 
422   See Article 149 co 3 of the Legislative Decree no 58; ibid 
423   ibid 
424   Ibid p 41 
 
425  ibid 
426   J Stevenson 'Auditor Independence : A Comparative Descriptive Study of the UK, France and Italy' 
International Journal of Auditing p 164 
427   M Cameran 'Audit Fees and the Large Auditor Premium in the Italian Market' (2005)9(2) International 
Journal of Auditing 131 
428  ibid 
429  J Stevenson 'Auditor Independence: A Comparative Descriptive Study of the UK, France and Italy' 
International Journal of Auditing p 163 
430  ibid 
431  ibid 
432  Ibid p 164 
433 ibid 
434  Codice Civile e Leggi Collegate 1995/96 
435  J Stevenson 'Auditor Independence: A Comparative Descriptive Study of the UK, France and Italy' 
International Journal of Auditing p 168 
 48 
Chapter Five            The Role of External Auditors in Banking Regulation and Supervision: A  Comparative Analysis   
the Consiglio Nazionale dei Ragionieri Commercialisti’s (CNRC) Codice Deontologico which was approved 
are covered first under general 
bound by 
ONSOB’s comprehensive regulations.  CONSOB performs quality reviews of the societa di revisione 
gularly440 in order to monitor independence and technical fitness.441 As a result of this process, CONSOB 
he two professional bodies with the aim of providing recommending changes 
442
endence are recognised and a range of safeguards are offered to reduce these threats.  
ent however, addresses issues on auditor independence more deeply than either the UK or 
EE codes.445 It also adopts the use of the principles based approach over a rules based approach as this 
y in dealing with issues related to auditor independence.446 The European 
AUDITOR ROTATION  
According to the data obtained for Italy, Italy is classified as having a relatively thin market for external 
 auditors 
                      
in October 1999 
 
The CNDC document is composed of 40 articles which cover three sections namely general principles, 
external relations and internal relations. Independence and objectivity 
principles before integrity and confidentiality but are not defined.436 
The CNRC’s Codice Deontologico is more comprehensive than the previously issued 1983 version and it has 
been influenced by the IFAC and FEE codes insofar as they are compatible with Italian legislation. As is the 
case in the UK, emphasis in the CNRC’s code is placed on objectivity rather than independence and on an 
independent frame of mind rather than the appearance of independence.437 
Since 1995, auditors (revisori)have to be qualified members of either the CNDC or CNRC and are 
automatically bound by their codes.438 In addition, external auditors of listed companies are 
439C
re
consults with the councils of t
to their practice and therefore plays an important role in external auditing in Italy.  Not only does it have 
the authority to remove any firm contradicting its regulations from the register, but also, registered firms are 
required to submit detailed documentation to CONSOB as part of its quality review process.443 
 
The EC Consultative Paper 
The EC Paper has evolved from an examination of the FEE Common Core Principles (FEE 1998) and has 
maintained not only the framework developed by FEE but that also common to the UK guidance whereby 
five threats to indep 444
The EC docum
F
promotes greater flexibilit
Commission has developed a two way approach by advancing a common set of principles governing the 
issue of auditor independence on the one hand, and tightening up the monitoring of audit quality within the 
EU on the other.447 
 
auditors.448 As a result, mandatory rotation would and should be desirable in Italy where external
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are concerned. Interestingly enough, mandatory rotation in Italy applies only to external auditors.449 Italy is 
e only EU Member State to require rotation of audit firms for listed clients as well as for other bodies such 
s insurance companies.450 
tors 
 years and was the main client of the 
onflict of interest faced by auditing 
th
a
 
 
Auditor Independence In the US 
In the US, developments relating to the issue of auditor independence have led to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) carrying out investigations in situations where conflicts of interests are 
apparent among major audit-consultancy firms.451 The preservation of the independence of external audi
is considered vital to investor protection – as a result, the Securities and Exchange Commission and AICPAC 
( American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) set up the Independence Standards Board (ISB).452 
In the aftermath of Enron, the Co-ordinating Group on Audit and Accounting Issues (CGAA) comprising 
regulators and ministers was formed by the UK government.453 The chairman and the director of the 
Accountancy Foundation Review Board (Review Board), were both members of the CGAA – the Board 
being responsible then for the independent oversight of the UK accountancy professional bodies.454 The 
Review Board in ensuring that policy discussions on the topic of auditor independence were well informed, 
commissioned a research programme in collaboration with leading academics and market research bodies.455 
Of great concern to the CGAA was the adequacy of the UK framework for auditor independence particularly 
given the circumstances which led to criticism of Andersen.456 These criticisms are as follows: The fact that 
the income generated by Andersen from non-audit services ($27 million) was greater than that from audit 
services ($25m); that Enron had been the partner’s only client for some
firm’s Houston office – hence making the office and partner economically dependent on keeping Enron as a 
client; and  a number of former staff of Andersen worked for Enron.457 
Enron’s accounting practices had overstated revenue from long term contracts and Andersen’s errors of 
judgement in the audit of Enron were admitted by Joseph Berardino, Andersen’s CEO before Congress in 
December 2001.458  As well as highlighting the importance of financial transparency in the adequate 
functioning of capital markets, the Enron case also demonstrates the c
firms where the same firm performs both the internal and external audits for the client firm and when the 
auditing firm also provides lucrative consulting services to the client.459 
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As regards non-audit services, the Review Board makes two recommendations:460 Firstly, for a prohibition to 
be introduced which would disallow auditors from providing advice to management where this had adverse 
effects for investors and secondly, that those permissible non-audit services presently in operation be 
reviewed and where threats to independence were significant, discontinuation of such services should be 
considered.461 Four further recommendations by the Review Board include the vesting of responsibility for 
e UK auditor independence framework in the Auditing Practices Board, that the level of economic 
ependence for one audit client be reduced to 5% of total practice fees, a suggestion for wide review to be 
urthly that the monitoring regime should extend 
ial information. 
 be determining factors in the expectations gap 
legal exposure to the audit profession but have also been directly addressed in both international and US 
auditing standards.470  The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act471 does not emphasise the significance of 
                                 
th
d
undertaken on the change of appointment procedures and fo
its scope to cover the management of economically significant clients.462 
 
Fourth Investigative Aim: The Audit Expectations Gap 
In countries like Italy and Germany where users of financial information are mainly bankers, governments or 
founding families, where there are relatively few listed companies ( when compared to the US and the 
UK),463 the expectations gap in these jurisdictions can be ascertained through the characteristics of the 
users of financ
Based on the uniformity of accounting rules, strong enforcement procedures which exist in the US,464 this 
would tend to reduce the expectations gap which exists in the US when compared to the EU and jurisdictions 
within the EU. 
Based on users of financial information however, countries such as Italy and Germany comprise mainly of 
core, insider shareholders465 hence the expectations gap is more likely to be reduced than the case of the UK 
and the US where there are many outside shareholders. 
In addition, the type of legal system (be it common law based or codified) is likely to have an impact on the 
expectations gap as the law can be said to be more well defined in codified systems in comparison to 
common law systems. These differences between credit/insiders (Germany and Italy) and equity/outsiders ( 
the UK and the US) shareholders and the legal systems may
within these jurisdiction. The situation however, is not so clear cut. Institutional and private investors now 
have an increasing importance in Germany466 and as mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the Italian 
and German governments have realised the growing importance of audits and requiring public or listed 
companies to publish detailed, audited financial statements. 
Litigation and legal exposure risks created by the expectations gap has led to great concerns for the 
international auditing community.467 Such are those concerns that the implementation of “expectations gap” 
auditing standards has taken place in the US.468 In addition, legislation relating to proportionate legal liability 
for auditors, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, was passed by the US Congress in 1995.469 
Management fraud and bankruptcy are two important audit contexts which not only present considerable 
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and R Parker Comparative International Accounting  p 22 
465
469
. 
ee ISA No 240 ( International Federation of Accountants 1996a), ISA No 570 (International 
460     S Fe
Collapse: An Example of Evidence-based Policy Making' (2004) 8(2) Intern
461   ibid 
462   ibid 
463   C Nobes  
464  See ibid p 46 
  Ibid p 24 
466  Ibid p 23 
467  B Anderson, M Maletta and A Wright 'Perceptions of Auditor Responsibility: Views of the Judiciary and the 
Profession' (1998) 2(3)International Journal of Auditing  215 
468  Ibid p 216 
  Ibid; The Act establishes conditions for auditor liability dependent on proportionate responsibility as opposed 
to joint and several liability which was stipulated by previous US law
470  Ibid p 217; S
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these two contexts since it requires audits of public companies not only to include procedures that will ensure 
e detection of fraud having a direct and material effect on the financial statements, but also an assessment 
472
. At present, a liability cap exists in just five EU 
ember states namely Germany, Austria, Belgium, Greece and Slovenia.475 Britain, in the meantime, is 
e of materiality, are likely to result to a higher level of 
tigation risk – since judges’ lack of consideration of materiality levels are likely to subject less culpable 
 
hether a fraud is above or below the auditor’s materiality level.  If factors such as materiality play such a 
th
of an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern, hence avoiding bankruptcy.  
 
Litigation concerns have  increased following the demise of Arthur Andersen, as a result of the Enron 
scandal. According to a European Commission policy paper due for publication in January 2007, the big four 
audit firms needed legal protection against potentially damaging legal actions.473 Four ways whereby 
Brussels could enhance protection for auditors as suggested by the Commission paper are as follows:474 
Firstly, through the imposition of a fixed monetary cap for auditor liability at European level via EU 
legislation; secondly, by introducing a cap based on the market capitalisation of the audited company; 
thirdly, the proposal of a cap based on a multiple of the audit fees charged by the auditor to his client; and 
fourthly, through the principle of “proportionate liability2 which can only be implemented by national 
governments. Under the principle of proportionate liability, auditors would only be liable for damages 
resulting from their own mistakes and not their clients’
m
implementing the concept of “proportionate liability”.476 
 
Expectations gap contribute to litigation risk because differences in perceptions between the judicial and 
audit profession, particularly with regards to the issu
li
auditors to less favourable judicial decision making. 
 
As well as evidence shows that certain external factors from the audit environment, held to be highly 
important by auditors are considered by the judiciary in deciding responsibility assessments and mitigate the 
effects of judges’ unfavourable attitudes towards the auditing profession, it has also been shown that whilst 
reliability and materiality greatly influenced auditors’ attributions, they did not play a part in the attributions 
of the judges.477 Findings show that whilst the audit profession attaches great importance to materiality 
issues in addressing audit responsibility in a fraud case, judges do not appear to take into consideration
478w
role in the audit standards, then judges should also consider these factors during responsibility assessments 
of auditors. 
 
In Germany, auditor legal liability is capped at a maximum amount and whilst there are pressures in other 
jurisdictions (such as the UK) to pass limited liability legislation, German auditors sought to increase the cap 
on audit liability in order to avoid broader unlimited responsibilities to third parties.479 Unique factors which 
exist in Germany include the close relationship of all professional groups within the state, the strong 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 Accountants, 1988d) SAS No 
on, M Maletta and A Wright 'Perceptions of Auditor Responsibility: Views of the Judiciary and the 
8) 2 (3)International Journal of Auditing 217 
474
477 ditor Responsibility: Views of the Judiciary and the 
478
nd the 
Federation of Accountants 1996d), SAS No 59 (American Institute of Certified Public
82 (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 1997); ibid. 
471 Title III 
472   B Anders
Profession' (199
473  T Buck 'Brussels Suggests Legal Shield for Big Audit Firms' Financial Times January  18 2007  
  ibid 
475  ibid 
476  ibid 
  B Anderson, M Maletta and A Wright 'Perceptions of Au
Profession' (1998) 2 (3) International Journal of Auditing  218 
  Ibid p 227 
479   B Anderson, M Maletta and A Wright 'Perceptions of Auditor Responsibility: Views of the Judiciary a
Profession' (1998) 2(3) International Journal of Auditing  229 
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influence of banks and conservative accounting.480 These factors are said to have accounted for the 
acceptance of capped audit liability arrangement over the past 60 years and for the initiative by auditors in 
seeking to increase the cap in order to avoid broader, unlimited responsibilities to third parties.481 In April 
1998, through amendments made to the German Commercial Code, audit reforms made effective for fiscal 
years ending after D 482ecember 31 1998, became law.  As well as changing the objective of the audit, the 
udit reforms refined audit reporting requirements, and increased the legal liability of auditors.483 The 
rms increased the legal liability limits of audit failures from 250,000 Euros 
YSIS 
ugh more work is required in regards to clearer 
485
reater level in the supervisory process. Effective 
nd regular communication is therefore required in order to ensure that the Bank provides timely, accurate 
nd complete information when required and requested for. The FSA also requires qualified and experienced 
a
legislation resulting from the refo
to 4 million Euros. 
 
COMPARATIVE ANAL
Comparative Analysis  between Germany and the UK 
First Investigative Aim 
The Central Bank's Involvement in Supervision in the UK and Germany  
BaFin and the Deutsche Bundesbank share responsibilities for banking supervision and this division of 
responsibilities is aided through a Memorandum of Understanding. The FSA, HM Treasury and the Bank of 
England also co-operate through a Memorandum of Understanding484. Reasons for HM Treasury's 
involvement are probably historical – the Bank of England's relationship with the Treasury dating as far as 
1946 through the Bank of  England Act 1946. A more direct involvement between the Bank of England and 
the FSA (rather than the existing tripartite one) would have been preferable – especially through the Bank of 
England's greater participation in the supervisory process. The Memorandum of Understanding aids 
accountability in the supervisory process – even tho
allocation of responsibilities, particularly in relation to when the Treasury should be involved.   The 
quality of the supervisory process would be greatly enhanced through the Bank of England's immense 
knowledge being effectively contributed to the supervisory process. 
The exchange of information between the Bank of England and the FSA is a vital principle486 since the Bank 
of England stands in a position whereby it can provide necessary information required for the FSA to 
function effectively. There should be more focus on exchange of information between the Bank of England 
and the FSA in order to involve the Bank of England on a g
a
a
                                                 
480  M Gietzmann and R Quick 'Capping Auditor Liability: The German Experience' 1996. See 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580>  (last visited 17th February 2007) 
481  Also see   B Anderson, M Maletta and A Wright 'Perceptions of Auditor Responsibility: Views of the 
Judiciary and the Profession' International Journal of Auditing 1998 p 229 
482  HA Skaife and J Gassen 'Can Audit Reforms Change the Monitoring Role of Audits? Evidence from the 
German Audit Market.' August 2006 see also 
<http://www.papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=933010#PaperDownload> 
483  Ibid ; Before the audit reforms, the audit objective focused on the verification of the composition and 
existence of assets-in-place. The published audit report was a one paragraph opinion that consisted of a mandatory 
phrase that annual financial statements were in compliance with German law and German generally accepted 
accounting principles, and that the financial statements presented a true and fair view of the enterprise. The auditor 
could voluntarily add an additional paragraph to the published audit report in order to inform the public about a 
specific problem or limitation of the audit, but the structure or the content of the optional additional paragraph was 
not codified by law; ibid 
 
484  Refer to chapter 1  for this 
485  See the Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial 
Services Authority (2006) paragraph 5 
486  For more on these principles see he Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, the Bank of 
England and the Financial Services Authority (2006) paragraph 1 
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staff who can recognise when such information is required. 
 
Regulatory Objectives 
In comparison to the UK, where the Financial Services Authority's statutory objectives govern the financial 
surance or investment activities, the regulatory objectives within the 
ctor in Germany have been retained. As these three regulatory objectives 
isting 
the inconsistencies arising from the fact that Germany has not adopted an 
debank 
or serious concern discovered during the course of their audits and secondly, that  
che Bundesbank rely not only on direct on site review but also on off site 
, and from this level of enforcement Germany's supervisory process introduces more checks in 
Treatment of Risk Concentration in the UK and Germany – Separate Supervision or Consolidated 
Supervision? 
re is still no integrated approach to cross 
                          
services industry, be it banking, in
banking, insurance and securities se
rank equally487, a situation could occur whereby conflicts arise as regards which regulatory objective should 
take priority. This presents a problem for the German system as there are no governing principles or 
guidelines to determine which objective should take priority – unlike the case which exists in the UK 
whereby section 2(3) of the FSMA 2000 exists. 
 
The Structure of Single Regulators 
In contrast to the UK where amalgamation of all previously existing financial services regulators, processes 
and objectives have taken place, Germany's structure of financial regulation consists of previously ex
regulators still operating independently albeit under one regulator, BaFin. As a result, there is still no 
integrated supervisory approach in Germany yet488 and as highlighted with conflicting objectives, this 
situation would also present opportunities for lack of coherence and inconsistencies when compared to the 
coherent system of the UK's FSA. 
In order to resolve 
integrated supervisory approach yet, it has been suggested that focus should be on close cooperation 
and an extensive exchange of information among the supervisory institutions in the various sectors.489 
This exchange of information would follow two objectives namely:490 To help improve the evaluation of 
cooperation with enterprises from the other financial sector in the case of sectoral individual supervision of 
an enterprise and secondly, to facilitate coordination between competent national supervisors in the 
deployment and evolution of the surveillance toolkit in connection with such one-stop finance strategies. 
Enforcement Process 
The audit reports produced by auditors of a German bank are submitted to the German Bundesbank for 
evaluation who then reports its findings to the BaFin. Safeguards inherent in the German system include: 
Firstly, the statutory obligations imposed on auditors to report to the regulator (BaFin) and the Bun
any irregularities or causes f
both BaFin and the Deuts
review.491 
In this respect
its enforcement process than is the case in the UK – as the regulator and the central bank both review the 
work performed by external auditors. The UK like also Germany imposes statutory obligations on auditors to 
report any irregularities or causes for serious concern discovered during the course of their audits.492 
Second Investigative Aim 
In contrast to the UK, where consolidated supervision exists, the
                       
's Annual Report for 2004 
ndesbank Monthly Report  (April 2005) p 55 
491
487 See BaFin
488  See Deutsche Bu
489  ibid p 56 
490  ibid 
  E Huepkes p 11 
492  See FSMA section 166 and the German Banking Act , KWG section 28 
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sector supervision of equivalent risks in Germany. The one stop financial services strategy on which the 
 sectors.  The provisions of section 7 of the 
 single risk-based approach rather than having multiple systems 
perating in various parts of the industry is that the risks posed by individual sectors can be compared 
gainst one set of criteria.500 A single approach does not necessarily indicate that all sectors of the industry 
risks or that they will give rise to the same degree of risk to the individual 
re are differences in the sources of finance for 
                                                
establishment of BaFin is based is reflected strongly in the “Risk Analysis and Finance Market Studies 
Department'.493 In Germany, financial conglomerates play a greater role in the insurance sector where they 
account for a total of 52% of the gross premiums written.494 In contrast, they play a less significant role in 
the banking sector.495 
The focus of the supervisory regime in Germany concerns setting specific capital requirements at a financial 
conglomerate level and treating risk concentration to separate supervision.496 Since there is still no integrated 
supervisory approach in Germany, there should be focus on close cooperation and extensive exchange of 
information between the supervisory institutions in the various 497
Banking Act and section 84(4) No 2a of the Insurance Supervision Act on the exchange of information will 
facilitate such close cross-sector cooperation between BaFin's insurance and banking supervisory sections.498 
It is also vital to monitor interrelationships between these two sectors to ensure accurate assessment of their 
scope and relevance to the stability of the financial system.499  
The main efficiency gain from using a
o
a
present the same kind of 
objectives or principles of regulation.501 
 
Third Investigative Aim 
Differences Between the Audit and Accounting Profession in Germany and the UK 
In addition to representing opposing accounting traditions, Germany and the UK have different legal 
systems.502 Whilst the UK operates according to a common-law based legal system, Germany is based on 
codified Roman Law. This legal difference plays an important role inter alia on each country’s interpretation 
of the ‘true and fair view’ principle.503 In addition, the
enterprises and as a result, differences in the importance of capital markets.504 German finance has 
traditionally been provided by banks ( both as equity owners and as lenders) whilst in the UK, finance has 
been provided by external shareholders.505 Understandably, this difference has led to greater importance and 
focus on audit and publication requirements in the UK.506 
In Germany, there is a lower number of listed companies than in the UK.507 In addition, share capital is less 
distributed and small investors are not as important.508 As a result of these differences, there is more 
tendency for the German system to place greater emphasis on creditor protection whilst the UK system 
 
493 See 'Responsibilities and Objectives : Cross Sectoral Departments' 
http /bafin/aufgabenundziele_en.htm< ://www.bafin.de >  
on of Financial Conglomerates in Germany' Monthly Report April 2005 p 39 
,40 
 40 
 
501
ns and C Nobes 'Harmonisation of the Structure of Audit Firms: Incorporation in the UK and Germany' 
opean Accounting Review at p 126 
 
494   'Supervisi
495  Ibid pp 39
496  Ibid p
497  Ibid p 56
498  Ibid  
499 ibid 
500  D Singh 'The Legal Aspects of Prudential Supervision' 2007 p 133  
  ibid 
502   L Eva
(1998) 7 (1)Eur
503  Ibid  
504  ibid 
505 Ibid p 127 
506  ibid 
507  Ibid p 141
508  ibid 
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emphasizes shareholder protection.509 
Vieten however questions differences which particularly relate to the distinction between statutory control in 
Germany and a strong profession in the UK – especially because of EU harmonisation.510 He points out that 
the increased scope for government tein rvention in Britain has resulted to a situation which is increasingly 
sembling that of the German system.511 Apart from this however, he notes that there are still more 
 systems – particularly their audit objectives.512 Whilst the audit 
cordance with the relevant legislation, that of the UK is to give 
st in Germany.515 In Britain, auditors grew more dependent 
unting and auditing professions in Germany and the United Kingdom are 
aps, and it is larger than the 
c  be heard at the general meeting if the directors try to remove him.520 The 
ch rights except in court proceedings – however, his right to make 
521
re
differences than similarities between the two
objective under German law is to test for ac
an opinion on the true and fair view.513  
 
Concepts of  “Auditing” and “Accounting” 
One significant difference between the auditing professions in Germany and Britain is the existence of 
auditing as a distinct profession in Germany.514 The Wirtschaftspruefer is a qualified auditor and in contrast 
to Britain, an accounting profession does not exi
on the expertise of accountants over the years until the audit function became dominated by the accounting 
profession.516 The concepts of “auditing” and “accounting” are often used interchangeably in Britain.517 
(One of the reasons why the dual role of external auditor/ reporting accountant) does not exist in Germany – 
roles are distinct, conflicts of interest better avoided). 
Other differences between the acco
as follows:518 In Germany, the tax profession is separate although it overl
accountancy body. In contrast the UK system includes those practising tax in its accountants' figure. A 
second tier auditing body for auditors permitted only to audit private companies ( of vereidigte Buchpruefer) 
came into being in the late 1980s. 
Communication between Audit/Accounting Profession and Third Parties 
In the UK, the auditor owes a duty to the company and following Caparo v Dickman to the shareholders as a 
body – not an individual person.519 Under company law, the auditor can also make written representation to 
shareholders and an
Wirtschaftspruefer does not have su
statements is limited by the duty of confidentiality he owes the company.  This is not to say that the 
auditor, under German law, cannot report irregularities. He has to do so by reporting to the management and 
supervisory board.522 
Exercise of Professional Judgements 
                                                 
509  ibid 
510  Ibid p 127 
511  H Vieten 'Auditing in Britain and  Germany Compared: Professions, Knowledge and the State' (1995) 4(3) 
European Accounting Review  495 
512  ibid p 500; also see  Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens  'Enforcement Mechanisms in Europe: A 
Preliminary Investigation of Oversight Systems'  April 2001 p 33 : the purpose of the German audit is to provide a 
statement as to whether or not the financial statements and the annual report are in accordance with authoritative 
accounting principles. 
513   L Evans and C Nobes 'Harmonisation of the Structure of Audit Firms: Incorporation in the UK and Germany' 
The European Accounting Review  127 
514 Vieten p 146 
515 ibid 
516 ibid  
517 ibid 
518  C Nobes and R Parker Comparative International Accounting  p 27  
519 Vieten p 153 
520 ibid 
521 ibid 
522 ibid 
 56 
Chapter Five            The Role of External Auditors in Banking Regulation and Supervision: A  Comparative Analysis   
It is debatable as regards whether the Wirtschaftspruefer does exercise as much professional judgement as 
his UK counterpart as a system of common law exists in the UK as contrasted to codification which exists in 
Germany. However, since German law does not cover all cases, some measure of professional judgement 
would still be required from the Wirtschaftspruefer.  
Some similarities however persist between the German and UK systems of regulation of 
auditors/accountants. As is the case in the UK523, a d au l system of state and self regulation operates in 
in usive than inspection. 
ank auditing goes beyond company law requirements.532 As well as providing German regulators with 
ime of its successor, the 
inancial Services Authority, has led to a more reduced level of frequency in number of reports produced. 
provide a special report required by the regulator. In addition, auditors are required by law to report, subject 
                    
Germany.524 The Wirtschaftsprueferkammer (chamber of auditors) was established in 1961 and assumes the 
form of a self-governing body but is supervised by the Federal Minister of Economics, whose approval is 
essential for amendments to its constitution.525 The other important body in Germany is the Institut der 
Wirtschaftspruefer, the members’ trade organisation.526 Membership of this organisation is not only 
voluntary but also restricted to practising auditors only.527 
Initially, there were no provisions for on-site inspection in Britain.528 Subsequently, the auditor’s role in 
facilitating monitoring was realised.529 Regulators are now incorporating audit technology into their 
enforcement procedures.530 Unlike financial regulators in the US however, British and German banking 
supervisors do not have large teams of inspectors investigating bank operations on-site. Instead, the external 
auditor contributes by monitoring.531 Auditing is also considered as being less tr
B
attested annual financial statements, German bank auditors are also required to provide them with a more 
detailed report on the audit.533 Confidential reports to regulatory authorities, as well as auditors’ reports 
which focus on capital ratios and other items have become important focal points.534 Auditing provides a 
vital connection between prudential authorities and regulated financial institutions.535 
 
Under the Bank of England’s regime, British banking law featured just a few reporting requirements.536 The 
audit report still follows company law by stating whether or not the financial statements provide a true and 
fair view and are properly in accordance with the Companies Act 1985. The reg
F
From 1 April 2003 to 31 March 2004, the FSA exercised its power under section 166 of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 to require firms to produce a skilled person’s report in 28 situations.537 This 
is a considerable reduction in investigations from the number of reporting accountants commissioned under 
section 39 Banking Act 1987 which frequently exceeded 600 reports annually.538 
 
Under Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) 620 Revised : The Auditor’s Right and Duty To Report To 
Regulators in the Financial Sector, auditors have routine reporting responsibilities and also responsibilities to 
                             
47 
74 
WG 
 and P O Russell  at p  107 
523 See chapter 3 
524 Vieten p 1
525 ibid 
526 ibid 
527 ibid 
528 Vieten p 1
529 ibid 
530 Vieten at p 166 
531 ibid 
532 ibid 
533 Section 26 (1) K
534 Vieten at p 166 
535 ibid 
536 See Vieten p 167 
537 P Dewing
538 ibid 
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to compliance with legislation relating to “tipping-off”, direct to a regulator when they conclude that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that a matter is or may be of material significance to the regulator. 
In the UK, prior to 1994, there was only a right to report under section 47 of the Banking Act 1987.539 This 
gave the auditor the right to report any matters of prudential concern to the Bank of England. Usually 
auditors are under a duty not to communicate with third parties. However, as long as the auditor had 
communicated to the regulator in good faith, he could not be considered to have breached any duty of 
confidentiality. SAS 620 gave rise to an extension of the right to the duty to communicate.540 In Germany, 
FSA Supervision Manual 
rovides examples of circumstances where the FSA may use skilled persons. The FSA may nominate or 
a k 
can undertake for the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority.  For all other audits 
                       
however, there has always been strict rules upon the auditor in that he had a duty to communicate.541 There 
is still no statutory duty to communicate in the UK even though the duty to report has gone beyond just using 
a professional standard (SAS 620) to using a statutory instrument.542 Apart from the duty to report to 
regulators in the financial sector, the auditor can also provide reports as a skilled person. 
In the UK, section 166 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 deals with the powers of the FSA to 
obtain a report by a skilled person (reporting accountant) to assist the FSA in performing its functions under 
FSMA 2000. Under sections 167 and 168 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, the FSA also has 
the powers to appoint competent persons to carry out investigations. The differences between the roles of 
reporting accountants (now known as skilled persons) and competent persons are demonstrated by the bearer 
of the costs for work carried out by these persons. For work undertaken by skilled persons, the bank bears the 
cost directly whilst for work undertaken by competent persons, the FSA bears the cost.543 The role of the 
reporting accountant has become so important that it will be incorporated into the entire regulated sector.544 
Even though skilled persons are usually approved by the FSA, the role is usually performed by auditors of 
the regulated firm.545 This raises the question of independence since both roles of auditor and reporting 
accountant are distinct roles which still overlap occasionally.546 Measures have however been adopted by 
the FSA to safeguard against possibilities of a conflict of interest. Chapter 5 of the 
p
approve the appointment of the auditor of a bank as a skilled person if it is cost effective to do so but also 
takes into account any conflicts the auditor may have in relation to the matter to be reported on. There are 
also defined and limited circumstances in which a firm can use skilled persons.547 
 
The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority has the powers to carry out special audits at any time but also 
makes use of external firms of certified accountants or could ask the Bundesbank for help. The Bundesb n
audits minimum reserves and foreign currency transactions and parts of the audit are performed for the 
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority.548 The Bundesbank does not charge any fees and there is a limit to 
the number of audits it 549
                          
n p 168 
542 tants ( Banking Act 1987) Regulations 1994, SI 1994/524 
te of 
 'The Role of Third Parties in Banking Regulation and Supervision' (2003) 4 (3) Journal of 
anking Regulation   9 
546
547
sidered 
killed persons because of the added value to be gained due to their expertise or knowledge and 
t b  restraints; to take into account cost implications and to use the tool in a focused and 
ay. 
n p 169 
539 See Viete
540 ibid 
541 ibid 
 See paragraph 3 of the Accoun
543  See J Hitchins, MHogg and DMallett  Banking: A Regulatory Accounting and Auditing Guide (Institu
Chartered Accountants 2001)  295 
544   D Singh 
International B
545  ibid 
 ibid 
  According to chapter 5 of the Supervision Manual, the FSA stated that firms are to appoint skilled persons 
only for specific purposes; not to use them as a matter of routine; to use skilled persons only after having con
alternatives; to use s
no ecause of resource
proportionate w
548 See Viete
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carried out by external auditors, which are section 44 reports, the external auditors are paid by the banks.550 
Whilst the Bank of England usually used a financial institution’s chosen auditor (even though it had the 
power to appoint its chosen auditors), the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority might select a different 
firm of accountants.551 
The FSA may nominate or approve the appointment of the auditor of a bank as a skilled person if it is cost 
effective to do so but also takes into account any conflicts the auditor may have in relation to the matter to be 
reported on. There are also defined and limited circumstances in which a firm can use skilled persons.552 
There are certain advantages in using a financial institution’s chosen auditor in that the auditor will most 
likely have worked at the bank before and therefore be familiar with the environment. This will save costs as 
he is not learning new things about the bank and is more familiar with vital information and procedures 
hilst the FSA’s use of external auditors has declined, when compared to the use of external auditors by the 
ecognised Supervisory Bodies whereby the Secretary of State could still delegate 
ower through them.555 The implementation of the Eighth Directive through the Companies Act of 1989, 
ddressed auditor independence in two ways namely:556 Firstly by stating the ineligibility of a person to be 
As a result of their historical development, large German audit firms were often owned by banks or the 
required for the audit. However, audit firms need to be rotated and if the same audit firm had been used by 
the bank for quite some time, this may affect the judgment of the audit firm as to much familiarity with the 
client ( bank) could compromise the objectivity and independence of the audit firm. As a result of potential 
conflicts of interests, it may be said that the FSA’s approach is definitely an improvement on the approach 
previously taken by its predecessor. 
W
Bank of England, it may be justified based on its reduction in use of external auditors also acting in the dual 
capacity of skilled persons. Where the external auditor acts solely and exclusively as an external auditor, and 
not under the dual role of skilled person/auditor, then increased use should be made of such auditors. 
 
The Impact of the Eighth EU Council Directive on German and UK Auditing Professions All UK registered 
companies are subject to an annual external audit as part of the requirement of the Companies Act of 
1985.553  As from July 2000, companies meeting two tests of the Audit Exemption Amendment 2000 SI 
2000/1430 and also requirements of the EC Fourth Directive were exempted from the audit requirement.554 
Through the Companies Act 1989, regulatory authority for auditing was given to the Secretary of State but 
the accountancy profession still maintained its self-regulatory status through the major professional bodies 
assuming the title of R
p
a
appointed as auditor where he is an officer or employee of that company or a partner/employee of a company 
officer or employee557 and secondly, by requiring Recognised Supervisory Bodies to have rules on eligibility 
as a further measure558. 
 
                                                 
 ibid 
 Ibid at p 170 
  According to chapter 5 of the Supervision Manual, the FSA stated that firms are to appoint skilled perso
only for specific pur
550
551
552 ns 
poses; not to use them as a matter of routine;to use skilled persons only after having considered 
 
ecause of resource restraints; to take into account cost implications and to use the tool in a focused and 
553 y p 
tests under the Audit Exemption being turnover up to £1 million and/or balance sheet total up to £1.4 
illi ximum of 50 employees. The Secretary of  State for Trade and Industry raised the turnover 
aximum of £4.8 permitted under the Fourth Directive.  
557
alternatives; to use skilled persons because of the added value to be gained due to their expertise or knowledge and
not b
proportionate way. 
  See JE Stevenson 'Auditor Independence : A Comparative Descriptive Study of the UK, France and Ital
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State.559 Article 2 of the 8th Directive allows an exemption with respect to voting rights and if this exemption 
had not been implemented in Article 2, these owners ( banks and the State) would have been barred with the 
resulting violation of the German constitution and legal proceedings against the State.560 
 
The UK implementation the 8th Directive through the Companies Act 1989 resulted in more rules being laid 
down in legislation instead of being delegated to the accounting profession.561 More importantly, there was 
the removal of the prohibition f 562or auditors to incorporate with effect from 1 October 1991.  KPMG 
xpressed their views on incorporation – their objection having been based rather on concerns related to 
uditor independence and confidentiality with the most apparent problem being the audit client holding 
t object in principle to the idea of incorporation but rather to the 
-guarding of assets, there were apparent conflicts of interest in 
e auditor’s appointment before the 1998 audit reforms.570 As well as making the supervisory board 
sponsible for hiring the auditor, the audit reforms made it mandatory for the auditor to report exclusively to 
571 The reforms brought about an increase in the legal liability limits for auditors 
                                                
e
a
shares in the audit firm.563 KPMG did no
idea of outside shareholders as they felt that the same person should not be allowed to hold a directorship 
with the auditor and his client.564 
 
Safeguards to Independence in Germany 
Germany on the other hand in 1985, introduced a law requiring all new corporate auditors to be wholly 
owned by persons working in the business of the corporate auditor and with a majority of voting shares being 
held by qualifying interests.565 In so doing, Germany was taking measures to strengthen independence.566 
German audit reforms which became law in April 1998 have made it compulsory for auditors to modify audit 
reports and disclose through a middle paragraph, a going concern limitation, a disclosure omission or non 
compliance with generally accepted accounting principles.567 According to the German Stock Corporation 
Act, it is compulsory for all German stock corporations to have a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) and a 
management board (Vorstand).568 Before the 1998 audit reforms, no guidelines were in place as regards who 
was responsible for hiring the auditor.569 Management was usually responsible for the hiring of auditors 
whilst the supervisory board approved the appointment and since the auditor was hired to check up on 
management’s compliance with laws and safe
th
re
the supervisory board.
which resulted in additional incentives for auditors to act independently by detecting and reporting 
accounting omissions, irregularities and uncertainties.572 
 
Safeguards in the UK 
 
d C Nobes 'Harmonisation of the Structure of Audit Firms : Incorporation in the UK and Germany' 
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UK legislation implements only the minimum requirement of Article 2 which requires a firm of auditors to 
e controlled by qualified persons (where this is defined mainly with respect to voting rights).573 The 
as insufficient to safeguard auditor independence if 
ontrol meant that only a mere majority of voting rights.574 Using their position as Recognised Supervisory 
ut in place a requirement that at least 75% of voting rights should be held by qualified auditors 
anagement body.575 
ory framework but also one which was 
 avoid regulating at EU level and the draft of a set of common 
 not require mandatory rotation of firms but does 
                      
b
Institutes ( ICAEW, ICAS and ICAI) considered this 
c
Bodies, they p
– which also applies to voting rights on the m
 
 
Convergence 
As mentioned previously, the UK is moving towards the German system in terms of relying more on state 
regulation.576  In other areas however, there have been problems with harmonisation. The Green Paper 
highlighted the weaknesses of the Eighth Directive in failing to produce a common definition of 
independence – thereby resulting not only in an incomplete regulat
not helping to fulfil EC objectives.577 
European harmonisation would help place the European Community in a strong position to take on an 
international role with bodies such as the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).578 
Following the Green Paper proposals, a new Committee on Auditing was established by the European 
Commission which consisted not only of representatives from auditing regulators in the 15 Member States 
and 3 countries of the European Economic Area (EEA), but also of representatives from the audit profession, 
internal auditors and large European firms.579 This signified a new approach to regulation by the European 
Commission in that unlike the previous use of directives to harmonise, the European profession was called 
upon to draft a common set of principles as a starting point.580 Given the problems of harmonisation with 
the Eighth Directive, the Green Paper had to
principles by the European profession (FEE) made this possible.581 The FEE’s efforts resulted to the 1998 
publication of “Statutory Audit – Independence and Objectivity, Common Core Principles for the Guidance 
of the European Profession” ( Initial Recommendations) and this publication has provided the framework for 
the European Commission Consultative Paper “Statutory Auditors’ Independence in the EU : A Set of 
Fundamental Principles” issued in 2000.582 
The Recommendation issued by the European Commission Statutory Auditor’s Independence in the EU: A 
Set of Fundamental Principles on 16 May 2002, does
require mandatory partner rotation on listed clients after seven years.583 This differs in some aspects from the 
UK requirements as :584 (i) It allows a return after two years ( not five years as in the UK); (ii) It applies to 
‘public interest clients’ not just listed clients and (iii) In a group context, it extends to key audit partners 
other than the audit engagement partner. No country within the EU, with the exception of Italy presently 
                           
s 'Harmonisation of the Structure of Audit Firms: Incorporation in the UK and Germany' 
574
997 p 155 
son 'Auditor Independence : A Comparative Descriptive Study of the UK, France and Italy' 
urnal of Auditing  156 
6 
583 f Audit Firms'  p 9 ; see <http:// www.icaew.co.uk/publicass> 
573  L Evans and C Nobe
The European Accounting Review  137 
  ibid 
575  ibid 
576  Vieten  1
577    J Steven
International Jo
578  Ibid p 15
579 ibid 
580 ibid 
581 ibid 
582 ibid 
 S Fearnley 'Mandatory Rotation o
584 ibid 
 61 
Chapter Five            The Role of External Auditors in Banking Regulation and Supervision: A  Comparative Analysis   
undertake a system of mandatory audit firm rotation.585 
If this recommendation fails to achieve desired harmonisation, the European Commission intends to resort to 
the use of legislation.586 The process of European Union auditing harmonization has so far, been successful 
and is likely to continue to be so in the future.587 Convergence with International Accounting Standards 
requires constant and thorough enforcement procedures across Europe and around the world.588 The UK’s 
 p ove its worth to users of audit reports.592 Both the EC Recommendation and the Code of 
thics of IFAC (International Federation of Accountants) adopt a conceptual framework approach to 
dependence . The Recommendation makes it necessary for auditors to identify, consider and document 
otential threats to their independence and to detail safeguards which have been put in place to eliminate 
s of immense importance, its powers should not be so great that this results to lack of accountability 
 the financial process. Lessons from Parmalat and the failure of the Bank of Italy to intervene when it 
ould led to rapid reforms being made to curtail the Bank of Italy's powers and catapulted the process of the 
d to the supervisory 
gency. 
                                                
Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) is considered by the FEE as a potential model for other EU 
jurisdictions even though some have commented that the effectiveness of the FRRP could be further 
strengthened by introducing some form of pro-active monitoring.589 It  was  however added that any 
changes to the FRRP should be co-ordinated with developments in Europe.590 
A survey carried out by the FEE shows that the principles-based approach to auditor independence which is 
set out in the EU Recommendation on Independence is now extensively used throughout Europe.591 The 
importance of a regulatory pause has been highlighted to allow time for this approach to auditor 
independence r
E
in
p
those threats.593 
 
 
Comparisons  between  the UK and Italy 
First Investigative Aim: Even though Italy is still in the process of adopting its single regulator for financial 
services, the importance of the central bank's role in the supervisory process is emphasised. Indeed, the Bank 
of Italy's powers are so immense that efforts are being made to curtail it – in contrast to the position of the 
Bank of England. This goes to show that even though the central bank's involvement in the supervisory 
process i
in
sh
adoption of a single regulator. Whilst the central bank's role in supervision is of immense importance, a 
balance should be struck between those powers assigned to it and those powers assigne
a
 
Second Investigative  Aim: There is more focus on meta risk regulation (the adoption of the Basel II 
Accord) by the Bank of Italy than on risk based supervision when compared to the UK. 
 
Third Investigative Aim 
The concept of the external audit has not been in operation in Italy for a considerably long period – however, 
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it has been distinguished from the traditional sindaci (internal) audit through legislative restraints on the role 
of the societa di revisione and equipping the stock exchange authority with primary control over external 
listed audits.594 The Italian guidance is surely not as developed as that in the UK – due to it being more 
recent, however most of the safeguards in Italy are laid down in legislation or under
595
 stock exchange 
s in an objective manner and are seen to do so.597 
, 98% of the companies are of small/medium size, do not depend on the stock 
market, and as a result, rely on banks or government and/or EU grants for financial resources. Financial 
institutions are more dependent on other resources and sources of financial information than a set of fiscally 
biased financial statements information. 
 
                                                
control.  As a result, not only is there stronger statutory control and uniformity in Italy than the UK, there 
is also stronger power distance and uncertainty avoidance in comparison to the weak power distance and 
uncertainty avoidance which exists in the UK.596  The role of CONSOB in regulating external audit of listed 
companies and its participation- being a stock market regulator, appears to be provide tighter measures for 
ensuring that auditors perform their dutie
The issue is that in Italy
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Comparisons between the UK and the US  
First Investigative Aim 
In contrast to the UK, the US has not adopted a single regulator even though it realises the need to do so. 
Historical factors and the complex structure of regulation which exists in the US would undoubtedly make it 
difficult to overhaul the present system of regulation. Such is the complexity of the present system of 
regulation that issues relating to responsibilities of various regulators in the event of an adoption of a single 
regulator, need to be carefully considered. If jurisdictions with just one supervisory authority still experience 
problems in allocating supervisory responsibilities, the task for the US system of supervision would not be 
less difficult.  
Second Investigative Aim 
The significance of the US risk based approach to supervision is that it focusses on the firm's risk 
management techniques and the safety and soundness of the bank whilst the UK seeks to focus on a specific 
interpretation of risk which connects risk and risk taking to objectives and principles.598 The UK and US 
however have adopted similar approaches as they both try to manage regulatory resources according to the 
risks posed by the respective institutions. Both systems are also similar in that they both emphasise the 
importance of being able to oversee the business undertaken by a group and an individual bank to assess 
whether such group activities present risks to objectives.599 Categories used in UK and US risk assessments 
are also similar even though they are labelled differently.600 
Work undertaken by the OCC, in comparison to the UK's FSA, does not show provision for cross 
comparisons with other banks in a sector and the different risk based systems in the US banking sector would 
make cross sector comparisons difficult.601 
 
Third Investigative Aim 
Following the Enron debacle, concerns were raised about the UK’s financial reporting system and as a result 
of greater awareness to continuously develop the financial reporting system and standards, there has been 
greater effort to improve accounting practices of UK listed companies – particularly at international level.602  
In response to a move aimed at facilitating integrated financial services market in the EU, a draft regulation 
was published in February 2001 in the aftermath of an announcement by the European Commission in June 
2000 that it would be mandatory for EU listed companies to use International Accounting Standards (IAS) in 
their consolidated accounts from 2005.603 In March 2002, the European Parliament gave approval for 
adoption of standards issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) which governs listed 
companies when preparing financial statements.604 
 
Problems within the UK corporate reporting sector include limited statutory requirements and non mandatory 
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) guidance on the operating and financial reviews of listed companies.605 
Since the late 1980s, continual efforts have been made in the UK to reduce the potential for exclusion of 
assets and liabilities from the balance sheet – particularly those which could affect the overall standing of 
 
598   D Singh 'Legal Aspects of Prudential Supervision' 2007 p 134 
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companies.606 The development of US standards has not attained this level although the FASB is 
considering moves in such direction.607 Although the Enron affair has not revealed any significant issues 
which present great concern for UK financial reporting standards, there is constantly a need to develop 
standards to incorporate new business practices, reasonable shareholder expectations and other 
developments.608 
Differences in audit regulation between the UK and the US comprise the following:609 There exists a 
principles-based approach system in the UK as opposed to a rules-based system which exists in the US; in 
the UK, the inspection regime is controlled by full-time professionally qualified inspectors employed by the 
professional bodies and whose work is approved by the government.; the UK Accountancy Foundation 
supervises the profession’s regulatory and disciplinary arrangements to ensure they are in accord with public 
interest. 
Examples of safeguards adopted in the UK to protect the independence of auditors include :610 The ability of 
staff on audit assignments to communicate concerns to a separate partner Provision for an independent 
partner to be reviewer or reviser of the work Regular rotation of audit partners 
– Effective interchange between the audit committee and auditor 
– Segregation of responsibilities and knowledge within the audit firm. 
Existing provisions to protect the auditor’s independence in the event of providing non-audit services 
include:611 The prohibition by the Institute of non-audit services to audit clients where that would present a 
threat to independence for which no safeguards are available; secondly, the audit committee, as 
representative of the shareholders has the responsibility of overseeing the relationship with the auditor, 
checking that the nature and scope of non-audit services in operation and satisfying itself that the auditor’s 
independence and objectivity are not compromised; thirdly, the ethical code states that an audit appointment 
to a listed company should not be accepted where the client provides as much as 10% of a firm’s gross 
income; and fourthly, an improved environment facilitating transparency has been created over the years 
whereby shareholders themselves are able to gauge the extent of non-audit services provided by auditors. 
Arguments in favour of the provision of non-audit services include the need for auditors to be able to acquire 
knowledge and experience from colleagues who are experts in key risk areas.612 In addition, rigid separation 
of audit and non-audit services within such a firm would lead to a  decrease in the level of audit quality, an 
increase in cost or some combination of both.613 In addition, the chairman of the SEC expressed his view that 
creating an “audit only” firm would not necessarily guarantee an “audit failure free “ future.614 This is true, 
however any reduction in audits failures ( be it not 100%), may range from little to a highly significant 
reduction – significant enough to avoid a major corporate crisis. 
 
Arguments in favour of mandatory rotation of audit firms require the consideration of two issues namely 
whether there is a link between the length of association and reduction of audit quality, and whether 
mandatory rotation in principle, would result to increased audit quality.615 In the United Kingdom, legislation 
requires shareholders to appoint auditors annually and the Combined Code requires audit committees to keep 
under constant review the independence of the auditor616. According to opponents of mandatory rotation, 
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these provide a better safeguard than fixed-period mandatory rotation. 
 
 
ASSESSMENTS  
 
 
Even though Germany’s system of supervision is advantageous in that its central bank, the Bundesbank, has 
principal functions within the regulatory and supervisory process, it has not amended its substantive law and 
cannot be said to be exploiting maximum possible benefits of implementing a single financial services 
regulator. This is in contrast to the UK, whose legislation was amended following the adoption of a single 
financial services regulator. The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 has gone a long way in improving 
accountability within the financial services sector. 
 
However it has also been argued the FSA is not sufficiently accountable to Parliament and to those financial 
customers on behalf of whom it regulates the financial services sector and who indirectly pay for its costs 
through charges imposed.617 Apart from recommending that the composition of the FSA Board be changed, 
that members of the FSA’s Consumer Panel should not all be appointed by the FSA and that the Financial 
Ombudsman Service618 be made into an entirely separate statutory organisation from the FSA, it has also 
been noted that the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 protects the FSA and its staff from being held 
liable to policyholders for losses arising from its negligence.619  This is in contrast to the situation which 
exists in Germany , Italy where the supreme courts of these jurisdictions have held that banking regulators 
can be held liable for loss caused to depositors as a result of their negligence.620 
 
Even though the introduction of new UK legislation (and its approach to integrated supervision as a result), 
has its benefits, the UK's system of supervision since the adoption of a single regulator also has its 
disadvantages. The UK’s adoption of a risk based approach to supervision by its regulator, the FSA, has led 
to the reduction of the use of external auditors by the FSA. The risk based approach to supervision is to be 
commended and if it were carried out on a sectoral level, that is, within the different sectors (insurance, 
banking sectors) as opposed to an integrated level, more resources could be allocated to the banking sector. 
This could be achieved by allocating a stipulated amount of resources to each sector. A risk based approach 
to supervision could then be carried out within the different sectors. Within the banking sector, priority 
would be given to external auditors, such that the number of external auditors used for on-site inspections in 
particular, would be increased to a level above that which had ever operated. 
This is important, not only because the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision recommends the use of 
                                                 
617   Summary of  Submission to the House of Lords Select Committee on the Accountability of the Financial 
Services Authority in general, and of the Accountability of the Government and of the Parliamentary Ombudsman 
Regarding the Equitable Debacle. 
618 The Financial Ombudsman Services was established under the FSMA 2000 in order to facilitate quick 
resolution of disputes between consumers and financial service firms. It is a company limited by guarantee, without 
share capital, deals with approximately 108,000 cases annually and has an estimated budget of about £53.1 million. 
Whilst the Financial Ombudsman Service is an independent  arbitration service, and whilst the  Financial 
Ombudsman Service Board is responsible for appointing the Chief Ombudsman and ensuring his independence, the 
FSA is responsible for appointing members of the Financial Ombudsman Service Board, for establishing the 
scheme's scope and areas of functions, and for establishing principles for handling customer complaints. For more 
information on this, see 'Sir Christopher Kelly appointed chairman of the Financial Ombudsman Service ' 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Communication/PR/2005/008.shtml (last visited 12th February 2007) 
619   Summary of  Submission to the House of Lords Select Committee on the Accountability of the Financial 
Services Authority in general, and of the Accountability of the Government and of the Parliamentary Ombudsman 
Regarding the Equitable Debacle. 
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external auditors, but because the reduced involvement of the Bank of England in the bank supervisory 
process warrants greater use of the expertise which could be provided by external auditors. In addition, a 
more pro active approach (increased use of on-site inspections) to bank supervision was suggested following 
the collapse of Barings Bank. External auditors can help bank examination staff perform on-site inspections. 
Risk based regulation has also impacted the UK's financial enforcement procedures as demonstrated 
by a case, the Legal and General Assurance Society (L & G) v FSA case621. This case has also brought to 
light the need for a more proactive approach to bank supervision. Self-enforcement, monitoring by 
regulators, the approval of financial statements and the statutory audit are enforcement mechanisms used by 
the UK, Germany and Italy. There are large differences in legal environments and these contribute in part to 
the differences in the enforcement procedures. 
In determining whether a particular jurisdiction’s accounting system and auditing practices are better than 
the other, factors such as jurisdictional differences, objectives and main purposes of each individual 
jurisdiction’s financial reporting systems need to be taken into account. For example, in comparing US and 
German accounting/auditing, one may assume right from the outset that US accounting is better because 
there is more disclosure.622 However, US accounting is very expensive to operate and such costs may not be 
justifiable for a country like Germany where there are limited capital markets.623 US financial reporting also 
produces more volatile series of earning figures than German accounting and even though this may be 
beneficial to active stock market users, it may not be so for a longer term view – a position which is usually 
favoured by German financiers.624 
 
The different mix of users in the various countries also need to be considered. In Germany for instance, the 
importance of banks has been given as a possible reason for greater conservatism in reporting than in the 
UK.625 Conservatism is however becoming a thing of the past in Germany and many European jurisdictions 
like Italy as many listed companies adopt IAS or US rules. 
 
 
In addition, to the categories of threat mentioned under the introductory section of this chapter, notable and 
key threats to auditor independence include: 
The Provision of Other Services  to Audit Clients 
Out of all the issues revolving round independence of auditors, this is the most debatable. The UK’s position 
on this issue shows no objection to a firm providing advisory services to a company which are additional to 
the audit.626 The UK 1989 Companies Act required disclosure of audit and non-audit fees paid to audit 
firms to be disclosed separately in financial statements – the aim of this being to provide information to 
investors which would help judge the relationship between the company and its auditors.627 In Germany, 
non audit services are also allowed, except for book-keeping.628 In Italy, the legal and professional bodies 
regard the provision of additional services by statutory auditors as a significant threat to their 
independence.629 In Italy, Presidential Decree 31.3.75 no 136 addresses the issue of members who are 
external auditors and forbids them from having other contractual relationships with the audit and from 
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628  C Piot 'Auditor Reputation and Model of Governance' International Journal of Auditing Volume 9(1) 2005 at 
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offering additional paid services to the client.630  
 
Acting For the Same Audit Client for a Prolonged  Period of Time 
 The UK Companies Act section 385(2) requires annual appointment of statutory auditors.631 Italy appoints 
its statutory auditors for more than one year and since these are statutory requirements, there is no ethical 
guidance on this matter.632  Germany on the other hand, has no fixed term and like the UK, the length of 
mandate is usually for one year.633 Auditors in Italy could be said to be in a stronger position relative to 
their counterparts in the UK and Germany when faced with client pressure.634 
 
Rotation of the Engagement Partnership 
The position in the UK can be differentiated from that in Italy since UK firms are allowed to keep their 
clients as rotation applies only to engagement partners.635 In Germany, rotation of the engagement partner 
takes place every 6 years.636 
The safeguards implemented in such jurisdictions such as Italy (prohibition of provision of non audit services 
by audit firms), Germany ( prohibition of provision of book keeping services by audit firms), could be 
considered in the UK. The benefits of allowing the provision of non audit services by audit firms, namely the 
need for auditors to gain knowledge and experience from other colleagues, increase in level of audit quality, 
should be weighed against the risks to be encountered if an audit firm’s independence is compromised as a 
result of provision of non audit services. 
 
Given the present operating UK safeguards, to protect the auditor’s independence in the event of providing 
non audit services, this does not seem to be an area which warrants great cause for concern. 
Questions regarding change to the UK’s system of audit regulation especially following the collapse of 
Enron necessitate not only consideration of reasons for changes arising from the major corporate collapses 
which occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the UK (and which resulted to many differences between 
the UK and US systems of audit regulation), but also require consideration of existing safeguards currently in 
place in the UK to protect the auditor’s independence. 
Accounting standards are more detailed and powerful in the US than in the EU – as a result, there is greater 
uniformity of practice than in any other country.637 It would be easier to implement enforcement procedures 
and provide more effective monitoring where there was greater uniformity. As mentioned previously, the 
harmonisation process in the EU has encountered various difficulties but it can be said that more uniformity 
has been achieved since the early 1980s when the EU’s harmonisation efforts began.638 
 
 
Conclusion 
First Investigative Aim 
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It is of vital importance that countries address two fundamental questions where reorganisation of their 
financial regulatory structure is being considered namely: Whether some model of unified financial services 
supervision be followed; and if unified financial services supervision were to be adopted, how it should be 
done.639 These questions should be addressed having regards to the countries' historical, economic, 
institutional and political frameworks.640  
 
This chapter has not only shown how the FSA can use external auditors to make up for the Bank of 
England's reduced presence in the supervision process and also to get closer to the market and consumers but 
also how other regulators in the investigated jurisdictions can benefit from the involvement of external 
auditors in the supervision process. Benefits of the central bank's involvement in banking supervision in 
jurisdictions such as Germany, Italy and the US have also been considered. The degree of the central bank's 
involvement in the supervisory process is also an important factor which is worth consideration. Whilst it is 
concluded that countries such as the UK would benefit from greater involvement of the central bank, the 
dangers of the central bank having too much powers is demonstrated in the case of the Bank of Italy. 
Following the collapse of Parmalat, the Bank of Italy's powers have been curtailed. The Italian financial 
regulatory framework went through a major overhaul in 2005 through the Law 262 of December 12th 2005 
on Protection of Savings and Financial Markets Discipline. Consob, the securities market watch dog was to 
have additional powers resulting in the new Consob being more powerful than its predecessor and taking 
over the supervision of debt issuance from the Bank of Italy.641 Consob’s powers have been re-inforced in 
many ways including:642 Additional investigative powers; the capacity to directly apply sanctions; a new 
internal framework.   
External auditors could help provide some solutions to the gap left as a result of the Bank of England's 
reduced involvement in the banking supervisory process. Auditors have valuable and vital third party 
knowledge of firms and the FSA would benefit immensely by exploiting such priceless expertise and 
knowledge. The FSA places great reliance on the cooperation of regulated firms to provide information 
which is timely, accurate and complete in order to be able to gauge whether a firm is complying with its 
requirements. Auditors can help facilitate smooth functioning of the supervisory process as they are also 
required under the FSMA to inform the FSA of certain matters of concern and have to provide annual reports 
to the FSA. The FSA in its proximity to the market and consumers would also need to be mindful of not 
getting 'captured' by those it is supposed to be regulating. 
There is no formal statutory based relationship between the supervisors and external auditors in countries 
such as the USA and Italy.643 Supervisors in these countries depend on direct inspections which they 
themselves carry out and commercial law governs the appointment of bank auditors.644 In the UK and 
Germany, the banking supervisor has statutory powers over the appointment of external auditors, such as the 
right of approval or removal, and the right to commission an independent audit.645 These powers help the 
banks in ensuring that external auditors with the required experience, resources and skilled are appointed to 
perform their duties.646 The bank supervisor's statutory powers also help avoid the situation which occurred 
in Legal and General in that it encourages the use supervisor to engage more in pro active supervision. In 
contrast to the Bank of England which commissioned reporting accountants' reports on annual and routine 
basis, the FSA predominantly uses its own front line supervisors in carrying out risk assessments. As a result, 
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a more proactive approach to supervision, such as that which exists in Italy647 and the US is encouraged and 
not just a proactive approach, but one which involves greater use of external auditors. 
 
Second Investigative Aim 
The immense contribution made by external auditors to the supervisory process is demonstrated in 
association with the implementation of Basel II. They can contribute towards the process of certifying more 
advanced model-based approaches to measuring credit, market and operational risks and verifying 
information required for disclosure under Pillar 3 of the Basel II Accord648.  
As seen from the analysis on the US, there is great interest in the implementation of Basel II. The  US 
realises that it needs a regulatory framework which corresponds to changes in global events. In the face of 
globalisation and conglomeration, the risks posed by financial institutions call for better management 
techniques. As it has retained its regulatory structure, the US realises that other measures need to be adopted 
to manage cross sector service risks which can be managed more efficiently by a single regulator. This is 
probably the reason for the great interest shown by the US in a meta risk based model such as that of Basel 
II. 
External auditors can therefore play an important role not only in risk based regulation, but also in the Basel 
II process. They can assist in the validation process of the advanced techniques used for measurements under 
the Basel II Accord.649 In addition to this role, external auditors can also help the regulator in the process of 
obtaining information which the regulator needs to assess whether a regulated institution is complying with 
required standards. 
 
Third Investigative Aim 
 
Other benefits of using the external auditor in the bank regulation and supervisory process include the ability 
of the external auditor to provide a wide range of resources and knowledge and acting as an intermediary for 
the regulator, thereby helping to protect the regulator's reputation and avoiding regulatory capture. The risks 
involved in using the external auditor include conflict of interests650, loss of information during the transfer 
of information to the regulator and higher costs.651 
 
 
It is appropriate to use external auditors as 'indirect supervisors' in the supervisory process even where such 
risks of conflict may exist - provided there are safeguards to protect against such risks. However external 
auditors used in this way should not also be protected by the immunity that shields regulators from tort of 
                                                 
647  In order to ensure proper compliance with the Bank of Italy's regulations, inspections are performed by the 
central and district inspection departments. These inspections are distinguished as either periodic or extraordinary. 
Periodic inspections are carried out without prior notification whilst extraordinary inspections are performed 
whenever irregularities are highlighted at a bank. Periodic inspections usually occur at the head offices of the banks 
and/or at the main branches and are classified as general where each aspect of bank activity is examined. The bank's 
management  and operations are reviewed as required by the Bank of Italy and on conclusion, a report is written. 
Extraordinary inspections can be either general or sectoral and are amongst the most important tools for the Bank of 
Italy to identify and resolve irregularities. The Bank's inspectors have the right to examine any documents and 
obtain relevant other information during the inspections. See pp 232, 233 , Business Law Guide to Italy 
648  E Huepkes 'The External Auditor and the Bank Supervisor' p 11 
649 ibid  
650  The external auditor in this situation would not only owe obligations to the bank, its shareholders but also to 
the regulator and those investors  whose interests are being safeguarded by the  regulator.   
651      E Huepkes 'The External Auditor and the Bank Supervisor' p 12 
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negliglence actions. In comparison with various European jurisdictions, the US legal system is said to be 
unique as a result of the ease with which large class lawsuits can be instigated at relatively low cost.652 This 
results from a public view of protection for individuals who have been harmed.653 There are however 
similarities between the US and the UK in that legal responsibilities to third parties in these 
jurisdictions are similar.654 Whether auditors in the UK should be afforded limited audit liability is 
however another issue – given that no statutory duty is owed by an auditor to an individual third 
party. Whilst protection measures exist for aggrieved individuals in the US in that  large class 
lawsuits can be instigated at relatively low cost, such ease of initiation does not exist in the UK. 
Factors such as culture and historical development have played defining roles in shaping the audit 
approaches adopted in Germany, Italy, the US and the UK. These jurisdictions represent a reasonably diverse 
selection with Gray655 classifying Italy as a country whose accounting system in terms of authority and 
enforcement, exhibited strong uniformity and weaker professionalism. The UK’s accounting system was 
considered to show strong flexibility and professionalism.656 In terms of measurement and disclosure of 
accounting systems, the Italian system ( like the French), is considered strongly conservative than the more 
transparent UK system.657 
 
Harmonisation Efforts and Difficulties 
 
The requirement of the EU’s Fourth Directive that “true and fair” should take precedence over detailed rules 
in all member states conceals unchanged old differences.658 In Italy for example, the Italian accounting 
system has altered slightly even though the requirement from 1 Jan 1993 that Italian financial statements 
should give a representation which is veritiero e corretto led to changes in the law and audit reports.659 
There’s a transatlantic distinction regarding the concept of fairness: In the EU Directives, fairness is an 
overriding concept whilst in the US, practice is to “present fairly in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles.”660 
 
In Germany however, there is still no legal preference for fairness over rules or for substance over form.661 
The main actors exerting an influence in their desire for change are some German multinationals who wish 
for greater access to international capital markets.662 Such access can be achieved through the preparation of 
consolidated statements which are not in accordance with normal German rules and practices.663  Since 2001, 
large listed companies in Germany have increasingly used US or International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRSs) accounting for their consolidated statements.664 
 
Proposals for Reform 
                                                 
652  B Anderson, M Maletta and A Wright 'Perceptions of Auditor Responsibility: Views of the Judiciary and the 
Profession' (1998) 2 (3)International Journal of Auditing 229 
653 ibid 
654  ibid 
655  SJ Gray 'Towards a Theory of Cultural Influence on the Development of Accounting Systems Internationally, 
pp 1-15 Vol 24 No 1 Abacus  
656  ibid 
657  ibid 
658  Nobes and Parker  p 35 
659  ibid 
660  ibid 
661  Ibid p 36 
662  ibid 
663  ibid 
664  C Nobes and R Parker Comparative International Accounting  p 569 
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1) There should be a greater role for and greater involvement of the Bank of England in the bank 
supervisory process than is the case at present. 
2) Greater use of external auditors should be encouraged not only in the UK but also in the US. As 
these jurisdictions' audit objectives focus more on investor protection, in comparison to Germany 
and Italy, there is greater need for the use of external auditors. This is not to say that Germany and 
Italy are not encouraged to make greater use of auditors. The Basel Committee also recommends 
greater use of external auditors within these jurisdictions. The reason for the UK FSA's reduced use 
of external auditors may be attributed to the dual role of the reporting accountant and skilled person. 
Separate persons should perform these roles and greater use of external auditors should be 
encouraged in the process. The adoption of a risk-based approach to supervision is one which should 
be applauded – however it should not provide an excuse for the reduced use of external auditors. 
Globalisation and conglomeration call for a risk based approach to supervision. A consolidated 
supervisor is also able to manage more efficiently cross-sector services' risks. 
 
3) Since Article 57(2) of the Treaty of Rome requires unanimity for the adoption of community 
measures concerning the protection of savings, what applies to banking depositors in Germany, 
Italy and France should also apply to policy holders in these countries and the UK.665 In addition, 
the FSA should have some form of responsibility for loss caused to depositors as a result of its 
negligence – as is the case in Germany and Italy. 
 
4) Italy appears to have the most stringent safeguards to protect the external auditor's independence. 
Whether these measures are enforced as they should be, is another matter. The more stringent 
regulations which exist in Italy such as not allowing external auditors to offer additional ( non-audit 
services), appointing firms for longer periods of tenure, rotation of audit firms, restrictions on staff 
movement between firms and clients and monitoring audit fees/hours are factors which would 
facilitate a better environment for auditor independence. It would therefore be worthwhile 
considering the adoption of these measures in the UK. As stated previously, corporate governance 
structures, “thinness” of the audit market and other relevant factors and jurisdictional differences 
would need to be considered when deciding whether or not to adopt certain measures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
665  See Summary of  Submission to the House of Lords Select Committee on the Accountability of the Financial 
Services Authority in general, and of the Accountability of the Government and of the Parliamentary Ombudsman 
Regarding the Equitable Debacle. 
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